Why, says he, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right* ? In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Lord, to act the part of wise men, and judge impartially of what they say. Those who do so, are highly commended for the candour and prudence they discover in an affair of so great consequence. We are even commanded, to be always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of our hope§; in meekness to instruct them that oppose themselves || ; and earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints **. God has neither, in natural nor in revealed religion, left himself without witness; but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render inexcusable the atheist and the unbeliever. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We must prove all things, as we are expressly enjoined in holy writ, if we would ever hope to hold fast that which is good ++.

Thus much I thought proper to premise, not to serve as an apology for the design of this tract, (the design surely needs no apology, whatever the world may judge of the execution) but to expose the shallowness of that pretext, under which the advo cates for infidelity, in this age, commonly take shelter. Whilst therefore we enforce an argument, which, in support of our re→ ligion, was so frequently insisted on by its divine founder, we will not dread the reproachful titles of dangerous friends, or dis guised enemies of revelation. Such are the titles, which the writer, whose sentiments I propose in these papers to canvass, has bestowed on his antagonists ‡‡; not, I believe, through ma lice against them, but as a sort of excuse for himself, or at least a handle for introducing a very strange and unmeaning com pliment to the religion of his country, after a very bold attempt to undermine it. We will however do him the justice to own, that he hath put it out of our power to retort the charge. No intelligent person, who hath carefully perused the Essay on Miracles, will impute to the author either of those ignominious characters.

* Luke xii. 57.
§ Pet. iii. 15.
tt 1 Thess. v. 21.

+1 Cor. x. 15.
|| 2 Tim. ii. 25.

# Page 201..

Acts xvii. 11. ** Jude 3.

My primary intention in undertaking an answer to the aforesaid Essay, hath invariably been to contribute all in my power to the defence of a religion, which I esteem the greatest blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men. It is at the same time a secondary motive of considerable weight, to vindicate philosophy, at least that most important branch of it which ascertains the rules of reasoning, from those absurd consequences which this author's theory naturally leads us to. The theme is arduous. The adversary is both subtle and powerful. With such an adversary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists, had I not the advantage of being on the side of truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is, as it requires bat moderate abilities to speak in defence of a good cause. A good cause demands but a distinct exposition and a fair hearing; and we may say with great propriety, it will speak for itself. But to adorn error with the semblance of truth, and make the worse appear the better reason, requires all the arts of ingenuity and invention; arts in which few or none have been more expert than Mr. Hume. It is much to be regretted, that on some occasions he has so ill applied them.

DISSERTATION

ON

MIRACLES.

PART I.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, AND RELIGIOUS MIRACLES ARE NOT LESS CAPABLE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAN OTHERS.

6

SECTION I.

Mr. Hume's favourite argument is founded on a false hypothesis. Ir is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any religious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believed on the testimony of others. A miracle,' says he, supported by any 'human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than 'of argument * Again, in the conclusion of his essay, Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of 'miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less 'to a proof+.' Here he concludes against all miracles. • Any 'kind of miracle' are his express words. He seems however immediately sensible, that, in asserting this, he has gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning. We may † Page 202.-See Preface, p. 2.

* Page 194.

⚫ establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such 'force, as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any system of religion.' In the note on this passage, he has these words: 'I beg the limitation here made, may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that other'wise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind, as to admit of proof from 6 human testimony.'

6

6

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs; but will directly lead to this general conclusion: That it is impossible for God Almighty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence, that it can be reasonably believed in after-ages, or even in the same age, by any person who hath not been an eye-witness of the miracles, by which it is supported.'

Now by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topics have been employed for the purpose by this subtle disputant. Among these there is one principal argument, which he is at great pains to set off to the best advantage. Here indeed he claims a particular concern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, it is not my business to controvert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay before the reader, the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom, for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

'Experience,' says he, is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact*. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Probability always supposes an opposition of ex'periments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence * Page 174. † Page 175, 176.