In addition to the remedy by action for damages in respect of torts which have actually been committed, there is, in certain cases, an ancillary remedy by way of injunction to prevent the commission of torts which are threatened or anticipated, or in cases of continuing injuries to restrain their continuance. The principle upon which such injunction is granted is that the injury, if suffered to be inflicted, would be of such a character that the plaintiff could not practically be compensated in damages. In some cases the injunction takes a mandatory form, where the defendant has created a permanent source of injury, such as the erection of a building to the nuisance of the plaintiff's lights or to the obstruction of his right of way, and orders him to restore the plaintiff to his right by removing the offending building or other source of damage (a). 66 By s. 79 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, it was provided that " in all cases of breach of contract or other injury, where the party injured is entitled to maintain and has brought an action, he may claim a writ of injunction against the repetition or continuance of such breach of contract or other injury"; and by s. 82 the plaintiff was empowered to apply for such writ at any stage of the cause (b). Previously to that Act there was no power in any court to restrain the publication of a libel (at all events until after the matter had been found to be a libel by the verdict of a jury (c))—not in the Court of Chancery, for the (a) For converse of this rule, see Brocklebank v. Thompson, (1903) 2 Ch. 344. (b) These two sections are now repealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49. (c) Whether the Court of Chancery had power to restrain publication of a Principle on which injunction granted. Torts of all kinds may be restrained by injunction. Interlocutory injunction may be granted where "just or convenient." And question of libel or no libel was one which they could not decide, nor in the Courts of Common Law, for they had no power to grant injunctions at all. By that Act, however, power so to do was given to the Common Law Courts, for it applied to torts of all kinds without any exception as to defamation, which term includes slander of title (a). Then by. s. 16 of the Judicature Act, 1873, there was transferred to the High Court the jurisdiction which at the commencement of the Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by any of the superior Courts, including the jurisdiction above mentioned under the Common Law Procedure Act. further by s. 25, sub-s. 8, of the same Act "an injunction may be granted . . . by an interlocutory order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made; and any such order may be made unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the Court shall think just; and if an injunction is asked either before, or at, or after the hearing of any cause or matter to prevent any threatened or apprehended waste or trespass, such injunction may be granted, if the Court shall think fit, whether the person against whom such injunction is sought is, or is not, in possession under any claim of title or otherwise, or (if out of possession) does, or does not, claim a right to do the act sought to be restrained under any colour of title, and whether the estates claimed by both or either of the parties are legal or equitable." The words "just" and convenient" in the section mean practically the same thing. That would not be convenient which was unjust, and in ascertaining what is just regard must be had to what is convenient (b). The effect of these provisions is that all branches of the High brook, (1878) 3 C. P. D. p. 343; though (a) Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Maison Talbot, (1903) 20 T. L. R. 88, reversed on evidence, (1904) 20 T. L. R. 579. (b) Per Jessel, M.R., Beddow v. Beddow, (1878) 9 Ch. D. p. 93. But see below, p. 791, as to the rule of practice which has been established by the Court limiting the conditions under which it is just and convenient to grant interlocutory injunctions to restrain libels. Court have now power before, at, and after the trial of the action, to grant injunctions to restrain the commission of torts of all descriptions, including libels (a). It would seem that the Court has jurisdiction even to restrain the commission of assaults. But whether it would ever exercise that power is another question. The proper remedy of a person who is under apprehension of an assault is to apply to justices to have the defendant bound over to keep the peace. Discretion of grant Court to The granting of an injunction is in the discretion of the Court; but the discretion is one which, in many cases, the Court will practically exercise only in one way. The exercise injunction. of the Court's discretion will depend upon the following considerations. In the first place the Court must be satisfied that the injury which is apprehended will be either continuous or frequently repeated, or very serious (b). And in such cases an injunction to restrain the recurrence of a nuisance or other damage will be granted after the nuisance is abated (c). If the Court is satisfied that the damage will be continuous or of frequent recurrence, it is not necessary that it should be of a highly serious nature: it will be enough that the injury will be of such a degree as would suffice to support an action for damages (d). An injunction will be granted to restrain a bare trespass, such as the wrongful use of a way, if the Court is satisfied that the trespass, unless restrained, will be frequently repeated (e). The ground upon which relief by injunction is granted in such cases is to prevent the plaintiff being put to the trouble and inconvenience of having to bring successive actions from time to time to recover a series of small damages (ƒ). It has, however, been held in the recent case of Behrens v. (a) There is in this respect no distinction between libels affecting trade or property and those affecting personal reputation Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; Monson v. Tussauds, Limited, (1894) 1 Q. B. 671. (b) Per Page-Wood, L.J., AttorneyGeneral v. Cambridge Consumers' Gas Co., (1868) L. R. 4 Ch. p. 81. (c) Chester, Dean of, v. Smelting Corporation, Limited, (1901) 85 L. T. 67. (d) Clowes v. Staffordshire Potteries Waterworks Co., (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. 125; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, (1851) 2 Sim. N. S. 78; Soltau v. De Held, (1851) 2 Sim. N. S. 133; and see Couper v. Laidler, (1903) 2 Ch. 337. (e) Coulson v. White, (1743) 3 Atk. 21. (f) Per Page-Wood, L.J., (1868) L. R. 4 Ch. p. 81; per Mellish, L.J., (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. p. 142; per James, L.J.. ibid. p. 143. Where damage con tinuous or of frequent re currence. Richards (a), that the Court will not restrain by injunction a user by the public of field paths traversing private property when such user inflicts no appreciable injury on the personal enjoyment of the owner of the land. A temporary nuisance which is not serious is not restrainable, even at the hearing (b), and still less will an interlocutory injunetion be granted to restrain it (c). Where, however, the nuisance, though of a temporary character, is such as materially to interfere with the comfort of neighbouring owners and occupiers it will be restrained by injunction (d). But an injunction will not, as a rule, be granted to restrain a nuisance which is intended to be repeated only at long intervals, and which on the occasion of each repetition will only be of short duration, as in the case of a gas company proposing periodically to take up the roadway for the purpose of repairing their gas-pipes, which they have laid in the road without statutory powers (e). Nor can a trespass which is only temporary and contingent be the subject of an injunction (f). On the same principle, a mandatory injunction to remove a building which obstructs the plaintiff's ancient lights will not be granted where the plaintiff, being only a tenant from year to year, is under notice to quit (g). It was formerly thought that the cases of patents, trade-marks, and copyright stood upon a peculiar footing in this respect, that from a single instance of infringement the Court was bound to infer the probability of repetition, however improbable such repetition might be in point of fact. It was accordingly held that if a person infringed the patent, trade-mark, or copyright of another in ignorance of that other's right (h), the Court was bound to grant an injunction; and in some cases judges went the length of holding that they had not even discretion to refuse the plaintiff his costs (a), even though the defendant upon complaint being made undertook to commit no further infringement (b). It is apprehended, however, that this extreme view can scarcely be regarded as accurately representing the law with regard to this particular description of property in the present day, in spite of the fact that the Trade Marks Act, 1905 (c), creates a vested and exclusive interest and proprietorship in the registered owner of a trade mark analogous in character to that possessed by an absolute owner in any other description of personal property. A defendant who has done a wrongful act cannot protect himself from an injunction by merely saying that he does not intend to do it again, the Court will now, in each case, grant or refuse the injunction according as they do or do not draw the inference that the defendant in fact intends to repeat the act complained of (d). And if a person innocently infringes a trade mark, the Court, even though they grant an injunction, will not necessarily order him to pay the costs of the action (e). Where the damage is not likely to be continuous or frequent, it must be serious (f), as where there is apprehension of the kind of damage which would be caused by an explosion. The Court will restrain the storing of any substance which is likely to be a source of serious danger to the adjoining property, such as gunpowder (g), or damp jute, which is liable to spontaneous ignition (h); and a similar rule applies in the case of overhanging branches of trees injuriously affecting the land of an adjoining proprietor (i). Again, where there is a conflict of statutory powers and the exercise by one corporation or individual of such power, in a Where apprehended injury |