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paper, and by other facilities for the acquisition and enlargement of credit. At the commencement of the year 1834, the banking capital of the United States, including that of the national bank then existing, amounted to about two hundred millions of dollars; the bank notes then in circulation to about ninety-five millions; and the loans and discounts of the banks to three hundred and twenty-four millions. Between that time and the 1st of January, 1836, being the latest period to which accurate accounts have been received, our banking capital was increased to more than two hundred and fifty-one millions; our paper circulation, to more than one hundred and forty millions, and the loans and discounts to more than four hundred and fifty-seven millions. To this vast increase are to be added the many millions of credit, acquired by means of foreign loans, contracted by the states and state institutions, and, above all, by the lavish accommodations extended by foreign dealers to our merchants.

subject. It has since appeared that evils, similar to those suffered by ourselves, have been experienced in Great Britain, on the continent, and, indeed, throughout the commercial world; and that in other countries, as well as in our own, they have been uniformly preceded by an undue enlargement of the boundaries of trade, prompted, as with us, by unprecedented expan. sions of the system of credit. A reference to the amount of banking capital, and the issues of paper credits put in circulation in Great Britain, by banks, and in other ways, during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836, will show an augmentation of the paper currency there, as much disproportioned to the real wants of trade as in the United States. With this redundancy of the paper currency, there arose in that country also a spirit of adventurous speculation, embracing the whole range of human enterprise. Aid was profusely given to projected improvements; large investments were made in foreign stocks and loans; credits for goods were granted with unbounded liberality to mer. chants in foreign countries; and all the means of acquiring and employing credit were put in active operation, and extended in their effects to every department of business, and to every quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence to the extraordinary character of the events which preceded it. The commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the greatest difficulties, and their debtors accustomed and expected credits, but called upon for payments, which, in the actual posture of things here, could only be made through a general pressure, and at the most ruinous sacrifices.

The consequences of this redundancy of credit, and of the spirit of reckless speculation engendered by it, were a foreign debt contracted by our citizens, esti mated in March last at more than thirty millions of dollars; the extension to traders in the interior of our country of credits for supplies, greatly beyond the wants of the people; the investment of thirty-nine and a half millions of dollars in unproductive public lands in the years 1835 and 1836, whilst in the preceding year the sales amounted to only four and a half mil-in this country were not only suddenly deprived of lions; the creation of debts, to an almost countless amount, for real estate in existing or anticipated cities and villages, equally unproductive, and at prices now seen to have been greatly disproportionate to their real value; the expenditure of immense sums in improve- In view of these facts, it would seem impossible for ments which, in many cases, have been found to be sincere enquirers after truth to resist the conviction, ruinously improvident; the diversion to other pursuits that the causes of the revulsion in both countries have of much of the labour that should have been applied to been substantially the same. Two nations, the most agriculture, thereby contributing to the expenditure commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the of large sums in the importation of grain from Europe highest degree of apparent prosperity, and maintaining -an expenditure which, amounting in 1834 to about with each other the closest relations, are, suddenly, in two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, was, in the a time of profound peace, and without any great nafirst two quarters of the present year, increased to more tional disaster, arrested in their career, and plunged than two millions of dollars; and, finally, without into a state of embarrassment and distress. In both enumerating other injurious results, the rapid growth countries we have witnessed the same redundancy of among all classes, and especially in our great commer-paper money and other facilities of credit; the same cial towns, of luxurious habits, founded too often on spirit of speculation; the same partial successes; the merely fancied wealth, and detrimental alike to the same difficulties and reverses; and, at length, nearly industry, the resources, and the morals of our people. the same overwhelming catastrophe. The most mate. It was so impossible that such a state of things rial difference between the results in the two countries could long continue, that the prospect of revulsion was has only been, that with us there has also occurred an present to the minds of considerate men before it actu- extensive derangement in the fiscal affairs of the fedeally came. None, however, had correctly anticipatedral and state governments, occasioned by the suspenits severity. A concurrence of circumstances inade- sion of specie payments by the banks. quate of themselves to produce such wide-spread and The history of these causes and effects, in Great calamitous embarrassments, tended so greatly to aggra- Britain and the United States, is substantially the hisvate them, that they cannot be overlooked in consider-tory of the revulsion in all other commercial countries. ing their history. Among these may be mentioned, as most prominent, the great loss of capital sustained by our commercial emporium in the fire of December, 1835,-a loss, the effects of which were underrated at the time, because postponed for a season by the great facilities of credit then existing; the disturbing effects, in our commercial cities, of the transfers of the public moneys required by the deposite law of June, 1836; and the measures adopted by the foreign creditors of our merchants to reduce their debts, and to withdraw from the United States a large portion of our specie.

However unwilling any of our citizens may hereto fore have been to assign to these causes the chief instrumentality in producing the present state of things, the developments subsequently made, and the actual condition of other commercial countries, must, as it seems to me, dispel all remaining doubts upon the

The present and visible effects of these circumstances on the operations of the government, and on the industry of the people, point out the objects which call for your immediate attention.

They are to regulate by law the safe keeping, transfer, and disbursement, of the public moneys; to designate the funds to be received and paid by the government; to enable the treasury to meet promptly every demand upon it; to prescribe the terms of indul gence, and the mode of settlement to be adopted, as well in collecting from individuals the revenue that has accrued, as in withdrawing it from former deposi. tories, and to devise and adopt such further measures, within the constitutional competency of congress, as will be best calculated to revive the enterprise and to promote the prosperity of the country.

For the deposite, transfer, and disbursement of the

revenue, national and state banks have always, with temporary and limited exceptions, been heretofore employed; but, although advocates of each system are still to be found, it is apparent that the events of the last few months have greatly augmented the desire, long existing among the people of the United States, to separate the fiscal operations of the government from those of individuals or corporations.

Again to create a national bank, as a fiscal agent, would be to disregard the popular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally expressed. On no question of domestic policy is there stronger evidence that the sentiments of a large majority are deliberately fixed; and I cannot concur with those who think they see, in recent events, a proof that these sentiments are, or a reason that they should be, changed.

Events, similar in their origin and character, have heretofore frequently occurred, without producing any such change; and the lessons of experience must be forgotten if we suppose that the present overthrow of credit would have been prevented by the existence of a national bank. Proneness to excessive issues has ever been the vice of the banking system; a vice as prominent in national as in state institutions. This propensity is as subservient to the advancement of private interests in the one as in the other; and those who direct them both, being principally guided by the same views, and influenced by the same motives, will be equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by improvidence of credit. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained by experience. The Bank of the United States, with the vast powers conferred on it by congress, did not or could not prevent former and similar embarrassments; nor has the still greater strength it has been said to possess, under its present charter, enabled it, in the existing emergency, to check other institutions, or even to save itself. In Great Britain, where, it has been seen, the same causes have been attended with the same effects, a national bank, possessing powers far greater than are asked for by the warmest advocates of such an institution here, has also proved unable to prevent an undue expansion of credit, and the evils that flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground for the re-establishment of a national bank, in the derangement alleged at present to exist in the domestic exchanges of the country, or in the facilities it may be capable of affording them. Although advantages of this sort were anticipated when the first Bank of the United States was created, they were regarded as an incidental accommodation; not one which the federal government was bound, or could be called upon, to furnish. This accommodation is now, indeed, after the lapse of not many years, demanded from it as among its first duties; and an omission to aid and regulate commercial exchange, is treated as a ground of loud and serious complaint. Such results only serve to exemplify the constant desire, among some of our citizens, to enlarge the powers of the government, and extend its control to subjects with which it should not interfere. They can never justify the creation of an institution to promote such objects. On the contrary, they justly excite among the community a more diligent enquiry into the character of those operations of trade, towards which it is desired to extend such peculiar favours.

The various transactions which bear the name of domestic exchanges, differ essentially in their nature, operation and utility. One class of them consists of bills of exchange, drawn for the purpose of transferring actual capital from one part of the country to another, or to anticipate the proceeds of property actually transmitted. Bills of this description are highly useful in the movements of trade, and well deserve all the en

couragement which can rightfully be given to them. Another class is made up of bills of exchange, not drawn to transfer actual capital, nor on the credit of property transmitted, hut to create fictitious capital, partaking at once of the character of notes discounted in bank, and of bank notes in circulation, and swelling the mass of paper credits to a vast extent in the most objectionable inanner. These bills have formed, for the last few years, a large proportion of what are termed the domestic exchanges of the country, serving as the means of usurious profit, and constituting the most unsafe and precarious paper in circulation. This species of traffic, instead of being upheld, ought to be discountenanced by the government and the people.

In transferring its funds from place to place, the government is on the same footing with the private citizen, and may resort to the same legal means. It may do so through the medium of bills drawn by itself, or purchased from others; and in these operations it may, in a manner undoubtedly constitutional and legitimate, facilitate and assist exchanges of individuals founded on real transactions of trade. The extent to which this may be done, and the best means of effecting it, are entitled to the fullest consideration. This has been bestowed by the secretary of the treasury, and his views will be submitted to you in his report.

But it was not designed by the constitution that the government should assume the management of doinestic or foreign exchange. It is indeed authorised to regulate by law the commerce between the states, to provide a general standard of value, or medium of exchange, in gold and silver; but it is not its province to aid individuals in the transfer of their funds, otherwise than through the facilities afforded by the post office department. As justly might it be called on to provide for the transportation of their merchandise. These are operations of trade. They ought to be conducted by those who are interested in them, in the same manner that the incidental difficulties of other pursuits are encountered by other classes of citizens. Such aid has not been deemed necessary in other countries. Throughout Europe, the domestic as well as the foreign exchanges are carried on by private houses, often, if not generally, without the assistance of banks. Yet they extend throughout distinct sovereigntics, and far exceed in amount the real exchanges of the United States. There is no reason why our own may not be conducted in the same manner, with equal cheapness and safety. Certainly this might be accomplished, if it were favoured by those most deeply interested; and few can doubt that their own interest, as well as the general welfare of the country, would be promoted by leaving such a subject in the hands of those to whom it properly belongs. A system founded on private interest, enterprise and competition, without the aid of legislative grants, or regulations by law, would rapidly prosper; it would be free from the influence of political agitation, and extend the same exemption to trade itself; and it would put an end to those complaints of neglect, partiality, injustice, and oppression, which are the unavoidable results of interference by the government, in the proper concerns of individuals. All former attempts on the part of the government to carry its legislation, in this respect, further than was designed by the constitution, have in the end proved injurious, and have served only to convince the great body of the people, more and more, of the certain dangers of blending private interests with the operations of public business; and there is no reason to suppose that a repetition of them now would be more successful.

It cannot be concealed that there exists, in our community, opinions and feelings on this subject in direct opposition to cach other. A large portion of them,

But when it became necessary, under the act of June, 1836, to withdraw from them the public money, for the purpose of placing it in additional institutions, or of transferring it to the states, they found it, in many cases, inconvenient to comply with the demands of the treasury, and numerous and pressing applications were made for indulgence or relief. As the instalments under the deposite law became payable, their own em. barrassments, and the necessity under which they lay of curtailing their discounts and calling in their debts, increased the general distress, and contributed, with other causes, to hasten the revulsion in which, at length they, in common with the other banks, were fatally involved.

combining great intelligence, activity, and influence, and the system promised to be permanently useful. are no doubt sincere in their belief that the operations of trade ought to be assisted by such a connection; they regard a national bank as necessary for this purpose, and they are disinclined to every measure that does not tend, sooner or later, to the establishment of such an institution. On the other hand, a majority of the people are believed to be irreconcilably opposed to that measure: they consider such a concentration of power dangerous to their liberties; and many of them regard it as a violation of the constitution. This collision of opinion has, doubtless, caused much of the embarrassment to which the commercial transactions of the country have lately been exposed. Banking has become a political topic of the highest interest, and trade has suffered in the conflict of parties. A speedy termination of this state of things, however desirable, is scarcely to be expected. We have seen for nearly half a century, that those who advocate a national bank, by whatever motive they may be influenced, constitute a portion of our community too numerous to allow us to hope for an early abandonment of their favourite plan. On the other hand, they must indeed form an erroneous estimate of the intelligence and temper of the American people, who suppose that they have continued, on slight or insufficient grounds, their persevering opposition to such an institution; or that they can be induced by pecuniary pressure or by any other combination of circumstances, to surrender principles they have so long and so inflexibly maintain-country by resorting to adequate taxation for the ed.

My own views of the subject are unchanged. They have been repeatedly and unreservedly announced to my fellow citizens; who, with full knowledge of them, conferred upon me the two highest offices of the go. vernment. On the last of these occasions, I felt it due to the people to apprize them distinctly, that, in the event of my election, I would not be able to co-operate in the re-establishment of a national bank. To these sentiments, I have now only to add the expression of an increased conviction that the re-establishment of such a bank, in any form, whilst it would not accomplish the beneficial purpose promised by its advocates, would impair the rightful supremacy of the popular will; injure the character and diminish the influence of our political system; and bring once more into existence a concentrated moneyed power, hostile to the spirit, and threatening the permanency, of our repub. lican institutions.

Under these circumstances, it becomes our solemn duty to enquire whether there are not, in any connection between the government and banks of issue, evils of great magnitude, inherent in its very nature, and against which no precautions can effectually guard. Unforeseen in the organisation of the government, and forced on the treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing banks, was, in truth, from the beginning, more a measure of emergency than of sound policy-When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to the burdens of the new governmen, we assumed all the large but honourable load of debt which was the price of our liberty: but we hesitated to weigh down the infant industry of the

necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in return for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too readily received, by an embarrassed treasury. During the long continuance of a national debt, and the intervening difficulties of a foreign war, the connection was continued from motives of convenience; but these causes have long since passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks necessary to aid the wants of the treasury; we have no load of national debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposite a large surplus. No public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal of a connection that circumstances have dissolved, The complete organisation of our government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which prevails between the different states, and with foreign powers, all enable us now to select the system most consistent with the constitution, and most conducive to the public welfare. Should we, then, connect the treasury for a fourth time with the local banks, it can only be under a conviction that past failures have arisen from accidental not inherent defects.

Local banks have been employed for the deposite and distribution of the revenue, at all times partially, and, on three different occasions, exclusively; first, anterior to the establishment of the first bank of the A danger, difficult, if not impossible, to be avoided United States; secondly, in the interval between the in such an arrangement, is made strikingly evident in termination of that institution and the charter of its the very event by which it has now been defeated. A successor; and, thirdly, during the limited period sudden act of the banks intrusted with the funds of which has now so abruptly closed. The connection the people, deprives the treasury, without fault or thus repeatedly attempted, proved unsatisfactory on agency of the government, of the ability to pay its each successive occasion, notwithstanding the various creditors in the currency they have by law a right to measures which were adopted to facilitate or insure its demand. This circumstance no fluctuation of comsuccess. On the last occasion, in the year 1833, the merce could have produced, if the public revenue had employment of the state banks was guarded especially been collected in the legal currency, and kept in that in every way which experience and caution could sug-form by the officers of the treasury. The citizen gest. Personal security was required for the safe. keeping and prompt payment of the moneys to be received, and full returns of their condition were, from time to time, to be made by the depositories. In the first stages the measure was eminently successful, notwithstanding the violent opposition of the Bank of the United States, and the unceasing efforts made to overthrow it. The selected banks performed with fidelity, and without any embarrassment to themselves or to the community, their engagements to the government,

whose inoney was in bank receives it back, since the suspension, at a sacrifice in its amount; whilst he who kept it in the legal currency of the country, and in his own possession, pursues, without loss, the current of his business. The government, placed in the situation of the former, is involved in embarrassments it could not have suffered had it pursued the course of the lat ter. These embarrassments are, moreover, augmented by those salutary and just laws which forbid it to use a depreciated currency, and, by so doing, take from

the government the ability which individuals have of out for their own profit, while they were permitted to accommodating their transactions to such a catas-substitute for it a credit in account. trophe.

In expressing these sentiments, I desire not to unA system which can, in a time of profound peace, dervalue the benefits of a salutary credit to any branch when there is a large revenue laid by, thus suddenly of enterprise. The credit bestowed on probity and in. prevent the application and the use of the money of dustry is the just reward of merit, and an honourable the people, in the manner and for the objects they have incentive to further acquisition. None oppose it who directed, cannot be wise; but who can think, without love their country and understand its welfare. But painful reflection, that, under it, the same unforeseen when it is unduly encouraged-when it is made to inevents might have befallen us in the midst of a war, flame the public mind with the temptations of sudden and taken from us, at the moment when most wanted, and unsubstantial wealth-when it turns industry into the use of those very means which were treasured up paths that lead sooner or later to disappointment and to promote the national welfare and guard our national distress-it becomes liable to censure, and needs corrights? To such embarrassments and to such dangers rection. Far from helping probity and industry, the will this government be always exposed, whilst it takes ruin to which it leads falls most severely on the great the moneys raised for, and necessary to the public ser- labouring classes, who are thrown suddenly out of emvice, out of the hands of its own officers, and converts ployment, and by the failure of magnificent schemes them into a mere right of action against corporations never intended to enrich them, are deprived in a moentrusted with the possession of them. Nor can such ment of their only resource. Abuses of credit and exresults be effectually guarded against in such a sys- cesses in speculation will happen in despite of the most tem, without investing the executive with a control salutary laws; no government perhaps can altogether over the banks themselves, whether state or national, prevent them; but surely every government can rethat might with reason be objected to. Ours is, pro-frain from contributing the stimulus that calls them bably, the only government in the world that is liable, into life.

in the management of its fiscal concerns, to occurrences like these. But this imminent risk is not the only danger attendant on the surrender of the public money to the custody of local corporations. Though the object is aid to the treasury, its effect may be to introduce into the operations of the government, influences the most subtle, founded on interests the most selfish.

(To be continued at page 337.)

For the Financial Register. INFLUENCE of the CURRENCY ON EXCHANGES.

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The use by the banks, for their own benefit, of the money deposited with them, has received the sanction of the government from the commencement of this That foreign exchanges are affected by the degree connection. The money received from the people, of fulness of the currency, is a principle which is asinstead of being kept till it is needed for their use, is, serted by some, denied by others, explained by none, in consequence of this authority, a fund, on which dis- and acted on by all. The Bank of England is believed counts are made for the profit of those who happen to to have adopted and practised this principle previously be owners of stock in the banks selected as depositories. to the beginning of this century; but when the eviThe supposed and often exaggerated advantages of dence was taken before the bullion committee in 1810, such a boon will always cause it to be sought for with the officers of that institution vehemently denied all avidity. I will not stop to consider on whom the connection between the currency and exchanges, and patronage incident to it is to be conferred; whether it appeared from their statements, and those of several the selection and control be trusted to congress or to eminent merchants, that the principle was entirely lost the executive, either will be subjected to appeals made sight of, and, in truth, forgotten. John Whitmore, in every form which the sagacity of interest can sug- Esq., governor of the bank, said that they had no regest. The banks, under such a system, are stimulated ference to exchanges in their issues, "it appearing to make the most of their fortunate acquisition; the upon a reference to the amount of our notes in circu deposites are treated as an increase of capital; loanslation and the course of exchange, that they frequently and circulation are rashly augmented, and, when the have no connection." (Ev. 111.) My opinion," he public exigencies require a return, it is attended with continued, "is that the amount of our paper circulation embarrassments not provided for, nor foreseen. Thus has no reference at all to the state of exchange." (p. banks that thought themselves most fortunate when 112.) Mr. Pearse, deputy governor of the bank, said, the public funds were received, find themselves most throughout, the same thing, and went into long calembarrassed when the season of payment suddenly culations to prove, that the Hamburgh exchanges arrives. showed no sympathy with the issues of the bank. "I Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system are not must very materially alter my opinions," said the inlimited to the banks. It stimulates a general rashness telligent and informed Mr. Jeremiah Harman, bank of enterprise, and aggravates the fluctuations of com- director, and general merchant," before I can suppose merce and the currency. This result was strikingly the exchanges will be influenced by any modifications exhibited during the operations of the late deposite of our paper currency." (Ev. 221.) By what process system, and especially in the purchases of public lands. of reasoning or experience, the bank has been led to a The order which ultimately directed the payment of change in its policy I am not aware, but at present its gold and silver in such purchases, greatly checked, but constant guide, and the sole limit of its general circucould not altogether prevent, the evil. Specie was in-lation, as I understand, is the state of the foreign exdeed more difficult to be procured than the notes which the banks could themselves create at pleasure; but still, being obtained from them as a loan, and returned as a deposite, which they were again at liberty to use, it only passed round the circle with diminished speed. This operation could not have been performed, had the funds of the government gone into the treasury, to be regularly disbursed, and not into banks, to be loaned

changes. Very recently the Hon. Mr. King, of Georgia, in his powerful and brilliant speech before the senate of the United States, remarked that "the only way in which a redundancy of currency or credit depreciates foreign exchanges, is by producing a specu lative rise in prices, and a consequent overtrading." I differ from this opinion, positively, by holding that there is an influence exerted by currency on exchange,

independent on trade, and negatively, by qualifying the effect which he ascribes to overtrading.*

Upon that theory of exchange, which we explained in the beginning of this discussion, (page 309,) which looks at a bill as a marketable commodity, and ascertains the rate of exchange by its price, it is quite clear, that since, according to the expression which we there obtained, their price increases as money increases,the demand and supply of bills, and the demand for money being constant,-an enlargement of the issues of the bank must enhance the price of bills. Upon the principle, however, which we have adopted, of considering the market value of gold as the measure of

The Hon. Mr. King, in the speech alluded to, has examined the intricate and perplexing question of the recent commercial revulsion, with the comprehen-ion of a statesman and the accuracy of an arithmetician. His information exhausts the knowledge of the subject, and his penetration has seized upon every principle that bears upon the case: his exposition, too, is as luminous as his analysis is profound. He is entitled to the high and peculiar praise of having given the best explanation that has yet appeared of a difficulty which has engrossed the consideration of two nations. After the wea riness that has been produced by the endless perverse debates of principles which have long since passed into the certainty of facts, and the disappointment that has been felt in finding those who possessed the truth, inaudible or errant, it is a rich and rare delight to turn to this complete and masterly produc tion.

The only part of the subject upon which Mr. King has not dwelt with that degree of fulness which would have been desirable, is that which relates to the cause of exchange being favourable to America, when in all probability, the balance of payments was against her. I have seen no satisfactory explanation of that paradox; but I am myself inclined to attribute much of it to the operation of the gold bill. The ultimate effect of such bills amounts to nothing; for prices accommodate themselves to the change; but the present result is, to cause gold to come into the country. We will suppose that a certain lump of gold would have been coined, before the change, into a guinea in England, and into a half eagle in America; that same gold, after the change, will be coined into more than an eagle in one place, and no more than a guinea in the other; of course, it will go where it is more valuable, and until there be a rise of prices where the change has been made, it will be more valuable there. Such a law as this, is very different from a seignorage.

Bank of England.

Mr. King's opinion is, that "by sending them bonds, bank shares, state stocks, and credits of various descriptions," we made exchanges favourable to us, and “drained them of their gold on credit" These remittances might prevent the flow of gold into England, or they might postpone it; but I do not see how they would turn exchange against that country and cause gold to leave England. If bank shares and state stocks were accepted in payment of debts, the debts were discharg ed; if bonds were given the debts were postponed: there is nothing in this process to charm gold out of the vaults of the The fact, however, is certain; and Mr. King has reasoned upon the consequent operations of the bank, and the result of those operations, with great force and perspicuity. Having been upon the spot at the time, I can bear witness to the accuracy of his logical history of financial events in England. From April, 1856, the gold in the Bank of England began to diminish rapidly, but still more rapidly from July. On July 1, 1836, the bullion in its vaults was 7,362,000; on July 2, it was 6,926,000; up to the beginning of September, it was about 6,000,000; through September and October, about 5,000,000; through November and December up to April. 1837, about 4,000,000. This drain of gold was the cause of the diminution of the circulation of the bank, because the securities and deposites were rather increased than diminished. The bank finding that this draining process was still going on, and well knowing where its gold was, and what would bring it back, stopped its accommodation by re-discount in London of bills of the joint-stock banks, in November, 1836, in order to eviscerate American credit. Within the circuit of operations connected with those discounts and re-discounts, ruin and panic spread with fatal rapidity. In that same month, the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland stopped; in the beginning of December, the Northern and Central Bank of Manchester, with forty branches, and twelve hundred partners, applied to the Bank of England for assistance, and the bank accordingly assisted them-to wind up. Throughout that month and the following, several eminent London houses connected with joint-stock banks received assistance. Nothing directly suffered in England, but that which came within the sweep of the blow which the bank aimed at American credit;

the subsequent difficulties were the re-action of the American failures.

foreign exchanges, we hope to make the matter more easily understood.

Yet, before examining the direct influence of the currency on exchanges, we will enquire what influence it has on the balance of debt through the medium of the balance of trade. It is stated loosely in many of the books, as in the speech alluded to above, that a free circulation leads to enlarged trade and to over-trading, and so turns exchange against a country. But, if the result of enlarged issues be the increase of the national trade, this will not of itself effect the balance of trade or payments: those balances are differences, and a difference does not depend on the magnitude of the things differing. Even if over-trading ensued, that might light on individuals to a ruinous extent, without affecting the debt of the nation. If the amount to which the merchants here have imported, turns out to be one-half as much as the nation wanted, they have under-traded greatly; if it proves twice as much as was wanted, they have over-traded equally in the two cases, the payments to him will be very different, but his own abroad will be the same in both. If our importers have over-traded, and the foreign merchants exporting from us have over-traded to the same extent, neither balance of trade nor of debt will be disturbed. A variation then, in the extent of the currency in one of two nations which trade together, seems to me to affect exchanges, not by any alteration in the magnitude of the imports and exports, nor yet by any change in the balance of trade, but by determining which country shall be the chief seat of the risk of those transactions which take place on speculation, and which shift the balance of payments without carrying with them the preponderance of trade; and whether the merchants in either one are, in respect of the imports, importers or factors, and in respect of the exports, consignors or purchasing agents. Suppose that two nations are similarly situated as to ability and facilities for trade, and there be no circumstances to cause a difference in the balance of credit on their usual transactions, and in the balance of property in any given amount of goods exchanged during a given time. Now if under this amount of trade and this ratio of exports and imports, the currency of one nation has been relatively freer than that of the other, then, a greater disposition to trade, and a wider spirit of speculation has existed on one side than on the other, and the balance of risk has been on that side; and if the trade be exactly balanced, the credit on the side of the eager speculator will be, probable reimbursements, for exports, and certain liabilities, for imports. Or, to state the same thing in other words, when two nations trade together, the trade of the two is a fixed amount, but a part of all these transactions will be at the risk and on the account of one, and part on the risk and account of the other; the prompting and inception of part of the trade is on one side, and of the rest is on the other. Now as the disposition to trade is one that springs eternal in the merchant's breast, the only limit and measure of trade is the ability to engage in it; that depends on the facility of getting money, and that again, is as the whole money in the country compared with the trade. So that on the relative abundance of money, or the greater or less amount compared with the trade of the country, will depend on which lies the balance of risk when the balance of trade is equal.

It is clear, that if all the goods sent and brought are sold at the anticipated prices, the risk alluded to occasions no loss, and the balance of payments on the subject of trade will be as the balance of trade; but as failures to realise the expected prices are constantly occurring, this question of the proportion of risk is important. All that I have mentioned only goes to say

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