CHAP. II. The Conclusions to which sound Policy would lead us, in regard to the Toleration of papists. As to the propriety, considered in a political light, of giving such a toleration to papists in Scotland, as has been already granted in England and Ireland, I must observe, in the first place, that this is a point, the decision of which belongs properly to the legislature. To me it appears particularly improper in ecclesiastical judicatories to meddle with it. It is a question solely regarding the safety of the body politic. If the constitution will not be endangered by such a measure, the principles of reason, and consequently of sound policy, and also the principles of Christianity, as has been shown, lead us to conclude that it ought to be adopted; otherwise, not. Now the question in regard to the danger of the constitution is surely of the department of the estates of the kingdom assembled in parliament.—— And though every little borough-corporation, parish meeting, society of artificers and others, corporate and not corporate, weavers, coblers, porters, &c. &c. presume that they are wise enough to direct the King, Lords, and Commons, and that they themselves understand better what concerns the interest, security, and government of the nation, this absurd conduct cannot hurt societies. They have no reputation to lose. Great allowances ought to be made, and will be made, by superiors, for their folly and ignorance. But would it become the supreme judicatory, and representative of this national church, in imitation of such examples, to step out of their line, and, without the most urgent necessity, to obtrude upon the legislative body, their advice unasked? Nothing, in my opinion, would more effectually lessen the dignity of that venerable court. There is but one case in which I conceive there would be any propriety in such a measure; and of this I shall take notice afterwards. 6 But some will object, Why do you talk of going beyond our line? Are not our ecclesiastical assemblies the natural guardians of our religion? Who then so proper as they to 'give warning of the danger, and to use the precautions which 'ought to be employed, in order to prevent it or ward it off?' I do not know precisely what meaning ye affix to the word guardians; but in one sense I certainly admit that both our pastors and our ecclesiastical judicatories are guardians in their several spheres. But this implies no more than that, when they apprehend danger, they ought to double their diligence in using the spiritual weapons above taken notice of, which the gospel supplies them with, for defending the people against seduction of every kind; and that, if there has been any remissness in discharging the ministerial duties in time past, there may be more vigilance and greater exertions in time to come, But their guardianship, I imagine, never extended so far as to entitle them, from any fancied necessity, to counteract the very spirit of their religion, and, for their master's service, to oppose alike his precepts and example. Yet such is manifestly the nature of that recourse to the secular arm, so strenuously argued for by some; a recourse which originated among papists, and would have been left with papists, if protestants had been in all respects consistent with themselves *. But however improper it may be in our judicatories, as such, to interfere with the legislature in this affair, we may be permit ted as individuals in this land of liberty, for the sake of quieting the minds of well-meaning people, freely to canvass the question of the expediency of the projected toleration. This is the privilege, if used discrectly, of all British subjects, in regard to public measures. I shall, therefore, with all due deference to my superiors, submit my sentiments on this head to the candid examination of the reader. It has been said, and very justly, that in every state, as in every individual, there is a right of self-preservation, which implies, amongst other things, that of protecting itself against violence offered, either from without or from within, from foreign * Short view, Rem. iii. ‹ The very name of religious toleration is justly dear 'to every Protestant.' He must be very shallow who does not perceive that with such Protestants as these writers, it is then only the name that is dear. The idea of persecution for conscience sake is most odious and detestable.' Qu. Have they expected to be read by none but fools? hostile states, or from its own seditious and corrupt members, and consequently of repelling force by force. It has been urged further, that it is the duty of the magistrate, who is the trustee, and consequently the servant, of the state, not only to defend the community when attacked, but to watch for its safety, and, by every just method which the constitution empowers him to use, that is, as far as his trust extends, to prevent every danger which may be foreseen, as well as to remove that which is present. Both positions are in my opinion undeniable. Now on these, and on these only, is founded the magistrate's title to interfere with religious sects. Opinion is naturally beyond the jurisdiction of magistracy, whose proper object is pub lic peace or national prosperity. As this cannot be injured or interrupted by men otherwise than by their actions, these are strictly all that are immediately cognizable by civil judicatories. As however it is unquestionable, that opinion has great influence on practice, so the open profession of such opinions as are inanifestly subversive of the natural or civil rights of the society, or of the rights of individual members of the society, is undoubtedly to be regarded as an overt act which falls under the cognizance of the magistrate. It is only in this view that opinion ought ever to be held, as coming under his jurisdiction. Considered in a religious view, as true or false, orthodox or heterodox, and consequently as affecting our spiritual and eternal interests, it is certainly not of the department of the secular powers. Yet this distinction has not always been observed. And those in power, from considerations of a spiritual nature, which were totally without their province, have thought themselves bound, by the most sacred ties, to do all they could for the encouragement of their own opinions, because supposed to be sound, and for the suppression of every opinion as unsound, which stood opposed to them. Hence that spirit of intolerance which has for many centuries proved the bane of Christendom, and which still continues the bane of many countries in Europe, as well as in other quarters of the globe. Nothing can be more evident, than that if the magistrate is entitled, nay obliged, by all the weight of his authority, to crush opinions, merely because erroneous, and con ceived by him pernicious to the soul, this obligation must be inherent in the office of magistracy, and consequently incumbent on every magistrate. Now, as his only immediate rule for what he is bound to cherish, and what to crush, is, and can be no other than, his own opinions, and (the magistrate having no more claim than private persons to infallible direction) as the same variety of sentiments may be, nay in different ages and nations has been, in those of this rank as in those of any other; it will be found, on this hypothesis, the duty of rulers to suppress and persecute in one country, and at one period, what it is the duty of rulers in another country, or even in the same country at another period, to cherish and protect. This consequence, how absurd soever, is fairly deducible from the aforesaid principle, and ought therefore to be held a sufficient demonstration of the absurdity of that principle. One of the many unhappy consequences which has flowed from the iniquitous but general practice of acting in conformity to that false tenet, is, that the minds of parties, even those whose differences in opinion are merely speculative, and could never, if left to themselves, have affected the peace of society, have been exasperated against one another. Jealousy and envy have arisen, and been fostered by mutual injuries. Every sect has been led to view in every other a rival and an enemy, a party from which, if raised to power, it would have every thing to dread. And as this almost equally affects both sides, each has played the tyrant in its turn. As men's conduct is influenced more by passion than by cool reflection, all have been very slow in discovering the falsity of the principle, the magistrate's right of interfering, when there is no visible danger to the state; this right, though sometimes controverted by the weaker party, the prevalent sect has always affirmed and defended, thinking itself entitled to a monopoly of the principle, as being alone, in its own account, on the side of truth. The remembrance too of injuries received, instead of opening their eyes, and showing them the ruinous Consequences of that radical error, has but served to rivet them in it, and make them avail themselves of it in their turn. Nay, so inconsistent a creature is man! Those who but a little before strenuously maintained the right of private judgment, are no sooner raised to power, than they obstinately refuse that right to others. As they have been accustomed to look on the other party as enemies, and have been badly treated by them, they think they derive hence an additional right to persecute them from the law of retaliation. This, I acknowledge, renders religious sects in another view, an object of attention to the magistrate. A party whose avowed principles, considered by themselves, have nothing hostile to society, may, from its strength and habitual enmity to the predominant sect, endanger the public peace. Hence it may happen, that civil governors, though perfectly indifferent which of two sects they shall favour, may find it incompatible with the safety of the state, to give equal countenance to both: Perfect equality, where there is reciprocal hatred, could not long subsist, without giving rise to reciprocal hostilities. The utmost vigilance could not always prevent this effect, which might, in the end, overturn the constitution. But where the public tranquillity has been long the sole object of the magistrate, there is hardly any risk of his adopting those measures which cause men's minds to rankle, and produces in their breasts that most unlovely and unchristian disposition one towards another. It is admitted, that when the public peace is in danger, it is his duty to interpose. Sedition or rebellion is not entitled to take shelter in religious sentiments, nor can the plea of liberty of conscience justly avail any man, for invading the liberty or property, sacred or civil, of another. So much for what appears to be the original rights of the civil power in what concerns sects in religion. It must be owned, however, that there are many particular circumstances, which, when they occur, ought, in a great measure, to restrain the exertion of a power otherwise warrantable. When parties are already formed, and of long continuance, though their fundamental principles be unfriendly to the rights of society, their numbers, and weight, and other considerations, may render an indulgence, otherwise unmerited, the more eligible measure, because in its consequences the less evil. It may however be remarked, in passing, that though there be several prudential considerations which may render it proper to extend favour to those whose tenets, or temper, or both, show that they but ill deserve it, no consideration can give the magistrate a right to persecute any party whose |