King of Siam sufficient evidence of the effects of cold on water? No. By implication he says the contrary: It required 'very strong testimony.' Will he say, that those most astonishing effects of electricity lately discovered, so entirely unanalogous to every thing before experienced, will he say, that such facts no reasonable man could have sufficient evidence

from testimony to believe? No. We may presume he will not, from his decision in the former case; and if he should, the common sense of mankind would reclaim against such extravagance. Yet it is obvious to every considerate reader, that his argument concludes equally against those truly marvellous, as against miraculous events; both being alike unconformable, or alike contrary, to former experiences *.

* I cannot forbear to observe, that many of the principal terms, employed in the essay, are used in a manner extremely vague and unphilosophical. I have remarked the confusion I find in the application of the words experience, contrariety, conformity. I might remark the same thing of the word miracle. A 'miracle,' it is said, p. 182. in the note, may be accurately defined, A TRANSGRESSION of the law of nature, by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent. The word transgression invariably denotes a criminal opposition to authority. Rapine, adultery, murder, are transgressions of the laws of nature, but have nothing in common with miracles. The author's accuracy in representing God as a transgressor I have not indeed the perspicacity to discern. Does he intend, by throwing something monstrous into the definition, to infuse into the reader a prejudice against the thing defined? But supposing that, through inadvertency, he had used the term transgression instead of suspension, which would have been more intelligible and proper; one would at least expect, that the word miracle, in the essay, always expresses the sense of the definition. But this it evidently does not. Thus in the instance of the miracle supposed (p. 203. in the note.) he calls it, in the beginning of the paragraph, A violation of the usual course of nature;' but in the end, after telling us that such a miracle, on the evidence supposed, our present 'philosophers ought to receive for certain,' he subjoins, (how consistently, let the reader judge) and ought to search for the causes, whence it might be derived." Thus it is insinuated, that though a fact apparently miraculous, and perfectly extraordinary, might be admitted by a philosopher, still the reality of the miracles must be denied. For if the interposal of the Deity be the proper solution of the phenomenon, Why should we recur to other causes? Hence a careless reader is insensibly led to think, that there is some special incredibility in such an interposal, distinct from its uncommonness. Yet the author's great argument is built on this single circumstance, and places such an interposition just on the same footing with every event that is equally uncommon. At one time, he uses the word miracle to denote a bare improbability, as will appear in the sixth section: At another, absurd and miraculous are, with him, synonymous terms; so

THUS I think I have shown, that the author is chargeable with some fallacies, in his way of managing the argument; that

are also the miraculous nature of an event, and its absolute impossibility. Is this the style and manner of a reasoner?

Let it, however, in further illustration of the question, be observed, that though, in one view, miracles may be said to imply a suspension of the laws of nature, by the interposition of an invisible agent, yet, in another and more extensive view, it may perhaps be affirmed, that, in strictness, nature's laws are never suspended. It will serve to remove the apparent inconsistency, to consider that, when we speak of the laws of nature, we commonly mean no more than those regarding the material world, or the laws of matter and motion with which we happen to be acquainted. Yet those which regard spiritual beings are as truly laws of nature as those which concern corporeal. Our acquaintance with the former, if we can call it acquaintance, is much more confined than with the latter; because the means of knowledge, in the one case are fewer, more subtle, and less accessible, than in the other. But we have reason from analogy to believe that every thing in the invisible, that is, in the moral and intellectual, as well as in the visible or material world, is regulated by permanent laws. In this view of the universal system, there is ground to think that the respective powers of the different orders of beings and their interpositions, and if so, divine illuminations themselves, are as really governed by general laws, as the events which result from physical causes, and take place in the material creation. In regard to these also, the term suspension is sometimes loosely used, where there is an interfering of powers, though it be acknowledged, on all sides, that, in the largest and most proper acceptation of the terms, there is no infringement of the laws of nature. Thus by the law of gravitation, a heavy body moves downwards, towards the centre of the earth, till it be stopped by some intervening object. By the law of magnetism, iron, one species of heavy bodies, may be attracted upwards, from the earth, and kept hanging in the air. In familiar discourse we might say that the law of gravity is suspended by the magnetical attraction; which means no more than that, in this instance, gravity proves a less powerful attraction than magnetism. In other instances, magnetism may be the weaker of the two. A loadstone, which will raise from the ground a piece of iron weighing an ounce, will produce no sensible effect upon one of a pound weight. But it is evident that, in a more enlarged view, the laws of nature undergo no suspension in either case, in as much as one, who is well acquainted with the attraction both of the magnet and of the earth, can, in any proposed experiment, tell for certain beforehand which will prevail. Thus, when we speak of miracles as suspensions of the laws of nature, the expression is admitted rather in apology for ignorance, than as what ought to be accounted philosophical or strictly proper. The intervention of superior agents, the comparative powers of these agents, and their operations may be, and probably are, regulated by the immutable laws of the universe, as much as whatever concerns the terraqueous globe, and the motions of the heavenly bodies. This will serve further to explain my retort upon Mr. Hume in the preceding paragraph, in relation to the freezing of water, which see.

he all along avails himself of ambiguity in the word experience; -that his reasoning includes a petitio principii in the bosom of it ;—and that, in supporting his argument, he must have recourse to distinctions, where, even himself being judge, there is no difference,

SECTION III.

Mr. Hume himself gives up his favourite argument.

6

MR. HUME himself,' methinks I hear my reader repeating with astonishment, gives up his favourite argument!' To prove this point is indeed a very bold attempt. Yet that this attempt is not altogether so arduous as, at first hearing, he will possibly imagine, I hope, if favoured a while with his attention, fully to convince him. If to acknowledge, after all, that there may be miracles, which admit of proof from human testimony; if to acknowledge, that such miracles ought to be received, not as probable only, but as absolutely certain; or, in other words, that the proof from human testimony may be such, as that all the contrary uniform experience, should not only be over-balanced, but, to use the author's expression, should be an, nihilated; if such acknowledgments as these are subversive of his own principles; if, by making them, he abandons his darling argument; this strange part the essayist evidently acts.

6

'I own,' these are his words, there may possibly be mira'cles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind ' as to admit a proof from human testimony, though perhaps' (in this he is modest enough, he avers nothing; perhaps) it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of his'tory.' To this declaration he subjoins the following supposition: Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that from 'the 1st January 1600, there was a total darkness over the 'whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this 'extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the peo'ple; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, 'bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least va

6

⚫riation or contradiction: It is evident, that our present philo'sophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it ❝ for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived *.'

6

Could one imagine, that the person who had made the above acknowledgment, a person too who is justly allowed, by all who are acquainted with his writings, to possess uncommon penetration and philosophical abilities, that this were the same individual, who had so short while before affirmed, that a miracle,' or a violation of the usual course of nature, supported by any 'human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument+;' who had insisted, that it is not requisite, in order to reject the fact, to be able accurately to disprove the 'testimony, and to trace its falsehood; that such an evidence 'carries falsehood on the very face of it ;' that we need but oppose, even to a cloud of witnesses, the absolute impossibility, 'or,' which is all one, miraculous nature of the events, which 'they relate; that this, in the eyes of all reasonable people, 'will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation §;' and who, finally to put an end to all altercation on the subject, had pronounced this oracle. 'NO TESTIMONY FOR ANY KIND OF 'MIRACLE CAN EVER POSSIBLY AMOUNT TO A PROBABILI→ 'TY, MUCH LESS TO A PROOF .' Was there ever a more glaring contradiction?

YET for the event supposed by the essayist, the testimony, in his judgment, would amount to a probability; nay, to more than a probability, to a proof; let not the reader be astonished, or if he cannot fail to be astonished, let him be incredulous, when I add, to more than a proof, more than a full, entire, and direct proof; for even this I hope to make evident from the author's principles and reasoning. And even 'supposing,' says he, that is, granting for argument's sake, 'that the testimony for a miracle amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of

+ Page 194.

S Page 196, &c.

*Page 203, in the note. Ib. || Page 202. There is a small alteration made on this sentence in the edition of the Essay in 1767, which is posterior to the 2d edition of this Disser tation. See Preface, page 3.

'the fact, which it would endeavour to establish *. Here is then by his own reasoning, proof against proof, from which there could result no belief or opinion, unless the one is conceived to be in some degree superior to the other. Of which proofs,' says he, the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist +.' Before the author could believe such a miracle as he supposes, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony is stronger than the proof against it from experience. That we may form an accurate judgment of the strength he here ascribes to testimony, let us consider what, by his own account, is the strength of the opposite proof from experience. · A 'miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and ' unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof ' against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire 'as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined ‡.' Again, As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there 'is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, ' against the existence of any miracle §.' The proof then which the essayist admits from testimony, is, by his own estimate, not only superior to a direct and full proof, but even superior to as entire a proof as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Whence, I pray, doth testimony acquire such amazing evidence? Testimony,' says the author, hath no evidence, but what it derives from experience. These differ from each other only as the species from the genus.' Put then for testimony, the word experience, which in this case is equivalent, and the conclusion will run thus: Here is a proof from experience, which is superior to as entire a proof from experience, as can possibly be imagined. This deduction from the author's words, the reader will perceive, is strictly logical. What the meaning of it is, I leave to Mr. Hume to explain.

What has been above deduced, how much soever it be accounted, is not all that is implied in the concession made by the author. He further says, that the miraculous fact, so attested, ought not only to be received, but to be received for certain. Is it not enough, Sir, that you have shown that your most full, most direct, most perfect argument may be overcome? Will * Fage 202. † Page 180. + Page 180. $ Page 181.