The European Armies.-Portuguese.

naturally incapable of military service, being certain moreover of his command whether suited to it or not, deemed it perfectly unnecessary to give his time or attention to the service. He seldom saw his regiment, perhaps, except on a court-day. The higher officers consisted of his younger brothers or relatives. The Subalterns, of his servants. It is unnecessary to say, that in regiments thus composed there could be nothing of a military spirit; nothing of that pride and gentlemanly honour, which even could call forth personal courage, and still less professional zeal. Accordingly, a gang of gipseys were to the full as military as the Portuguese regiments.

With respect to arsenals, so late as the year 1807, the people knew not what they were; their ruins, their deserted areas and workshops, were shewn as the curiosities of former times. Every thing was at a stand; not only workmen were wanted, but even the most ordinary knowledge of the work. There was neither gunpowder nor the materials for it. The ordnance, such as it was, was without carriages, horses, or mules; there were no drivers, but such as were picked up in the moment in which they were wanted, and every one took the first opportunity to run away. To say all in a word, the whole nation, court, army, and people, were poltroons. As to their garrison-towns and forts, they had been suffered to go into a degree of decay beyond the possibility of repair. The walls were demolished as if purposely picked out to their very foundations. The ditches were not merely filled up, but rendered mounds, as they became the ready receptacles for all the filth of the towns. These fortifications, moreover, from some cause or other, were all on wrong principles. From these reasons it is, that during the last and present campaign, they have been almost useless to either of the belligerents; If any thing, they are favourable to the enemy, inasmuch as being what they are, they must necessarily fall into the hands of the superior force. This, indeed, is the necessrry evil of all military works or fortifications on wrong or imperfect principles. The proper use of such works is, that according tothe degree of their strength, they enable a smaller body of men to keep their ground against a larger body. If their principle be defective, this advantage is lost. They cannot be defended. The garrison that trusts to them is lost. And if

The European Armies.- Portuguese.

the enemy happens to be numerically superior, they necessarily fall into his hands, and thus become good posts, though they might be bad forts. Almeida is a melancholy proof of this, and all the fortresses on the line of the Tagus, that is, on the high road, are in the same condition.

There is another infinite source of military imbecility in the Portuguese army. The men are levied on the old feudal principle, a short limited service. It is mentioned in a recent publication, of which an account will be given, that so late as the month of June 1809, recruits were enlisted in the regular regiments for the space of four months: such enlistment, moreover, to entitle them to a period of exemption from future service.

To this may be added, as a further military disqualification, the fixed locality of all the Portuguese regiments. Being levied as we have said, on limited and feudal principles, the Portuguese regiments were attached to their respective districts; they remained in the inmediate vicinity of the towns in which they were raised; they considered it as a hardship, and a breach of their condition of enrolment, to be moved from their homes; the very next province was a foreign country. The Portuguese Government had not strength and selfconfidence enough to oppose this habit of thinking, and though the vigour of Lord Wellington has prevailed against it, in common with many other obstacles, it has not been without exciting an infinite deal of discontent and secret counteraction, the effects of which he bas lately felt. If the government of England merit praise for any thing, it is for the timely prudence and energy with which they gradually subdued the same kind of prejudices in our own country, and thus rendered our own militia something better than a mere Posse COMITATUS.

Present State of the Portuguese Army.

Regulars.-Infantry, twenty-six regiments of

The total of all kind of force is about two hundred thousand men, of which about sixty thousand are effective, and may be reckoned upon as of excellent service in pushing an enemy after his ranks have been broken by the English. And as late events have shewn, they may be trusted even in receiving and giving a charge.

The Portuguese battalion is composed of seven companies, and one of the seven is a company of grenadiers, which, in its full complement, consists of one hundred and forty men. The number of men in the battalion is fixed at seven hundred and fifty. The six companies are composed of one hundred each, and the grenadier company, as has been above said, of one hundred and forty.

The evolutions of the Portuguese, previously to their new formation by Marshal Beresford, were contemptible in the extreme; they scarcely knew how to form themselves into squares, and could not even preserve their front in marching. Neither men nor officers, moreover, are acquainted in the slightest degree with field duty; they can neither attack nor defend, nor make works, nor know how to destroy them. In a country like Portugal, which can only be defended by this kind of knowledge, and which, with this knowledge, is impregnable, the want of it is inexcusable. And the more so, as perhaps there is nothing in the world so easily taught, and so easily learned, as that common degree of field work, which is necessary to throw up a mound or breast-work, to mine, to dig a trench, or to fill it up. Yet the aukwardness of the Portuguese soldier in these kinds of operations is incredible. They seem as if they were naturally incapable of handling the axe and spade.

The Portuguese cavalry (as it at present exists) is admirably well mounted; the horses are good, and of a moderate size. They are certainly in no degree comparable to the English horse, but they are equal, and sometimes superior to the French cavalry. Caval

The European Armies.-Portuguese.

ry, according to General Dumourier, should possess four qualification: order, solidity, force, and swiftness. The Portuguese cavalry are easily trained to order; and they do not want solidity. Perhaps, the English dragoons are the only horse in the world who unite all these qualities in a degree perfectly sufficient. They are not too heavy-bodied to want that energy of nerve and spring of muscle, which are the source of all spirited motion, action, and force, in man and beast. Nothing, in fact, is wanting in them, but that they should be accustomed to bear that variety of diet, and scantiness of straw, which must always be sustained by them in foreign campaigns. very little art would soon bring about this. A Frenchman's horse will eat any thing.

Of this cavalry, one legion is Cuirassiers. Their defect is-That the horse are not calculated for this service. They are too small. These cuirassiers are armed with a breast-plate, which General Dumourier praises much. According to him, it answers two purposes. The first is-That it affords protection to the soldier. The second is -That by giving him an idea of his superiority over other troops not so armed, they inspire him with a greater resolution. In regular troops, however, all the same resolution is formed by discipline and military habits. One thing, however, should never be forgotten; if a soldier has any incumbrances, they should be such as in some degree conduce to his safety. Caps of pasteboard and hair answer no useful purpose whatever.

It is a maxim, however, with Lord Wellington, to employ the Portuguese cavalry as little as possible by themselves; to keep them as close as possible to the English infantry. Their best use is, to serve in the line as a cover and protection to the infantry; or having the advantage of a moderate eminence, or other ground protected in the front, to cover the flanks of the foot. Another good service of them, and in which they supply the place of better troops, is to protect and

bring up the supplies.

The Portuguese cavalry has another eminent good quality. From the nature and difficulties of the country, they are very easily, and as it were, naturally formed to act on the most rugged, and uneven ground; they can accordingly leap a hedge or a ravine, or pour in

Battle of Busaco.

full speed down a hill, which would startle an English fox-hunter. This renders them admirably fitted for the species of war in which they are engaged. It is with cavalry as with infantry; the more versatile they are, the more useful.

The Portuguese light infantry, as they have been lately disciplined, are a serviceable force; in the mountainous scene of the present operations, their utility is necessarily suspended, but in the plain of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo they were of use. Should the French pass the mountains, they might be again serviceable. They are brisk in incursions, and active in cutting off convoys.

The artillery consists of three battalions. It has been before said, that their condition was miserable, previously to the efforts of Marshal Beresford. The cannon were so ill made as to be unserviceable. They had no notion of the use or necessity of field-pieces or small cannon to accompany the infantry. This is the more inexcusable in a country like Portugal, where every mile is a post or battery.

The engineers are without education, and therefore totally without knowledge. Strange, that till within a few years, even in England, no previous education was deemed necessary to form an engineer.

Neither in England nor in Portugal, is there any military map of the mountains and fastnesses of the kingdom. In our next magazine, we hope to be enabled to supply this deficiency. If we succeed, it will contain not only a topographical and military ground plan of the mountains, but of the hollows, the valleys, the ravines, the courses of the mountain rivers, and the possible roads, paths, and openings. Without such a map, a military man cannot easily comprehend the movements, their reasons, and their probable issues; and with such a map, he has no cause to lament his absence.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Further Particulars-Previous Motions of the Armies--Objects of the Movements Probable Consequences-Explanatory Illustrations of the Gazettes.

Of all the events which have happened within a long period, there

are none which merit more attentive consideration, than those which Vol. I. No. 1. F