66 66 66 66 "have reason to give you thanks for the civil and obliging man"ner in which you have conducted the dispute against me, on so interesting a subject as that of miracles. Any little symptoms ❝of vehemence, of which I formerly used the freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a sight of the manuscript, "are either removed, or explained away, or atoned for by civi❝lities, which are far beyond what I have any title to pretend It will be natural for you to imagine, that I will fall upon some shift to evade the force of your arguments, and to "retain my former opinion in the point controverted between us: But it is impossible for me not to see the ingenuity of your performance, and the great learning which you have dis"played against me. I consider myself as very much honour"ed in being thought worthy of an answer by a person of so "much merit; and, as I find that the public does you justice, with regard to the ingenuity and good composition of your piece, I hope you will have no reason to repent engaging with an antagonist, whom perhaps, in strictness, you might have ❝ ventured to neglect. I own to you that I never felt so vio"lent an inclination to defend myself as at present, when I am "thus fairly challenged by you; and I think I could find some"thing specious, at least, to urge in my own defence: But as "I had fixed a resolution, in the beginning of my life, always "to leave the public to judge between my adversaries and me, "without making any reply, I must adhere inviolably to this "resolution, otherwise my silence, on any future occasion, "would be construed to be an inability to answer, and would "be matter of triumph against me *. 66 "It may perhaps amuse you to learn the first hint which "suggested to me that argument which you have so strenuous * As far as I recollect, Mr. Hume, whose curious theories have raised many able opponents, has, except in one instance, uniformly adhered to this resolution. But what no attack on his principles, either religious or philosophical could effectuate, has been produced by a difference on an historical question, a point which has indeed been long and much controverted; but, as to which, we may say with truth, that it would not be easy to conceive how the interests of individuals, or of society, could, at present, be affected by the decision, on which ever side it were given. I believe Mr. Hume's best friends wish, for his own sake, as I do sincerely, (for I respect his talents) that he had given no handle for this exception. Swedish generals, when he gave them the honourable appellation of his masters in the art of war, I may, with great sincerity, pay my acute and ingenious adversary. I shall add a few things concerning the occasion and form of the following dissertation. Some of the principal topics here discussed were more briefly treated in a sermon preached before the Synod of Aberdeen, and are now made public at their desire. To the end, that an argument of so great importance might be more fully and freely canvassed than it could have been, with propriety, in a sermon, it was judged necessary to new-model the discourse, and to give it that form in which it now appears. The edition of Mr. Hume's Essays, to which I always refer in this work, is that printed at London, in duodecimo, 1750 *, intitled, Philosophical Essays concerning Human Uuderstanding. I have, since finishing this tract, seen a later edition, in which there are a few variations. None of them appeared to me so material as to give ground for altering the quotations and references here used. There is indeed one alteration, which candour required that I should mention: I have accordingly mentioned it in a note t. The arguments of the essayist I have endeavoured to refute by argument. Mere declamation I know no way of refuting but by analysing it; nor do I conceive how inconsistencies can be answered otherwise than by exposing them. In such analysis and exposition, which, I own, I have attempted without ceremony or reserve, an air of ridicule is unavoidable: But this ridicule, I am well aware, if founded in misrepresentation, will at last rebound upon myself. It is possible, that, in some things, I have mistaken the author's meaning; I am conscious, that I have not, in any thing, designedly misrepresented it. * As this advertisement was prefixed to the first edition of the Dissertation, I was not a little surprised to observe, that the French translator declared, in the first sentence of his Avis au Lecteur, that he did not know what edition of Mr. Hume's Essays I had used in this work. On proceeding, I discovered that my advertisement has not been translated by him, which makes me suspect, that, by some accident, it had been left out of the copy which he used. † Page 101. Miracles are capable of Proof from Testimony, and Religious Miracles are not less capable of this Evidence than others. SECT. I. Mr. Hume's favourite argument is founded on a false ...... hypothesis,.. II. Mr. Hume charged with some fallacies in his way of managing the argument, III. Mr. Hume himself gives up his favourite argument, IV. There is no peculiar presumption against such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion, V. There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such VI. Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr. PART II. The Miracles on which the Belief of Christianity is founded, are sufficiently attested. I. There is no presumption arising from human nature, against the miracles said to have been wrought in II. There is no presumption arising from the history of III. No miracles recorded by historians of other religions are subversive of the evidence arising from the miracles wrought in proof of Christianity, or can be considered as contrary testimony, 56 63 80 V. Examination of the POPISH miracles mentioned by VI. Abstracting from the evidence for particular facts, we have irrefragable evidence, that there have been mira- cles in former times; or such events as, when compar- CONTENTS OF SERMONS, &c. PREFACE. I HERE offer to the Public a new and improved edition of my Dissertation on Miracles, first printed in the year 1762, together with some other Tracts related to it, as supplying additional evidences of the truth of our Religion, displaying its amiable spirit, and manifesting its beneficial tendency, in respect, not only of individuals, but of communities and states. The first of these is a Sermon on the Spirit of the Gospel, preached before the Synod of Aberdeen in 1771. The second, a Sermon preached before the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge in 1777; the scope of which is to show, that the success of the first publishers of the gospel is a proof of its truth. The third is a Sermon preached at the Assizes at Aberdeen, on the happy influence of Religion on Civil Society. The fourth also is a Sermon, on the Duty of Allegiance, preached at Aberdeen in 1776, on the Fast-day, on account of the Rebellion in America; and the fifth, an Address to the People of Scotland, on the alarms that had been raised in regard to Popery. On the Dissertation itself I have made a few amendments, not very material I acknowledge, yet of some use for obviating objections and preventing mistakes. It has been observed by several, that Mr. Hume has, since the Dissertation first appeared in print, once and again republished the Essay to which it was intended as an answer; not only without taking the smallest notice that any thing reasonable, or even specious, had been urged in opposition to his doctrine, but without making any alteration of any consequence on what he had advanced. I know but one exception, if it shall be thought of moment enough to be called an exception, from this remark. What, in former editions, had been thus expressed, as quoted in the Dissertation," Upon the whole, it appears that no testimony * Part I. Sect. 1. A |