take benefit from it. Our cause is desperate and hopeless if we do not strike some stroke. Our affairs are hastening apace to ruin if we do not retrieve them by some happy event. Delay with us is near equal to a total defeat. We must not suffer ourselves to be lulled into security and inactivity because the enemy does not cross the river. The love of my country, a wife and four children in the enemy's hands, the respect and attachment I have to you, the ruin and poverty that must attend me and thousands of others, will plead my excuse for so much freedom."

Notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force, when Washington received this letter, he had already formed the daring plan of attacking all the British posts on the Delaware at the same instant. If successful in all, or any of these attacks, he hoped not only to wipe off the impression made by his losses and by his retreat, but also to relieve Philadelphia from immediate danger, and to compel his adversary to compress himself in such a manner as no longer to cover the Jerseys.

The positions taken to guard the river were equally well adapted to offensive operations.

The regulars were posted above Trenton from Yardley's up to Coryell's Ferry. The Pennsylvania flying camp and Jersey militia, under the command of General Irvine, extended from Yardley's to the ferry opposite Bordentown, and General Cadwalader with the Pennsylvania militia lay still lower down the river.

Writing to Colonel Reed on the 23d of December, Washington says: "Necessity, dire necessity will - nay, must justify any attempt. Prepare, and in concert with Griffin, attack as many posts as you possibly can with a prospect of success. I have now ample testimony of the enemy's intentions to attack Philadelphia as soon as the ice will

afford the means of conveyance. Our men are to be provided with three days' provisions, ready cooked, with which and their blankets they are to march. One hour before day is the time fixed upon for our attempt on Trenton. If we are successful, which heaven grant! and other circumstances favor, we may push on. I shall direct every ferry and ford to be well guarded, and not a soul suffered to pass without an officer's going down with the permit."

In the plan of attack which had been digested, it was proposed to cross in the night at M'Konkey's Ferry, about nine miles above Trenton, to march down in two divisions, the one taking the river road, and the other the Pennington road, both which lead into the town; the first toward that part of the western side which approaches the river, and last toward the north. This part of the plan was to be executed by Washington in person, at the head of about 2,400 Continental troops. It was thought practicable to pass them over the river by 12, and to reach the point of destination by 5 in the morning of the next day, when the attack was to be made. General Irvine was directed to cross at the Trenton Ferry, and to secure the bridge below the town in order to prevent the escape of the enemy by that road. General Cadwalader was to pass over at Dunk's Ferry and carry the post at Mount Holly. It had been in contemplation to unite the troops employed in fortifying Philadelphia to those at Bristol, and to place the whole under General Putnam, but such indications were given in that city of an insurrection in favor of the royal cause that this part of the plan was abandoned. The cold on the night of the 25th was very severe. Snow, mingled with hail and rain, fell in great quantities, and so much ice was made in the river that, with every possible exertion, the division conducted by the General in person

could not effect its passage until 3, nor commence its march down the river till nearly 4. As the distance to Trenton by either road is nearly the same, orders were given to attack at the instant of arrival, and after driving in the outguards to press rapidly after them into the town and prevent the main body from forming.

Trenton was held by a detachment of 1,500 Hessians and a troop of British light horse, the whole under the command of Colonel Rahl,* a Hessian veteran, who (says Gordon, in his lively description of the affair), “had received information of an intended attack, and that the 25th, at night, is thought to be the time fixed upon. His men are paraded and his picket is looking out for it. Captain Washington, commanding a scouting party of about fifty foot soldiers, has been in the Jerseys about three days without effecting any exploit. He therefore concludes upon marching toward Trenton; advances and attacks the picket. He exchanges a few shots and then retreats. As he is making for the Delaware, on his return to Pennsylvania, he meets with General Washington's troops (December 26, 1776). Conjecturing their design he is distressed with an apprehension that by the attack he has alarmed the enemy and put them on their guard. The enemy, on the other hand, conclude from it after awhile, that this is all the attack which is intended, and so retire to their quarters and become secure; many get drunk."

While the enemy was thus lulled into security General Washington, who accompanied the upper column, arriving at the outpost on that road precisely at 8, drove it in, and in three minutes heard the fire from the column under

*This name is spelt by some writers Rall, and by others Rawle. + William A. Washington, afterward distinguished as a colonel of cavalry.

Sullivan, which had taken the river road. The picket guard attempted to keep up a fire while retreating but was pursued with such ardor as to be unable to make a stand. Colonel Rahl paraded his men and met the assailants. In the commencement of the action he was mortally wounded, upon which the troops, in apparent confusion, attempted to gain the road to Princeton. General Washington threw a detachment into their front while he advanced rapidly on them in person. Finding themselves surrounded and their artillery already seized they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. About twenty of the enemy were killed and about 1,000 made prisoners. Six field pieces and 1,000 stand of smallarms were also taken. On the part of the Americans two privates were killed, two frozen to death, and three or four privates wounded. Captain Washington, who had returned to the scene of action with General Washington's column, and Lieutenant Monroe (afterward President of the United States), were both wounded in capturing the enemy's artillery.

Unfortunately the ice rendered it impracticable for General Irvine to execute that part of the plan which was allotted to him. With his utmost efforts he was unable to cross the river, and the road toward Bordentown remained open. About 500 men, among whom was a troop of cavalry, stationed in the lower end of Trenton, availed themselves of this circumstance, and crossing the bridge in the commencement of the action escaped down the river. The same cause prevented General Cadwalader from attacking the post at Mount Holly. With great difficulty a part of his infantry passed the river, but returned on its being found absolutely impracticable to cross with the artillery. Although this plan failed in so many of its parts, the

success attending that which was conducted by Washington in person was followed by the happiest effects.

Had it been practicable for the divisions under Generals Irvine and Cadwalader to cross the river, it was intended to proceed from Trenton to the posts at and about Bordentown, to sweep the British from the banks of the Delaware, and to maintain a position in the Jerseys. But finding that those parts of the plan had failed, and supposing the British to remain in force below, while a strong corps was posted at Princeton, Washington thought it unadvisable to hazard the loss of the very important advantage already gained, by attempting to increase it, and recrossed the river with his prisoners and military stores.* Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor, his aide-de-camp, who carried the intelligence of this success to Congress, was presented with a horse completely caparisoned for service, and recommended to the command of a regiment of cavalry.

Nothing could surpass the astonishment of Howe at this unexpected display of vigor on the part of Washington. His condition and that of his country had been thought desperate. He had been deserted by all the troops having a legal right to leave him, and to render his situation completely ruinous nearly two-thirds of the Continental soldiers still remaining with him would be entitled to their discharge on the 1st day of January (1777). There appeared to be no probability of prevailing on them to continue longer in the service, and the recruiting business was absolutely at an end. The spirits of a large proportion of the people were sunk to the lowest point of depression.

* Before the Hessian prisoners were actually marched through the streets of Philadelphia, the Tories in that city affected to doubt the reality of any victory having been obtained by Washington. Probably no procession in Philadelphia was ever attended with so much effect as this of the Hessian prisoners.