moners, a verdict in an action for or against one, is evidence for or against another claiming in the same right. Per Lord Kenyon, Reed v. Jackson, 1 East, 357. So a verdict with regard to a public right of way. Id. 355. But the verdict in such cases is not conclusive. Biddulph v. Ather, 2 Wils. 23. The judgment in rem, of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, is conclusive as to all the world, vide post, p. 104. Where a judgment is offered in evidence merely for the purpose of proving the fact that such a judgment has been obtained, and not with a view to prove the facts upon which the judgment was founded, it may be evidence for or against a stranger. Thus a verdict against a master, in an action for the negligence of his servant, is evidence in an action by the master against the servant, to prove the amount of damages. Green v. New River Co., 4 T. R. 590.

Effect of judgments and verdicts with regard to the subject matter of the suit.] A judgment between the same parties, and upon the same cause of action, is conclusive; and if the cause of action is the same, it is immaterial that the form of action is different. Thus a verdict in trover is a bar in an action for money had and received, brought for the value of the same goods. Hitchen v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 827. So a judgment in debt is a bar in an action of assumpsit on the same contract, Slade's case, 4 Rep. 94 b. So a judgment in trespass, in which the right of property is determined, is a bar in trover for the same taking. Com. Dig. Action (K. 3). If the party mistake his form of action, and fail on that account, the judgment in such action will not conclude him. Ferrars v. Arden, Cro. Eliz. 668, 2 Saund. 47, p (n). Godson v. Smith, 2 B. Moore, 157. If the plaintiff omit to give any evidence of a demand which he might have recovered in a former action, he will not be precluded from giving evidence of it in a subsequent action. Seddon v. Tutop, 6 T. R. 607; and see Ravee v. Farmer, 4 T. R. 146. Thorpe v. Cooper, 5 Bingh. 129. But where the declaration in the second action is framed in such a manner that the causes of action may be the same as those in the first suit, it is incumbent on the party bringing the second action to show that they are not the same. Lord Bagot v. Williams, 3 B. and C. 239.

A judgment is only evidence where it is directly upon the point in question, and is not evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment. Duc. of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 533. Blackham's case, 1 Salk. 290.

Effect of judgments and verdicts in the superior courts with regard to the manner in which they are taken advantage of.] A judgment

upon the same point, between the same parties, will operate as an estoppel, if so pleaded in a second action; but if only offered in evidence, and not so pleaded, it is not conclusive. Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 365, Stafford v. Clark, 2 Bingh. 381, 9 B. Moore, 724, S. C. Hooper v. Hooper, M'Cl. and Y. 509. Thus, where an action was brought for widening a water channel to the damage of the plaintiff's mill, it was held that a verdict obtained by the defendant, on a former action brought by the plaintiff for the same cause, but not pleaded as an estoppel, was not conclusive, but only evidence to go to the jury. Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. and A. 662.

Admissibility, in civil cases, of verdicts in criminal cases.] It has been said, that a conviction in a court of criminal jurisdiction, is evidence of the same fact, coming collaterally into controversy in a court of civil jurisdiction. B.N.P. 245; and see Gilh. Ev. 30. Where the conviction has been procured on the evidence of the party who seeks to avail himself of it in a civil action, it has been decided that such conviction is inadmissible; and it seems also to be very doubtful whether it is admissible when it has been procured, not on the sole evidence of the party, or even where it has been procured entirely on the evidence of others. Hillyard v. Grantham, cited 2 Ves. 246. Gibson v. Maccarty, Rep. temp. Hardw. 311. Hathaway v. Barrow, 1 Campb. 151. Burdon v. Browing, 1 Taunt. 520. Brook v. Carpenter, 3 Bingh. 300. 2 Evans's Pothier, 313. If on an indictment for an assault the defendant pleads guilty, the record is said to be evidence in an action for damages for the same assault, like any other admission by the party. Tr. pr. Pais, 30, Anon. 1 Phill. Ev. 320. But the contrary has been ruled by the present Lord Chief Justice at Nisi Prius. 2 Phill. Ev.203, 7th edit.

Effect of Sentences in the Ecclesiastical Courts.

The Ecclesiastical Courts having the exclusive right of deciding directly upon the legality of marriages, the temporal courts receive the sentences of the ecclesiastical courts, upon such questions, as conclusive evidence of the fact; Bunting's ease, 4 Rep. 29 a; upon the principle that the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is conclusive upon the same parties, upon the same matter coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose. Duch. of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 538, 540. So a sentence in a suit of jactitation of marriage, is evidence in an action in a court of common law to disprove the marriage. Joves v. Bow, Carth. 225. In the last-mentioned case such sentence was held to be conclusive evidence, but in this point the authority of that decision has been overthrown, for a sentence in a suit of jactitation has only a negative and qualified effect,

Effect of Sentences in the Ecclesiastical Courts. 103

viz., that the party has failed in his proof, leaving it open to new proofs of the same marriage, in the same cause, and does not conclude even the court which pronounces it. Duch. of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 543; and see Blackham's case, 1 Salk. 290, und Harg. Law Tracts, 451.

The Ecclesiastical Courts have also the exclusive right of deciding directly on the validity of wills of personalty, and in the granting of administration. Noel v. Wells, 1 Lev. 235. A probate therefore is conclusive till it be repealed, and no court of common law can admit evidence to impeach it. Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125. See Hargr. Law Tructs, 459. And on this ground the payment of money to an executor, who has obtained probate of a forged will, is a discharge to the debtor of the intestate, though the probate be afterwards declared null. Ibid. But letters of administration are not evidence of any fact which can only be inferred from them, as the intestate's death. Thomson v. Donaldson, 3 Esp. 63, 20 How. St. Tr. 533. Though it cannot be shown in a court of common law that the Ecclesiastical Court has erred in granting probate, yet evidence may be given to show that the Ecclesiastical Court had no jurisdiction, as that there were no bona notabilia within its jurisdiction, B. N. P. 247, or that the supposed intestate is alive. See Allen v. Dundas, 4 T. R. 130. So the letters of administration may be proved to be revoked, for this is in affirmance of the proceedings of the spiritual court. B. N. P. 247. So it may be shown that the seal of the ordinary has been forged, for that does not impeach the judgment of the court; but it cannot be shown that the will was forged, or that a testator was non compos mentis, or that another person was appointed executor, lbid. Noel v. Wells, 1 Lev. 236, for those questions are decided by the judgment of the Ecclesiastical Court.

Effect of Sentences in the Court of Admiralty.

Upon questions of prize the Court of Admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore a sentence of condemnation in that court is conclusive, and being a proceeding in rem it binds all the world. Kinnersley v. Chase, Park Inns. 490, 6th Ed. And the sentence of a foreign Court of Admiralty also is, by the comity of nations, held to be conclusive upon the same question arising in this country. Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show, 232, Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East, 160. But the sentence of a Court of Admiralty, sitting under a commission from a belligerent power in a neutral country, will not be recognised in our courts. Havelock v. Rockwood, 8 T. R. 268, Donaldson v. Thompson, 1 Campb. 429. The sentence is only evidence of what is positively affirmed in it, not of what is to be gathered by inference from it. Fisher v. Ogle, 1 Camph. 413, Horneyor v. Lushington, 3 Campb. 89, but see Lothian v. Hender

son, 3 B. and P. 525. If the property is condemned on the ground of its not being neutral, the sentence is conclusive evidence of that fact. Barzillay v. Lewis, Park Ins. 469, 6th Ed. So where no special ground is stated, but the ship is condemned generally as a good and lawful prize, it is to be presumed that the sentence proceeded on the ground of the property belonging to an enemy, and the sentence will be conclusive evidence of that fact. Saloucci v. Woodmas, Park Ins. 471. 3 Dougl. S. C. But where there is some ambiguity in the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, so that the precise ground of the determination cannot be collected, the courts here may examine the ground on which the sentence proceeded. Bernardi v. Motteaux, Dougl. 574. And if the condemnation does not plainly proceed upon the ground of enemies' property, or of the ship not having complied with subsisting treaties between her own country and that of the capturing power, but on the ground of regulations arbitrarily imposed by the latter, to which neither the government of the captured ship nor the other powers of Europe have been made parties, such a condemnation shall not be admitted as conclusive against a warranty of neutrality. Pollard v. Bell, T. R. 444. Baring v. Clagett, 3 B. and P. 215; see Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East, 155, 2 Taunt. 85.

Effect of Judgments in rem.

A judgment of condemnation of goods in the Court of Exchequer upon a proceeding in rem, is conclusive evidence as to all the world, and, therefore, after such judgment, trespass will not lie against the officer who seized the goods, to try the point of forfeiture again. Scott v. Sherman, 2 W. Bl. 977. But if the proceeding was in personam merely, as a conviction for penalties, and not in rem, the judgment is not evidence in any case in which the parties are different. Hart v. M'Namara, 4 Price, 154 (n). So the judgment of commissioners of excise, on an information for an offence against an excise law, is conclusive, Fuller v. Fotch, Carth. 346, and binds a stranger. Roberts v. Fortune, Hargr. Law Tracts, 468 (n). 1 Phil. Ev. 337; but see Henshaw v. Pleasance, 2 W. Bl. 1174, contra. See also 1 Ridgway, Irish T. R. 1, 2 Evans's Pothier, It has been said that an acquittal in the Court of Exchequer, upon a seizure made for want of a permit, is conclusive evidence that the permit was regular; Per Lord Kenyon, Cooke v. Sholl, 5 T. R. 255. Vin. Ab. Evid. (A. b. 22); but this opinion has been, with reason, questioned; for the acquittal does not, like a conviction, ascertain any precise fact, and may have proceeded merely on the ground that sufficient evidence was not produced. 1 Phil. Ev. 338.

307.

Effect of Proceedings in Equity.

Bill in Chancery.] It is laid down in a book of authority, that a bill in Chancery is evidence against the complainant, for the allegations of every man's bill shall be supposed true, nor shall it be supposed to be preferred by a counsel or solicitor, without the party's privity, and therefore it amounts to a confession, and admission of the truth of the fact, and if the counsel have mingled with it any fact that is not true, the party may have his action; but in order to make the bill evidence against the complainant, there must be proceedings upon it. B. N. P. 235. Snow v. Phillips, 1 Sid. 221. Taylor v. Cole, 7 T. R. 3 (n). Gilb. Ev. 49. 1 Stark. Ev. 286. But it is said by Lord Kenyon, that a bill in Chancery is never admitted in evidence further than to show that such a bill did exist, and that certain facts were in issue between the parties. Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T.R. 3. 1 Phill. Ev. 341. Ferrers v. Shirley, Gilb. 197. So in the Banbury Peerage case, 2 Selw. N. P. 714, to a question whether a bill in Chancery can ever be received in evidence, in a court of law, to prove any facts either alleged or denied in such bill, the judges answered, that generally speaking a bill in Chancery cannot be received in evidence in a court of law to prove any fact, either alleged or denied, in such bill. But whether any possible case might be put, which would form an exception to such general rule, the judges could not undertake to say. At all events a

bill in equity cannot be received as evidence against a party not claiming, or deriving in any manner under either the plaintiff or defendant in the Chancery suit. Ibid. See 1 M. and R. 667, 7 B. and C. 789.

Answer.] An answer in Chancery is good evidence against the defendant, as an admission on oath, and it must all be taken together; therefore if upon exceptions taken a second answer has been put in, the defendant may insist upon having that read to explain what he swore in his first answer. B.N.P. 237, Gilb. Ev. 50. Where one party reads part of the answer of the other party in evidence, he makes the whole admissible only so far as to wave any objection as to the competency of the testimony of the party making the answer, and he does not thereby admit as evidence, facts which may happen to have been stated by way of hearsay only; Per Chamber, J., Roe v. Ferrers, 2 B. and P. 548; but this point does not appear to have been judicially decided. See ante, p. 34.

The answer of a guardian is no evidence against an infant, nor the answer of a trustee against a cestui que trust. B. N. P. 237. But an answer will be evidence against privies; thus an answer in a suit for tithes instituted by a vicar