Some advocates poffefs the happy talent of injuring the cause which they mean to fupport. This is ftrongly exemplified in Mr. Young, who actually furnishes the ftrongeft arguments in favour of that very reform of parliament which he labours fo ftrenuously to refift. The following paragraph from the pamphlet before us will ferve to prove that this is not an unfounded affertion : "But" (fays he, p.92) "the House of Commons are corrupted and bribed. And if the nature of fuch an affembly demands to be corrupted in order to purfue the public good, who but a vifionary can. wish to remove corruption ?" Muft not an affembly, conftituted for the public good, be of a moft deteftable nature, if it demands to be bribed in order to discharge its duty? Again, "Influence, or, as Reformers call it, Corruption, is the oil which makes the machine of Government go well." And p. 171, "Extravagant Courts, felfifh Minifters, and CORRUPT MAJORITIES, are fo intimately interwoven with our practical freedom, that it would require better political anatomifts, than our modern reformers, to fhew, on fact, that we did not owe our liberty to the identical evils which they want to expunge." Could the whole National Convention more grossly libel the King, the Minifters, and the Parliament, of this country? Surely, Mr. Young must have known, that he was writing the most bitter and dangerous fatire on our Government, when he faid, that extravagant Courts, felfish Minifters, and Corrupt Majorities, were intimately interwoven with our Freedom; and yet affert, that this is "that glorious Conftitution which is the inheritance and pride of Britons!" I appeal to every candid man whether the friends to the Liberty of the Prefs, or Mr. Young, feem moft difpofed "to publish the Corruptions of the Conftitution, in other words, to write it down. (Vide p. 163.)" The prefent author confiders the queftion of Reform under four diftinct points.-1ft, The neceflity of reforming the House of Commons. zdly, How far a reform can be made in conformity with the fpirit, principles, and practice of the Conftitution. 3dly, The time for making a reform. 4thly, What the nature of the reform fhould be. The neceffity of a reform he proves by Mr. Y.'s very admiffion of the existence of corruption; by the declaration made by Mr. Pitt, when Mr. Pitt was a reformer, that it was notorious that the Nabob of Arcot had fifteen members in the (then) House of Commons, and that they did not act upon an identity of intereft with the people;" by the confequence to be deduced from this fact, that any other prince might fend in his members, and, by expending a million of money, take the money out of Englifhmen's pockets, and force them to fight his battles.' The channel through which a prince might do this he fhews to be the rotten and venal boroughs. Some have defended the propriety of preferving fuch boronghs, by faying that a certain degree of influent over the House of Commons was neceffary to the crown: but the spirit of the Conftitution difavows fuch influence. If it were intended that the crown fhould influence that house, why was it not left to the King to nominate the members? It is evident that the Conftitution meaned that the will of the people alepe should influence it, as it was to the people alone that it gave the Q3 right right of electing the members. Nay, though it vefted in the King the prerogative of calling fubjects to feats in the House of Lords, it took care, left they should be under influence if they were to fit there only during pleasure, that the grant of the peerage fhould be irrevocable except by act of parliament. Who, then, can deny that the letter and fpirit of the Conftitution are against an influence of the crown over the parliament ? Under the fecond head of inquiry, he fhews that fuch is the genius of our Constitution, that it adapts itself to circumstances and exigencies, and admits of reform without the fmalleft violence to its spirit or ef fence. It appears that formerly none but liberi homines, or freemen, had a right to vote at elections; and that none were truly denominated freemen, but land owners who held in capite. In fubfequent times, circumftances required an extenfion of this franchife, and it was accordingly extended to freeholders who held not in capite, and to men of confideration in the ftate, without any violence or injury to the Conftitution. On the fubject of the TIME for making a reform, the author, borrowing expreffions from the fpeeches of Mr. Francis on the 7th of May, of Mr. Grey on the 6th, and of Mr. Erfkine on the 7th, thus remarks, with Mr. Grey: "This, indeed, is a never failing argument, equally in times of profperity and adverfity; in times of war and peace. If our fituation happens to be profperous, it is then afked, whether we can be more than happy, or more than free? In the feafon of adverfity, on the other hand, all reform or innovation is deprecated, from the pretended risk of increasing the evil and preffure of our fituation. From all this, it would appear, that the time for reform never yet has come, and never can come." With respect to the 4th head, what the nature of the reform should be, the author fuggefts not any plan of his own, nor rejects any one that has yet been recommended, but expreffes his concurrence in opinion with Mr. Grey, that to confitute the Houfe of Commons by univerfal fuffrage, or by any other mode which would make it more independent than it is at prefent, would be a falutary improvement. He remarks that the plan of univerfal fuffrage, which feems fo violently to alarm Mr. Young, has not been propofed even by the most violent leader of the most violent fociety in Britain; fuch he prefumes Mr. Y. confiders Mr. Horne Tooke and the Constitutional Society. To follow the author farther on this fubject, we fhould exceed our prefcribed limits. What we have faid of this performance will probably incline our readers to perufe a work, which, if they be not wedded to prejudice, will afford them very rational entertainment: they will find the author clear in his pofitions, ftrong in his arguments, found in his principles, juft in his conclufions, and, on the whole, moderate in the measures which he would recommend.-Though Mr. Y. is honoured with the greatest share of his attention, Mr. Reeves, the Bishop of Gloucefter, the Rev. J. Gardener of Taunton, the Rev. Mr. Bromley of Fitzroy Chapel, aud Judge Afhhurft, are not overlooked. Sh. Art. Art. 29. As the contents of this notable pamphlet have previously appeared, as Effays, in the news-paper called The World, we fhall confine our remarks on them to a narrow compafs. We think that nothing can be more improper than appeals to the public on the subject of a fuit which is actually depending in a court of law. The judges ought to have nothing before them to direct their judgment, except the evidence given in the courfe of the trial, and the remarks of the advocates on both fides. It is an infult to juftice to attempt to bias the mind of the court by extrajudicial publications. In the cafe before us, the able writer is evidently a partizan of Mr. Haftings, whom he juftifies by what may be called argumentum ad homines: he labours to fhew that thofe who approve of the conduct of Mr. Pitt are bound, by the principle of confiftency, to acquit Mr. Haftings; and that thofe, who agree with Mr. Dundas in the flattering account which he gives of the finances of the Eaft India Company, are bound not merely to acquit but to give honour to Mr. Haltings, for having found out the refources which make the revenue of Bengal fo productive at this moment. He goes farther; he fhews that part of this revenue arifes from the expulfion of Cheyt Syng from Benares, and from the terms impofed by Mr. Haftings on the fucceffors of that native chief, of which England now avails herself, though he is actually profecuting Mr. Haftings for tripping Cheyt Sing of his Zemindary, and for exacting a greater tribute from the country of Benares than it could afford to pay without ruin to the inhabitants. The writer lays great ftrefs on this circumftance, that the very perfons who accufe Mr. Haftings on this head have not thought proper to leffen that tribute, but have on the contrary reckoned on the continuance of it as part of the permanent income of Bengal. We admit that those who act in this manner cannot, with a good grace, appear as accufers; they ought first to remit the excess of tribute, and then profecute the man who wantonly impofed it. We can difcover no confiftency in those who would receive ftolen goods, convert them to their own ufe, and afterward, without intending reftitution, profecute the man from whom the goods were received, Such conduct, however, is far from being uncommon; for how often have we known a member of Parliament, while in oppofition, violently reprobate, as unjust and oppreffive, taxes propofed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, of which, when he came into power himself,-fo far from repealing them,-he has availed himself as much as of the most approved part of the revenue. Art. 30. A State of the Reprefentation of the People of England, on the Principles of Mr. Pitt in 1785; with an annexed State of additional Propofitions; by the Rev. Chriftopher Wyvill, late Chairman of the Committee of Affociation of the County of York. 8vo. pp. 55. 15. Johnfon. 1793. The refpectable author of this little pamphlet, feeing that the quef tion of reform is drawing faft toward a crifis, and that the time is probably not far diftant when a collifion may take place between the fupporters and oppofers of this meafure, fo much dreaded by one ᏚᏂ . fet of men, and fo ardently defired by another, as effential to the well being of the ftate and the happiness of the people; comes forward with the olive branch to discharge the duties of a minifter of peace, and to act as mediator between two parties, one of which asks for every thing, and the other is for granting nothing. He fhews that both fhould take into confideration times and circumftances, and there read the abfolute neceflity of mutual conceffions. It is on this ground that he feels himself difpofed to carry reform farther at this moment than it was intended, in 1785, by Mr. Pitt and the affociation to which he at that time belonged. The plan of 1785 was more than even the people themselves could be brought to request at that period, but a great deal less than they now demand. It is in confequence of a change in the temper of the times, that Mr.W. thinks the plan of 1785 inadequate; and he therefore fubftitutes another in its place, not different in principle, but formed on a more extenfive scale. Our readers will recollect that Mr. Pitt propofed to abolish forty rotten boroughs, and to add 67 new members for counties, two to Westminster, and one to Southwark; to give to Marybone, Bir mingham, Manchester, Sheffield, and Leeds, the right of fending two members each to parliament; and alfo to allow the inhabitants of ten cities and towns, who are now fhut out by their respective corporations, the privilege of returning two members each; by which measure, it was fuppofed, about 100,000 voters would be added to the number of electors through the kingdom. Mr. W. takes this plan for his bafis, and attempts only to carry it farther. We will ftate his improvements in his own words : The most obvious and neceffary addition to Mr. Pitt's plan is, that it should be extended to the reprefentation of the people of Scotland; in fuch a manner as to remove that degrading exception by which fix of the counties of Scotland are reduced to alternate reprefentation; to place Edinburgh and fome other principal cities, in refpect of their reprefentative importance, on a footing of equality with the great towns of England; and to regulate elections in Scotland by the fame general rules to which they are fubject in England. Another neceffary addition to that plan seems to be, the extenfion. of the right of fuffrage to all decent householders throughout Great Britain. By thefe regulations the following COUNTIES of SCOT. LAND would receive an addition of THREE MEMBERS; fo that each of thofe counties would be conftantly reprefented by ONE MEMBER. The following CITIES and TOWNS of SCOTLAND would receive an addition of SEVEN MEMBERS, viz. - 55 The elections which at prefent are confined to a few members of a corporation in each of the following towns of England, by thefe regulations would become popular elections, viz. Marlborough, Launceston, Thetford, Addition of Conflitutional Members by Popular Elections in four Towns of England. 8 By thefe regulations, alfo, the body of conftituents in England, on any reafoñable definition of the perfons meant by "decent houfeholders" would receive an addition, probably, not short of 150,000 The fame regulations adding to the prefent electors in Scotland, freeholders and copyholders of 40 fhillings value, and decent houfeholders, would probably increafe the conftituent body there by an augmentation of nearly 100,000 voters. The total augmentation of voters by these regulations throughout Great Britain, would be nearly 250,000 additional voters.' The newest feature in this plan is the extenfion of the right of voting to all copyholders and decent householders. Mr. W. is aware that it may not be very eafy to define the precife meaning of the term decent houfeholders; he throws the idea out for difcuffion, and thinks that the term might be applied to those who are assessed to the poor's rates, or who pay the window tax. The plan has at leaft this merit, that it contains a specific propofition; that its whole extent can be feen at once; and that nothing treacherous or dangerous lurks behind. The author adds, however, three fubfidiary measures which he thinks effential to this reform in Parliament, and which would, no doubt, flow from it, were the reform once carried. These measures are, 1. A reduction of the enormous influence of the Crown. 2. The repeal of the feptennial act. It might not be improper, perhaps, to annex to Paisley fome of the fmall unreprefented burghs in its neighbourhood, to take a part in election for reprefentatives of that town. The fmall share of the reprefentation at prefent enjoyed by Glafgow, Aberdeen, and Dundee, would devolve upon the other burghs with which they are conected and increase their share.' 3. Paffing |
