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Journal of the Operations in Portugal. other side of it, towards Lisbon, some heights which command the road to great advantage. There is another position consisting of a very deep and broad ditch, likewise crossing the road by bridges.
From Villa Franca to Sacavem is twelve miles. The road is good, but heavy. It is flanked, however, by heights on which detachments could act 10 great advantage. A branch of the Tagus crosses the road, and is defended by batteries. Sacavem is four miles from Lisbon.
The following, therefore, is the ultimate route which Lord Wellington's army will have to take, if he resolve upon an effort to defend Lisbon, before he shall quit Portugal:
Guarda to Belmonte ......... ....... 12 miles.
...... 12 Lisbon .....
Total .......... 163
The province of Beira, however, and particularly that part of it termed Lower Beira, is the first and most immediate scene of operation; the one arny endeavouring to force it, and the other to defend it. We conceive, therefore, that we cannot be too full, or even too minute, in our account of it. The following may assist much to explain the existing military operations. The ground-work of it is General Dumourier's admirable work, compared with later authorities.
The province of Beira is the largest in Partugal: it extends the whole breadth of the kingdom, from east to west; its eastern boun
Journal of the Operations in Portugal. dary being the kingdom of Spain, and its western boundary being the Atlantic. From north to south it is eighty-two miles iu length. la breadth it is one hundred.
The first division of this province is into two parts: the Upper, consisting of the courtry on the Spanish side of the mountains of the Sierra de Estrella ; and the Lower Beira, which consists of the country fenced in by those mountains.
The mountains, therefore, are of course the boundaries.
The province of Beira is again divided into six Corregidorias, and two Ouvidorias ; that is to say, into eight districts.
These eight districts are as follow: Coimbra, Vizeu, Lamego, Pinhel, Guarda, Castello Branco, Montemor o Veblo, and Mon Feira,
The district of Coimbra contains only one city, but several small towns. Its population is nearly 200,000. The city of Coimbria is situated on the river Mondego. It has no sufficient strength, how• ever, to oppose an invading enemy. The source of the Mondego, has many military aptitudes, and cannot be very easily crossed in the face of a hostile army.
The district of Vizeu is likewise situated along the Mondego. Vizeu itself is an episcopal town, and is situated between the rivers Mondego, and Vonga. Vizeu is considered by all military writers as an admirable station. It is thirty miles from Coimbra, by the fole lowing road, which we notice as being the line of march of the French to the Sierra de Busaco.
From Almeida to Pinhel ................ 9 miles.
Voll. No. 1.
Journal of the Operations in Portugal. -
From Celerico to Figueiro ........ 3 miles.
The following is the road from Coimbra to Oporto, and the respective distances : :
From Coimbra to Forros ...... ...... 3 miles.
Avelans, where Massena is stated to have been on the 30th of last month (October) is twelve miles from Coimbra.
The district of Lamego comprebends an episcopal city, thirty-three towns, and nearly one hundred thousand inbabitants. Lamego is
situated on the Douro, in a plain surrounded by mountains. It is a strong post, but at the same time a very dangerous one, as retreat is impossible.
From Coimbra to Lamego is sixty miles. The principal stations on the road, are the six following, at a distance of about fifteen miles from each other. From Coimbra to Sardao, thence to Ponte Foura, thence to St. Pedro de Sul, thence to Castro Dairo, and thence to Lamego. All these are probable stations of detachments and outposts.
The district of Pinhel contains but little that is worthy of remark. The town is fortified in the old manner, and is untenable. It is about ten miles from Almeida, and eighty from Coimbra. Almeida is in this district.
The district and town of Guarda has been already described in sufficient detail. Guarda was founded in the year 1199, by King Sancho the First, near the head of the Mondego, and at the foot of the Sierra de Estrella. The walls are stone and turreted. The plain of Guarda is much above the level of the whole province, and according to Dumourier, most completely commands it. “ Lord Galway,” says Dumourier, “ decides in his memoirs, that it is by far the best post which the Portuguese can take for the defence of Lisbon. It has before it, Sabugal, Penamacor, Castello Branco, &c. for advanced stations; it. eommands the defiles that lead from them, and is defended by woods and swamps in front, whilst the river Zezere covers its right flank.' Tbus does it protect all Beira, as well as the Tagus and Douro."
The district and town of Castello Branco have been already described. The town stands between two streams, the Liria and the Ponsul, fifteen miles from the Tagus. It is furtified with a double wall, seven towers, four gates, and an old castle. Idanha Nova is a principal town in this district. Penmaco is another town, very strongly situaled; its castle commands the whole range from Castello Branco to the Coa. It is a noble military position.
Such is the military character of the ground which constitutes the ield of operations of the two armies.
The European Armies.--- Postuguese.
PRESENT STATE AND ECONOMY OF THE ARMIES OF
O f all the armies in Europe, the Portuguese army, before the two last campaigns, in every military point of view was the most miserable. An army and a nation, which under the able leaders of its early history had acquired a just and long renown, had become so rusted by a long sloth, and so debased under a succession of unskilful and negligent administrations, that every people in Europe looked on it with contempt, and even the government of its own country, seeing its manifest inutility, lost all confidence in it. That sure connexion of effects which always follows upon bad government, was thus eminently seen in the Portuguese army and administration. Aweak and negligent governinent first ruined all discipline, all military spirit and pride, and therefore necessarily all courage, strength, and energy, in their army; and the ruin of the arny, re-acting upon the government, infused that diffidence in its councils, that cowardly spirit and habitual submission in its intercourse with other nations, which has led to the ruin of the kingdom. In their consciousness of the weakness of their means of defence, the Purtuguesc Court had long been fearful of holding any other tope than that of conciliation or submission. In different parts of the world they presented a very singular contrast. In Brazil, where they were beyond the reach of those European powers who were inclined to injire them, 'no one could bear a loftier port, and speak in a higher tone ; whilst in Europe they sought to elude rather than to resent the most outrageous insults, and were even content to compromise for insult as long as they could put off violence. This conduct has been followed by its expected issue. If Portugal shall continue to exist as a kingdom, it will not owe its safety to itself.
The character of an army will always follow that of its officers. Previous to the late English campaigns, many of the Portuguese re. giments were the hereditary rights of some of the Portuguese nobility. The officer, therefore, sometimes a minor, and very frequently