was not strong enough either to march upon Richmond or to maintain his position, common sense, as well as military principles, required him to retire towards Hanover Court House, near the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, for this would have been marching towards his reinforcements instead of away from them, and would have been interposing his army between Washington and the enemy, whose capital he would still threaten, while retaining his base at White House.

By July, 1862, our efforts in the Peninsula had resulted only in disaster. After the failure of the attempt upon Richmond, a "change of base" had placed the nation's principal army where it could not fire a shot to protect Washington from capture or the loyal States from invasion. As Richmond was no longer seriously threatened, there was nothing to prevent the march northward of a Confederate army of 90,000 men but a few scattered divisions in Northern Virginia, which could have made but a short and feeble resistance.

This dangerous situation was the result of the last of McClellan's blunders in the Peninsula. When, after Fair Oaks, satisfied, right or wrong, that he

It took General Halleck the whole month of July to discover that no time should be lost in recalling the army for the protection of Washington, the first order for its return not being sent till

August 3d, which would have been already too late but for the extreme caution of the Confederate commander.

Obviously, the first movement of our troops homeward from the Peninsula, Richmond being no longer threatened, would be the signal for the rush forward of the mass of the Confederate army; and our only chance of safety consisted in keeping this formidable force at bay till our Peninsular army should be transferred to its new field. This was the difficult task imposed upon General Pope, with a scattered force, to begin with, of 28,000 at the end of July, increased to 33,000 by August 12th, and to only 41,000 by August 14th. On the 15th Jackson began his march from Gordonsville. His command, including seventeen field batteries, was not far from 30,000 strong, and was the advance of an army of 80,000 men on its way to overwhelm Pope before McClellan's forces could join. Longstreet, with 50,000, constituting the main body of Lee's army, had left Richmond August 13th, and by the 16th had passed Gordonsville, only two short marches from the Rappahannock. The situation recalls Sir John Moore's daring attempt to relieve his Spanish allies by throwing himself with his small column into the heart of Spain, within reach of a large French army under Napoleon himself, ready to crush him by superior numbers. There has seldom been a more trying position. Defeat and disgrace seemed certain, as three days would suffice for Lee's concentrated army to rout our forces and possess itself of Manassas Junction, the key to Washington.

August 16th. Pope, having learned by the capture of a dispatch Lee's intention to overwhelm him before McClellan's arrival, retired behind the Rappahannock his right three miles above Rappahannock Station, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river; his left at Kelly's Ford, three miles below it, thus covering the railroad, which was his line of communication and supply.

On the 18th he received a dispatch from General Halleck directing him to

"stand firm on the line of the Rappahannock." General Halleck, with more self-confidence than was ever displayed by Napoleon himself, had undertaken to direct the movements of our forces in the field from his cabinet in Washington; in a dangerous crisis, too, when the situation was changing every hour.

August 19th. Heavy columns were seen marching to our right. The enemy's turning movement had begun.

August 20th. The pickets upon our extreme right were driven in, and the whole Confederate army was in our front, overlapping our right. Halleck, informed of this, merely instructed Pope to hold on to his communications with Fredericksburg; Pope suggesting in vain that his right might be turned, in which case he ought to throw himself on the enemy's flank and rear.

August 21st. Pope reports a decided movement of the enemy to his right, and that he can no longer hold on to Fredericksburg. But Halleck persists in directing him to hold on, saying, “In forty-eight hours more we can make you strong enough."

August 22d. Pope telegraphs to Halleck: "Clear, enemy turning our right. No forces east of Stevensburg. All tending up river. Lee's captured letter of 15th indicates this movement."

At five P. M. "Movement to our right all day. Will mass all at Fayetteville to attack his flank." At 6.30 P. M. "Everything indicates enemy marching to Warrenton by Sulphur Springs." At nine P. M. 64 Heavy forces moving up Hedgman's River towards Warrenton." At 9.15 P. M. "Enemy crossing Sulphur Springs, and on road from Sperryville to Warrenton."

But Pope, in obedience to Halleck's instructions, still waited for reinforcements to arrive from Fredericksburg before falling on Jackson's flank.

The next day, Halleck telegraphed Pope "not to expose his railroad communications with Alexandria." Early that morning Sigel had reported that the enemy had positively outflanked us. Hampered by his instructions, Pope simply ordered Sigel to "stand firm, and

let the enemy develop towards Warrenton," and threw forward McDowell a few miles towards Warrenton, which place his advance occupied that night.

August 24th. Sigel reported the enemy's main body (under Longstreet) at Jeffersonville, and his advance (Jack son's corps) at Amissville: the advance "consisting of thirty-six regiments, with the usual proportion of batteries, and considerable cavalry, seen marching in the direction of Rectortown, White Plains, Salem, and Thoroughfare Gap; the main body moving to our right."

August 25th. Jackson's corps, consisting of Jackson's, Ewell's, and A. P. Hill's divisions, marched, covered by the Bull Run Mountain range, to Salem, where it arrived at midnight. Pope, having heard through McDowell that the enemy was at White Plains, moving to Thoroughfare Gap, gave orders for massing his troops, including those expected from Alexandria, at Warrenton, Warrenton Junction, and Manassas Junction; the cavalry (a mere handful effective) then at Manassas Junction to push forward to "watch" Thoroughfare Gap. He had then been reinforced by Reynolds's 2500 Pennsylvania Reserves, and by Kearney's division of Heintzleman's corps; making his total effective strength about 45,000.

August 26th. Longstreet, with the enemy's main body, marched from Jeffersonville to join Jackson. Meanwhile Jackson marched from White Plains, through Thoroughfare Gap, by Haymarket and Gainesville. He was joined at Gainesville by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart, who accompanied him to Bristoe Station, seven miles southwest of Manassas Junction, where he arrived at sunset. At eight P. M. Pope was still of the opinion that the fight should be made at Warrenton; but that same night he heard of the enemy's passage of Thoroughfare Gap. Meantime he had been reinforced by Porter's corps and Heintzleman's corps (Kearney's division of which had previously joined), the two corps amounting together to 18,000 men.

August 27th. The next day Pope's force, exclusive of Banks's corps of 5000

left to bring up the trains, numbered about 49,000 effective, with only 500 cavalry fit for service. It was posted at Gainesville, Warrenton, Warrenton Junction, and on the railroad below Bristoe Station. McDowell's and Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division were ordered to Gainesville, by which place Lee's main body would have to pass to unite with Jackson; to be supported by Reno's corps and Kearney's division, directed on Greenwich. Porter, on being relieved by Banks, was also to march to Gainesville; McDowell's column to reach Gainesville that night. At the same time Pope, with Hooker's division, moved up the railroad after Jackson. That afternoon, after a sharp fight, Hooker drove Ewell from Bristoe Station, who then joined Jackson at Manassas Junction.

The same night, however, this programme was changed, Jackson, then at the Junction, becoming the sole objective point. McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds were ordered to push forward from Gainesville, right on Manassas Gap Railroad, towards Manassas Junetion, and Reno from Greenwich to the same point, as also Porter, Kearney and Hooker; McDowell's column to attack Jackson before Lee's main body should arrive.

August 28th. But Jackson did not wait to be attacked. Early the next morning he moved northward, by the Sudley Springs road, to the Warrenton turnpike, crossed the pike, and took up a strong position on some timbered land northwest of Groveton, his right on the pike, where he awaited Longstreet's coming. Jackson had commenced his march from Manassas Junction in the direction of Centreville. So Pope pushed on to that place in pursuit of him, with Reno's corps, which had arrived from Greenwich, and Hooker's and Kearney's divisions of Heintzleman's corps.

If every part of Pope's present programme had been carried out according to orders, Jackson would that day have been overwhelmed by twice his number. But it was just as well for us that Jackson did not await our attack; for half of

our force would have been absent. McDowell's column, of about 25,000 men, had been ordered to march from Gainesville by the railroad to the Junction early that morning; but Sigel, who was to lead, did not leave that place till the day was well advanced. At two P. M., Pope, having learned that Jackson was on the Warrenton road, ordered McDowell to march by that road towards Centreville, in order to intercept him. At six P. M., King's division (under Hatch) of McDowell's corps, which was the advance of his column, marching by this road, was attacked in flank by the whole of Jackson's force, near Groveton. After a fierce combat, in which the division nobly held its ground against greatly superior numbers, it retired under cover of the darkness to Manassas Junction. Jackson prudently remained in the position he had chosen, not wishing to risk an engagement with forces whose numbers were unknown, of which this division was apparently the advance.

Again, though McDowell had been ordered to " move with his whole force" to the Junction, he had that forenoon taken the responsibility of detaching Ricketts's division of his corps, without Pope's knowledge, to seize and hold Thoroughfare Gap, which the enemy's main body, under Longstreet, was now approaching in its march to unite with Jackson. Ricketts pushed rapidly forward, but arrived just too late. The enemy had taken up strong positions in the pass, and was already crowning the heights. Ricketts nevertheless commenced an attack which lasted till dark; when, the enemy marching through Hopewell Gap, three miles to his right, in large numbers, and his left being at the same time threatened, he was compelled to retire, with considerable loss. He rejoined the main body near Sudley Church by the evening of the 29th.

Jackson was still holding his position on the high ground northwest of Groveton, commanding the Warrenton turnpike, by which he was expecting Longstreet to join him. His right rested on the turnpike, his left was near the Sudley Mills, and his masses were sheltered in thick woods. Our own forces were still scattered. Sigel and Reynolds were near Groveton, to the east of Jackson; Reno's corps and Hooker's and Kearney's divisions on the turnpike, between that place and Centreville; and McDowell and Porter at Manassas Junction. Hooker and Kearney, followed by Reno's corps, were ordered to push forward to Groveton, join Sigel, and attack. McDowell and Porter were ordered to march to Gainesville. Sigel, with Hooker and Kearney, attacked Jackson's left with such vigor as to drive it back several hundred yards to an unfinished railroad, crossing the turnpike obliquely northeast and southwest; behind the embankment of which, a ready - made parapet, Jackson's line maintained its ground, substantially, during the whole. day.

Meantime, the enemy's main body had been rapidly advancing from Thoroughfare Gap, had entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and by noon, with the exception of Anderson's division, was all in line on Jackson's right. Its own right extended either to the Manassas Railroad, or to the south of it; its three right brigades, somewhat refused, and in echelon; the whole flanked by Stuart's cavalry, thus barring our approach by the Manassas Railroad to Gainesville.

near Bethlehem Church, a little to the west of the Sudley Springs road, where, about one P. M., notwithstanding his orders, McDowell marched his own corps towards Groveton, but did not arrive there till towards sunset. Left to himself, Porter did not take the responsibility of a movement with his single corps which had been directed to be made by two corps; especially as he discovered a strong force of the enemy to be in front of him, which force could be no other than Lee's main body under Longstreet, since Jackson's corps was then in front of Pope, some five miles off. He therefore remained in position the rest of the day, with one division deployed, the other troops massed.

Porter's judgment had not deceived him; for, as before stated, the road to Gainesville was covered by the right of Longstreet's force, which was the main body of the Confederate army. The Confederate commander, seeing his right flank seriously threatened by what was evidently an army corps at least, reinforced it at once with three brigades drawn from his left, and with some guns. These brigades returned to their position in line about sunset. Though Lee had intended to bring on the general battle on the 29th, Longstreet was deterred from doing so by this deployment of force in his front, which apparently left him no available point of attack. Accordingly, Longstreet's entire command remained in position the whole day, taking no part in the battle with Pope, except that, late in the evening, Hood's and Evans's brigades were engaged in repulsing an attack by King's division of McDowell's corps.

Our attack in the morning on Jackson's left was followed by desultory artillery firing, attended with no effect; and afterwards by skirmishing at various points, more or less severe.

At 4.30 P. M., Pope still supposed that only Jackson's corps was on the field, not knowing that Lee's main body was at that moment in position on Jackson's right, and held in check by Porter's single corps. He therefore, very naturally, sent an order to Porter to move VOL. XLII. —NO. 251.

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upon the enemy's right and rear, keeping his right in communication with Reynolds (who was on the left of our line at Groveton), and using his batteries. This order did not reach Porter till 6.30 P. M.; that is, about sunset. He immediately made his dispositions to obey it. The ground did not admit of the use of batteries; but, what was still more important, it was impossible to keep his right, as directed, in communication with the left of our line at Groveton. He had already attempted to communicate with McDowell, then on his march to that place; but his messengers had run into the enemy. It was but doing justice to Pope to assume that he would not have issued such an order had he been aware that it required the march of an isolated corps, not upon Jackson's flank, but upon the front of what was apparently Longstreet's whole force, outnumbering ours, probably, three to one. Under these circumstances Porter judged it to be his duty not to attempt to carry the order into execution.

About 5.30 P. M., Pope, expecting Porter to arrive on Jackson's flank, ordered an attack on the enemy's left, which was so vigorously made by Reno, Heintzleman, and Sigel as nearly to double back the enemy's left on his centre; but who, with the aid of heavy reserves, succeeded in reëstablishing his line, and by about eight P. M. the fighting was over.

I have been unable to find authentic data fixing the exact number of the Confederate forces in this battle; but a careful examination of the materials for forming a judgment in the matter gives the following result, which cannot differ materially from the truth. At the commencement of the battle Jackson's effective force, including seventeen field batteries, numbered about 25,000 men; and Longstreet had actually in line some 30,000 infantry and artillery, with Stuart's cavalry, 2500 strong.

Exclusive of Banks's corps, left behind in charge of the trains, Pope's aggregate force was about 49,000 men; but as Porter's corps of 11,000 was not on the field, and McDowell's of 13,000