vantage that Buonaparté had gained, was, that his army had killed Major Oldfield, Captain Wilmot, and Colonel Phillipeau, three of the most able officers in the English army, with an immense number of persons of less consequence, in the numerous sorties that were made from the garrison. The ships and boats in the port continued to annoy his camp incessantly, and it became necessary, in the opinion of Buonaparté, that decisive measures should still be hazarded.

On the 25th of April, a mine intended to blow up the tower, near the breach, was completed, and the batteries were opened upon the place. The mine was set fire to, but a subterraneous passage under the tower presenting a line that weakened the resistance, the mine blew up but on one side of the tower, and the breach remained in such a state as to be difficult of access as before. Buonaparté ordered 30 grenadiers to get into the tower, and reconnoitre its means of communication with the rest of the fortress; they advanced as far as the ruins under the arch of the upper story, but the Allies, who kept up a communication by means of the narrow vaulted passages, and who were in possession of the ruins of the upper arches, showered down such quantities of burning materials upon them, that those who were not entirely disabled hastily retreated.

On the 25th, in the evening, an attempt was made to effect a lodgment in the first story, and workmen were employed several hours for the purpose of rendering it more practicable: but the Turks allowed them to approach the breach only to get them within their power; they threw down burning materials upon them, and compelled them again to retire from the tower.

The British, in order to defend their front of attack, of which almost all the cannon were dismounted, ran out a ravelin on each side of the enemy's approach, which was worked by the English marines, under a constant canmonade from the French; batteries were also formed,

which advantageously flanked the tower and the breach. The English and the Turks laboured at these works without cessation, and every step was taken to increase the effect of the fire from the flanking batteries, and to prepare for a counter attack against the trenches of the besiegers. Under cover of the fire from the towers and elevated walls, they formed their outworks with a degree of facility; and it was evidently impossible for the French to make any impression without a far superior artillery, and a greater quantity of ammunition than they were provided with: several times did they carry these works, but were always driven from them.

On the 1st of May four 18-pounders were directed against the tower, for the purpose of widening the breach; in the evening 20 grenadiers were ordered to effect a lodgment in the tower, and, in some measure, succeeded; but they were exposed to a cross fire of the marines in the fosse, and, feeling the impossibility of passing through the tower, desisted from the attempt. At the moment the grenadiers were mounting the breach at the tower the besieged made a strong sortie from their right; they were charged by two companies of grenadiers with such impetuosity and effect, that all those who could not retire under the protection of the fire from the gunboats, were cut off or driven into the sea,

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Buonaparté gave orders that a second breach should be made in the curtain of the fortifications to the Eastward a sapping against the fosses, and the formation of a mine, in order to blow up the connterscarp, were also ordered. Until the 4th of May the works and operations of the besiegers and the besieged were carried on with great ardour and activity; when the ammunition of the French began to fail, and Buonaparté ordered the fire to be slackened. Perceiving this, the besieged carried on their sapping with greater activity than ever, particularly that on the right, the object of which was to prevent the VOL. III.