M. de Grammont, "want of powder forced me to capitulate.”—“ To let you also into a fecret, replied the Chevalier, "I fould not have granted you fuch honourable terms, had I not been in great want of ball." Biog. Gallica, vol. i. p. 202.

The Comte de Grammont was taken dangerously ill in 1696. The King, who knew that this nobleman was not very religious, defired the Marquis de Dangeau to vifit the Comte, and to fay, from him, that it was time to think of another world. M. de Grammont, on hearing this, turned towards his wife, and faid, "Countefs, if you do not take care, Dangeau will trick you out of my confeflion."

A well-executed tranflation of this work is published by Harding, in Pall Mall, (price 41. 10s.) accompanied with the fame engravings and notes which adorn and illuftrate the prefent edition in French. The notes, we are informed, were first written in English, and have been tranflated into French for Mr. Edwards's impreffion.

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ART. XV. Unterfuchungen uber die Englifche Staats verfaffung, Ec. i. e. Inquiries concerning the English Conflitution. By HENRY CHRISTOPHER ALBRECHT. First Part, pp. 336; Second Part, pp. 364. Svo. Leipfig. 1794.

AMONG the innovators of Germany, there exifts, it feems, a confiderable party who are for new-modelling the conftitution of that empire on the plan of the British government. In order to refift this Anglo-mania, the prefent work has been publifhed; which depicts the ruling inftitutions of this country in an unfavourable point of view, and holds up their conftruction to notice as a warning and not as an example. Great part of the first volume is taken up with the abuse of religious eftablifhments, of Henry the Eighth the founder of the Church of England, and with the hiftory of the perfecution of Dr. Priestley. The fecond volume talks about the conftitution of Alfred, the convention of Runymede, and the deficiency of the reprefentation, in a mannet from which an Englishman can learn. nothing but audacity of difcontent. The author concludes with the opinion that this nation ought not to pursue a parlia mentary reform, which would remedy abfurdities rather than evils, and thofe in one branch only of the legislature, but a conflitutional reform, or a revifal and reconftruction of the whole Lystem.

Thefe differtations are written with a spirit of freedom which rivals that of the Letters of Groenvelt, (fee Rev. N. S. vol. ix. p. 169.) but they exhibit fymptoms of offenfive coarsenefs and fcanty information.

Tay.

ART.

ENGLISH LITERATURE.

ART. XVI. Hiftory of the principal Republics in the World: a Defence of the Conftitutions of Government of the United States of America, against the Attack of M. Turgot, in his Letter to Dr. Price dated the twenty-fecond Day of March 1778. By John Adams, LL. D. and a Member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences at Boston. A new Edition. 8vo. 3 Vols. 11. 1s. Boards. Stockdale. 1794. PERHAPS it would not be an extravagant affertion, if we were

to say that at least one half of the confufion, which arifes in the world, is owing either to an ignorant mifapprehenfion, or to a perverfe abufe of words. In the affairs of politics, this axiom might be exemplified by a thousand examples, but by none more pertinently than by that which is the main fubject of the prefent work, the term republic. Many perfons, to whom, notwithstanding the early prepoffeffions of a claffical education, the very name of republican, from various accidental causes, is become odious, will be furprised at being told that the British state, in its original fpirit and true character, is in reality a free republic; and will wonder fill more that an American republican, and one of the most able and active members of that Congrefs which, in 1776, firft declared the American colonies free, fovereign and independent ftates, has written one of the moft able defences of the British Conftitution that has ever appeared. Yet we are very much mistaken if the truth of all this will not be confeffed by every impartial reader, who attentively perufes this Hiftory of the principal Republics in the World-the additional title very properly prefixed to the prefent edition *.

The circumftance which gave rife to this publication was an objection made against the conftitution of the States of America by M. Turgot, in a letter to Dr. Price; " that they had, without any particular motive, imitated the cuftoms of England, and inftead of collecting all authority into one center, that of the nation, have eftablifhed different bodies,-bodies of reprefentatives, a council, and a governor, because there is in England, a Houfe of Commons, a Houfe of Lords, and a King." In reply to this obfervation, Dr. Adams undertakes to prove, at large, that a free republic is the best of governments, and the greatest bleffing to which mortals can aspire; and that the freedom of a republic can only be fecured by inftituting three independent branches in its legiflature and preferving their independence facred, and by keeping the legislative and executive authorities perfectly detached from each other. In order to maintain his point, this able politician fometimes. reasons theoretically: but, doubtless aware of the difficulty of

* For the first edition, fee M. R. vol. lxxvi. p. 394.

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efta

eftablishing a practicable fyftem of government merely on abftract principles, he very judiciously makes his principal appeal to facts. He takes a fuccinct view of most of the ftates which have fubfifted in the world under the name of republics: examining the various modes of government, both nominal and real, in each; and detailing fuch particulars, refpecting the internal and external condition of these states, as may serve to illuftrate his general pofition. In the result, he finds that each ftate has been refpectively free and happy, or otherwise, in proportion to the attention which has been paid to the diftribution of its power into three orders, a governor, a fenate, and the general body of the people acting perfonally or by their reprefentatives. The term republic, res publica, principally fignifies in general public affairs, and is applicable to every kind of government, but it has been lately by many writers arbitrarily confined to the democratic form of government, in which the whole power or fovereignty of the people is centered in a fingle affembly, chofen by them at ftated periods. This term Dr. Adams applies with precifion to his own fyftem, by adding to it the epithet free; and his work is a demonftration, founded on induction, that the great principle of a free republican government is, that it fhall be fo conftructed as to preferve an equilibrium of eftates or orders, and an independent execution of the laws.

We must not attempt to follow our political hiftorian through his well-arranged details. Our readers will derive much pleasure, and we fhall not perhaps presume too far if we add, instruction alfo, from the perufal of his account of republics democratical, ariftocratical, monarchical, or regal and mixed, at prefent exifting in Europe; from his retrofpect, in the first volume, of the feveral republican forms of government in Greece and Rome; and from the full defcriptions which he gives, in his fecond and third volumes, of the rife, progrefs, and operations of the feveral political conftitutions in the Italian republics, through the middle ages, to the 14th century. The general obfervations deduced from the whole furvey are, that, though there be no example of a government fimply democratical, there are many of forms nearly or remotely refembling what is at prefent understood by collecting all authority into one center; from all which it appears that caprice, inftability, turbulence, revolutions, and the alternate prevalence of thofe two plagues and fcourges of mankind, tyranny and anarchy, have been the effects of governments without the balance of three orders.

In the argumentative parts of the work, the author reviews the fentiments of many eminent writers; particularly, among the antients, Plato, Ariftotle, Polybius, Dionyfius Halicarnaffenfis,

naffenfis, Cicero, and Tacitus; and, among the moderns, of Machiavel, Sydney, Montesquieu, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Swift, Hume, Franklin, Price, and Nedham. The work of this latter writer, entitled the Excellence of a Free State, or the Right Conftitution of a Commonwealth, published in 1656, containing every femblance of argument which can poffibly be urged in favour of the democratic fyftem, and being the work from which M. Turgot's idea of a commonwealth was probably borrowed, is examined at large by Dr. Adams. The reply to this tract, which fills about three hundred pages of the third volume, forms a very important part of the prefent work; which we recommend to the attentive perufal of those who adopt the opinion that nothing but declamation, or fophiftry, can be offered in defence of any form of government befides that which is purely democratic.

We must not take our leave of this very important, and at the present time particularly interefting, publication, without copying two or three paffages; in which the author's political fentiments are fully expreffed, and his forcible method of fupporting them is well exemplified. We begin with selecting a few mifcellaneous remarks on Reprefentation, &c. from the preface:

Representations, instead of collections, of the people-a total feparation of the executive from the legislative power, and of the judicial from both-and a balance in the legislature by three independent equal branches are perhaps the three only discoveries in the conftitution of a free government, fince the institution of Lycurgus. Even thefe have been fo unfortunate, that they have never fpred: the first has been given up by all the nations, excepting one, who had once adopted it; and the other two, reduced to practice, if not invented, by the English nation, have never been imitated by any other except their own defcendants in America. While it would be rafh to fay, that nothing further can be done to bring a free government, in all its parts, fill nearer to perfection -the reprefentations of the people are most obviously fufceptible of improvement. The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a reprefentative affembly, feems to be the fense of the people, the public voice: the perfection of the portrait confifts in its likeness. Numbers, or property, or both, fhould be the rule; and the proportions of electors and members an affair of calculation. The duration fhould not be fo long that the deputy fhould have time to forget the opinions of his conftituents. Corruption in elections is the great enemy of freedom. Among the provifions to prevent it, more frequent elections, and a more general privilege of voting, are not all that might be devifed. Dividing the districts, diminishing the distance of travel, and confining the choice to residents, would be great advances towards the annihilation of corruption.'

There can be no free government without a democratical branch in the conftitution. Monarchies and aristocracies are in poffeffion of the

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the voice and influence of every univerfity and academy in Europe. Democracy, fimple democracy, never had a patron among men of letters. Democratical mixtures in government have loft almost all the advocates they ever had out of England and America.

Men of letters must have a great deal of praife, and fome of the neceffaries, conveniencies, and ornaments of life. Monarchies and aristocracies pay well and applaud liberally. The people have almoft always expected to be ferved gratis, and to be paid for the honour of ferving them; and their applaufes and adorations are bestowed too often on artifices and tricks, on hypocrify and fuperftition, on flattery, bribes, and largeffes. It is no wonder then that democracies and democratical mixtures are annihilated all over Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inacceffible mountain, or an impenetrable foreft. The people of England, to their immortal honour, are hitherto an exception; but to the humiliation of human nature, they fhew very often that they are like other men. The people in America have now the best opportunity, and the greateft truft, in their hands, that Providence ever committed to fo fmall a number fince the tranfgreffion of the first pair: if they betray their truft, their guilt will merit even greater punishment than other nations have fuffered, and the indignation of heaven. If there is one certain truth to be collected from the hiflory of all ages, it is this; that the people's rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture in a conftitution, can never be preferved without a strong executive, or, in other words, without feparating the executive power from the legiflative. If the executive power, or any confiderable part of it, is left in the hands either of an aristocratical or a democratical affembly, it will corrupt the legiflature, as neceffarily as ruft corrupts iron, or as arfenic poisons the human body; and when the legislature is corrupted the people are undone.

The rich, the well-born, and the able, acquire an influence among the people that will foon be too much for fimple honesty and plain fenfe in a houfe of reprefentatives. The moft illuftrious of them must therefore be feparated from the mafs, and placed by themfelves in a fenate: this is, to all honeft and ufeful intents, an oltracifm. A member of a fenate of immenfe wealth, the moft refpected birth, and tranfcendent abilities, has no influence in the nation in comparison of what he would have in a fingle reprefentative affembly. When a fenate exifts, the most powerful man in the ftate may be fafely admitted into the house of reprefentatives, because the people have it in their power to remove him into the fenate as foon as his infuence becomes dangerous. The fenate becomes the great object of ambition; and the richest and the moft fagacious with to merit an advancement to it by fervices to the public in the house. When he has obtained the object of his wishes, you may ftill hope for the benefits of his exertions, without dreading his panions; for the executive power being in other hands, he has loft much of his influence with the people, and can govern very few votes more than his own among the fenators.'

The idea fuggefted in this laft paragraph is uncommon, and furnishes an important argument for the inftitution of a fenatorial body. We proceed :

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