pleasure." Are then those events which God brings about himself, which are consequently according to his good pleasure, and included in his plan, so odious to him, that, "nothing can be more abhorrent to his nature?" How will you reconcile these flat and palpable contradictions? P. 26, "If the decrees of God" respect all events, and are eternal and immutable, then all his enemies may despair of accomplishing their purposes." "If the decrees of God respect all events," and all are according "to his eternal purpose," pray tell me what event is not included among all events, and what purpose can be opposed to his purposes. Are not all the events and purposes of all the enemies of God, included among all events and every purpose, which you say are brought about by God himself! How then can you consistently talk about events and purposes, in contradistinction from the events and purposes of God, seeing "He brings every thing to pass which is brought to pass." This is another instance of your contradictory assertions; and it is as much impossible for a man to believe both sides of a contradiction true, as it is to reconcile Hopkinsianism with the oracles of God. Credulous minds may be fascinated for a season, by the sorceries of error; but they can never be brought understandingly to embrace a "scheme" manifestly contradictory in itself. It must therefore be from inattention, indifference, or want of spiritual light, that men profess faith in such glaring absurdities as you have advanced. If a man had set himself to work

on purpose to blacken the character of God by the most vile misrepresentations, he could not have done it more effectually than you have done, I hope undesignedly, in your sermons, especially the first and third. For no man could impute more than all the wickedness, that ever has been, is, and will be, to him; and this you have done by sayi at "He brings to pass every thing which is brought to pass;" unless by some extraordinary effort, you are able to prove that sin is no-thing, that is, nothing. Seeing therefore that such is the natural tendency of your doctrine, it must be false, because God is just, wise, holy and true.

6. It might be added in the sixth place, that your doctrine destroys the immutability of God. From the immutability of his counsel, we may suppose that he never alters any of his designs. In the account Moses has given of the creation of the world, it is said at the conclusion of the whole, And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good. Man, at this time was holy-He afterwards became unholy-and if this change was an effect purely of an act of God, which it must have been, if all things are brought to pass by him, then God changed his design-he first designed man should be holy, and afterwards that he should be unholy; unless you can make it appear that holiness and unholiness are one and the same, or that God designed he should be holy and unholy at the same time, which is a contradiction. Moreover, it seems

evident, that, had not sin entered into the world, man would not have been subject to death-such was his nature, viewed in connexion with surrounding circumstances. The design then of the Almighty appears to have been that man should be immortal in his pristine state. To suppose therefore that sin was brought about by God, by which Adam's nature was so far changed that he became mortal, is to suppose that God's design toward Adam was changed-unless you suppose he designed him immortal and mortal at the same time, which is a contradiction, and therefore impossible. But by admitting the designs of God were immutably the same towards man, and that he designed him to be good, holy, and immortal; and that man voluntarily and unnecessarily sinned against the law of his nature, or the law of God, and thereby made himself bad, unholy, and mortal, we secure the immutability of God, and place mutability to man's account, where it properly belongs. The contrary sentiment transfers it from man to God, and thereby impeaches him with a defect foreign to his nature; and therefore that sentiment is not founded in truth.

II. 1. I proceed in the second place to notice the texts of scripture by which you attempt to support your inconsistent notion of predestination; and as you lay the greatest stress upon those respecting the crucifixion of Christ, they will be noticed first. Luke xxii. 22. And truly the Son of man goeth as it was determined; but woe unto that min by whom

he is betrayed. "This scripture," say you, "can mean nothing less than this, That God had determined that his Son should be betrayed by Judas." p. 13. By what rule of criticism will you make the determination here spoken of refer to God? It, is the nominative to the verb determined, which does not necessarily refer to the determination of God, who is not mentioned in the connexion of the passage. Why may it not as well refer to the determination of Judas, who is spoken of in the preceding 21st verse, Behold, the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on the table. The supposition that

Ngoμavov (orismenon) here translated determined, is a participle of the present or imperfect tense, or paulo post. fut. and may be rendered, determining, or about to determine. There is no word in the greek, from which our translators have translated the helping verb, was, thereby carrying the mind back to some indeterminate period, as Mr. Williston supposes, before the world began, when, it is supposed, God determined Judas should betray Christ. Allowing the above criticism to be accurate, we might read the text thus, "Truly the Son of man goeth as is determining, or about to be determined presently," (by Judas and the chief priests) “but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed." That it is not necessary to suppose that because the verb wgoμevov, is used, it must have reference to an eternal determination of God, is evident from Acts xi. 29, where the same word way, is used to signify the determination of the disciples to send relief to the brethren which dwelt in Judea. The same word therefore is used to denote the determination of man, and the determination of God, Acts ii. 23. No argument therefore can be inferred from the word, simply considered, to induce us to refer the determination spoken of in Luke xxii. 22, to God; and the context, as has been seen, leads to a contrary conclusion. The reader, however, must judge for himself.

the determination refers either to Judas, or the Sanhedrim, is strengthened by what is said in verses 2-6. And the chief priests and scribes sought how they might kill him: for they feared the people.Then entered Satan into Judas, surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve. And he went his way, and communed with the chief priests and captains, how he might betray him unto them. And they were glad, and covenanted to give him money. And he promised, and sought opportunity to betray him unto them in the absence of the multitude. From this scripture it appears there was a collusion between Judas, and the chief priests and captains, in which they counselled together how they might apprehend Jesus Christ. They stipulated to give Judas money, and he agreed to betray him. All this was perfectly known to Jesus, and therefore he spoke of the treacherous conduct of his disciple, Judas, and .of the determination which was forming thereon among the chief priests. It appears therefore "that the text may," without any violence, "mean" something "less than this, That God had determined his Son should be betrayed by Judas." The most natural meaning is, That the Son of man was now going to be betrayed according to the determination which resulted from the consultation between the chief priests and Judas-the whole context leads to this conclusion. To suppose that God, from all eternity determined that Judas should betray the Lord Jesus into the hands of wicked men, is to transfer the guilt of his whole conduct from Judas to God,