an acquiescence. Neale v. Parkin, 1 Esp. 229. In an action on a bill of exchange, evidence of an admission by the plaintiff, that he had no interest in the suit, is a ground of nonsuit. MS. Archb. Pl. and Ev. 346. So an admission by the lessor of the plaintiff, in ejectment, that he had assigned his interest in the premises. Doe v. Watson, 2 Stark. 230. Letters written by a party are evidence against him, without producing those to which such letters are answers. Lord Barrymore v. Taylor, 1 Esp. 326. The contents of a written instrument cannot be proved against a party by his admission, unless the non-production of it be accounted for. Bloxam v. Elsie, R. and M. 187. So an admission in an answer in Chancery of the execution of a deed, is only secondary evidence, and does not supersede the necessity of proving it in the regular way. Call v. Dunning, 4 East, 53. Cunliffe v. Sefton, 2 East, 187, 188. But see Bowles v. Langworthy, 5 T. R. 366. But this objection does not apply where the party enters into an admission with a view to the trial of the cause. 2 Stark. Ev. 37. A declaration by the payee of a note payable on demand (the note being then in his possession), that he gave no consideration for it to the maker, is not admissible in an action by an indorsee against the maker, the payee being alive. Barough v. White, 4 B. and C. 325. Smith v. De Wruitz, R. and M. 212.

Admissions may sometimes be presumed from the silence of a party, when certain statements are made; but the deposition of a witness, taken in a judicial proceeding against a party, is not evidence in another proceeding against that party, on the ground that he had been present, and had not crossexamined the witness. Melen v. Andrews, 1 M. and M. 336.

A notice signed by partners, stating that the partnership has been dissolved," is evidence against them of the dissolution, though the partnership was by deed. Doe v. Miles, 1 Stark. 181. 4 Campb. 373. S. C.

Receipts.] The acknowledgment in a deed of the receipt of money, is conclusive evidence, against the party executing the deed, of such receipt. Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. and C.704. Rowntree v. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141. But see Stratton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366. But such receipt will not be conclusive, if the recitals of the deed show that the money is not paid. Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. und A. 607. 1 D. and R. 211. S. C. Nor is the receipt indorsed on the back of a deed conclusive. Per Holroyd, J. 5 B. and A. 611. In general, a receipt not under seal, is only a prima facie acknowledgment that the money has been paid. Skaife v. Jackson, 3 B. and C. 421. Though it has been ruled, both by Lord Kenyon and Lord Ellenborough, that a receipt in full of all demands given with a knowledge of all the circumstances, is conclusive. Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172. Alner v. George, 1 Camph. 392. As between the underwriter and the assured, the acknowledg

ment in the policy of the receipt of the premium is conclusive. Dalzell v. Main, 1 Camph. 532. If an agent employed to receive money, and bound, by his duty to his principal, from time to time communicate to him whether the money is received or not, renders an account, from time to time, which contains a statement that the money is received, he is bound by that account, unless he can show that the statement was made unintentionally, and by mistake. Per Bayley, J. Shaw v. Picton, 4 B. and Č. 729. A receipt does not exclude parol evidence of the payment. Per Lord Ellenborough, Rambert v. Cohen, 4 Esp. 213. Where the plaintiff entered an account in writing of goods and cash furnished to the defendant from time to time, each page of which was authenticated by the defendant's acknowledgment in writing, of the receipt of the contents, it was held, that though such an acknowledgment in writing could not be given in evidence, per se, in respect of the cash items amounting to above 40s. in each page, for want of receipt stamps, yet that it was competent to the plaintiff to prove, that upon calling over each article to the defendant, he admitted that he had received the same, and that the witness might refresh his memory by referring to the accounts. Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 460.

Admissions of particular character, and admissions made in a particular character.] The character in which the plaintiff sues, or in which the defendant is sued, is frequently proved by the defendant's admissions. Thus, if B. has dealt with A. as farmer of the post-horse duties, it is evidence in an action by A. against B., to prove that he is such farmer. Radford v. Macintosh, 3 T. R. 632. And see Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 104. So in an action for slandering the plaintiff in his profession of an attorney, the words themselves importing that the defendant would have the plaintiff struck off the roll of attornies, were held to be an admission of the plaintiff's character as attorney. Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366. Pearce v. Whale, 5 B. and C. 39. And see Smith v. Taylor, 1 N. R. 196. So an admission by a defendant that a third person has become bankrupt, (as where an auctioneer advertised for sale the property of J. S. a bankrupt,") is evidence of the title of the assignees, in an action brought by them against the defendant. Maltby v. Christie. 1 Esp. 340. Booth v. Coward, 1 B. and A. 677; and see post, "Actions by assignees of bankrupts." So where the defendant, with a view to obtaining a commission against the party, swore to an affidavit stating that he had become bankrupt. Ledbetter v. Salt, 4 Bingh. 623, 1 M. and P. 597, S. C. And see Hurmer v. Davis, 7 Taunt. 577. So it has been held that a bankrupt who has petitioned for his discharge under stat. 49 Geo. III. c. 121. s. 14, cannot, in an action against his assignees, dispute the validity of the commission. Watson v.

Wace, 5 B. and C. 153. See also Clarke v. Clarke, 6 Esp. 61. Like v. Howe, 6 Esp. 20. But where the admission that he has become bankrupt, is made in the course of a transaction with third persons, the bankrupt is not thereby estopped from showing, in an action against his assignees, that he has not become bankrupt. Heune v. Rogers, 9 B. and C. 577. Nor is he precluded from disputing the commission by surrendering, or by petitioning the Chancellor to enlarge the time for surrendering. Mercer v. Wise, 3 Esp. 219. So as against a creditor the merely proving a debt under the commission is not such an admission as will dispense with the regular proof of the bankruptcy. Rankin v. Horner, 16 East, 191. In the case of peace-officers, justices of the peace, constables, &c., it is sufficient to prove that they acted in those characters, without producing their appointments. Per Buller, J. Berryman v. Wise, 4 T.R. 366. So in an information against a military officer, for false musters, the returns in which he described himself to be such officer are evidence of the fact. R. v. Gardner, 2 Campb. 513. So also in an action for penalties against a collector of taxes, proof of the defendant having collected the taxes is sufficient proof of his being collector, though the appointment is by warrant under an act of parliament. Lister v. Priestley, Wightw, 67.

In an action by assignees of a bankrupt, admissions made by them before their appointments are inadmissible. Fenwick v. Thornton, 1 M. and M. 51. So an admission by one of several trustees will not bind his co-trustees. Davies v. Ridge, 3 Esp. 102. And an admission by an individual of a corporation will not bind the corporate body. Mayor of London v. Long, 1 Campb. 23.

Admissions by persons, not parties to the suit, but interested.] An admission is evidence, whether made by a nominal party who sues for the benefit of another, Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 T. R. -664, or by the person really interested, but not named on the record. R. v. Hardwick, 11 East, 578. Thus, in an appeal, declarations by the rated inhabitants of either parish are admissible, for they are in fact parties, though the appeal is entered in the names of the parish officers. Ibid. So in an action on a bond conditioned for the payment of money to L.D., the declaration of L. D. that the defendant owes nothing is evidence. Hansm v. Parker, 1 Wils. 257. So in an action by the master of a ship for freight, brought for the benefit of the owner, the admissions of the latter are evidence. Smith v. Lyon, 3 Campb. 465. So in actions on policies, the declarations of the parties really interested. Per Lord Ellenborough, Bell v. Ansley, 16 East, 143. So in an action against the sheriff, the declarations of a party who has indemnified the sheriff are evidence against the defendant. Duke v. Aldridge, cited 7 T. R. 665. So again in trover for a deed which the defendant admitted he detained

at the request of W. R., and in the detainer of which W. R. was substantially interested, the declarations of W. R. in favour of the plaintiff's claim are admissible. Harrison v. Vallance, 1 Bingh. 45; and see Robson v. Andrade, 1 Stark. 372. But in an action for contribution, by one of several sureties in a bond, against another, the declarations of the obligee as to payments, not made at the time of payment, are inadmissible. Dunn v. Slee, Holt, 401.

Admissims by guardian and prochein amy.] The admissions of a guardian are not evidence against an infant who sues by his guardian. Cowling v. Ely, 2 Stark. 366. And so of the admissions of prochein amy. Webb v. Smith, R. and M. 106.

Admissions by agents.] Where a party to the suit constitutes a third person his agent for the purpose of the admission, the admission so made is evidence. Thus if a person agrees to admit a claim, provided J. S. will make an affidavit in support of it, such affidavit has been ruled to be conclusive. Lloyd v. Willan, 1 Esp. 178. Stevens v. Thacker, Peake, 187. But to render such an affidavit conclusive, the evidence should be very clear. Garnett v. Ball, 3 Stark. 160. So if the vendee of goods denies having received them, but adds, "If the carrier's servant says he delivered the goods, I will pay you," the answer of the servant, when applied to on the subject, may be given in evidence, after his death. Daniel v. Pitt, 1 Campb. 366 (n). So where an executor refers a creditor of the testator to J. S. for information respecting the assets, the admission of J. S. is evidence, and he need not be called. Williams v. Innes, 1 Campb. 364. So where a party being applied to for payment says, "A. will pay you," an admission by A. is sufficient to bind the principal, and A. need not be called. Burt v. Palmer, 5 Esp. 145. With regard to the admissions of agents in general, the rule is this: When it is proved that A. is agent to B., whatever A. does or says, or writes in the making of a contract as agent of B., is admissible in evidence, because it is part of the contract which he makes for B., and which therefore binds him, but it is not admissible as the agent's account of what passes. Per Gibbs, J. Langhorne v. Allnut, 4 Taunt. 519. Thus the declaration of a servant employed to sell a horse, is evidence to charge the master with a warranty, if made at the time of sale; if made at any other time, the facts must be proved by the servant himself. Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72; and see Peto v. Hague, 5 Esp. 134. But the admissions of an agent not made at the time of the transaction, but subsequently, are not evidence; thus the letters of an agent to his principal, containing a narrative of the transactions in which he had been employed, are not admissible in evidence against the principal. Ibid. Kahl v. Janson, 4 Tuunt. 565 and

see Fairlie v. Hastings, 10 Ves. 128. Betham v. Benson, 1 Gow, 45. But a letter from an agent abroad stating the receipt of money, coupled with the answer of the principal directing the disposition of the money, will be evidence of the receipt by the principal. Coates v. Bainbridge, 5 Bingh. 58. It is said to have been ruled at nisi prius, that where A. had ordered goods of B. to be delivered to C., an acknowledgment of the receipt by C. was evidence against A., Biggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454: but Lord Kenyon frequently ruled the contrary; see Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 T. R. 665. 10 Ves. 128; in which he was followed by Lord Ellenborough. Evans v. Beattie, 5 Esp. 26; and see Bacon v. Chesney, 1 Stark. 192. The admission by an under-sheriff of an escape is evidence against the sheriff; Yabsley v. Doble, 1 Ld. Raym. 190. and see Drake v. Sykes, 7 T. R. 117; and the admissions of a bailiff are evidence against the sheriff, like the statements of any other agent, when they form part of the transaction. North v. Miles, 1 Campb. 389. The admissions of a surveyor to a corporation respecting a house belonging to the corporation, are admissible against the latter. Peyton v. Governor of St. Thomas's Hospital, 3 C. and P. 363. In all cases, before the admissions of an agent can be given in evidence, the fact of his agency must be proved, and evidence that the party has acted as agent in other instances, in which the principal has recognised his acts, will be evidence of a general authority. Neale v. Irving, 1 Esp. 61. Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368. It must appear that the admission was made with regard to a matter within the scope of the agent's authority. Schumack v. Lock, 10 B. Moore, 39.

Admissions by counsel or attorney.] Where, after a verdict subject to a special case, a new trial has been directed, the special case, signed by the counsel on each side, is evidence of the facts there stated. Van Wart v. Wolley, R. and M. 4. An admission made by an attorney of one of the parties to prevent the necessity of proving a fact on the trial, is sufficient evidence of that fact; Young v. Wright, 1 Campb. 141; as where he admits the handwriting of the attesting witness, it is sufficient proof of the execution of a deed; Milward v. Temple, 1 Campb. 375; and see Truslove v. Burton, 9 B. Moore, 64; but statements made by the attorney in the course of conversation are not admissible. Young v. Wright, 1 Campb. 140. Admis sions made by the defendant's attorney respecting the plaintiff's demand (the attorney refusing to be examined) are evidence against the defendant, and proof that they were made by the attorney on the record, will be sufficient to establish his agency. Gainsford v. Grammar, 2 Campb. 9. An undertaking to appear for Messrs. T. and M., joint owners of the sloop A.," given by the attorney on record, in evidence of the joint ownership. Marshall v. Cliff, 4 Campb. 133.

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