1831. POWELL V. EASON. December 1830, sought by this action to recover the amount from the Defendant. The Defendant had inserted the Plaintiff's name and the amount of the promissory note in his schedule. A verdict having been obt ined for the Plaintiff, Adams Serjt. obtained a rule nisi to set it aside, on the ground that the Defendant, by his discharge under the insolvent debtors' act, was exonerated from any such demand. Wilde Serjt, was to have shewn cause, but the Court called on Adams to support his rule. He contended that the general object of the insolvent debtors' act, 7 G. 4. c. 57., was to give the debtor a complete discharge from all his embarrassments, which object would be defeated if, notwithstanding a discharge from the claim of a principal creditor, he should afterwards be liable at the suit of a surety to such creditor. The insolvent is not to take the benefit of the act a second time within five years, except in certain cases, of which a suit at the instance of a surety is not one; if, therefore, this action lies, the Defendant may, for five years, be deprived of the benefit of the act. By section 60. he is to be released from arrest for any debt or sum or sums of money due before his discharge; and the words sum or sums of money seem to have been intended to apply to such a demand as the present. So by s. 51. he is to include in his schedule sums payable by way of annuity or otherwise. In Wilmer v. White (a) the Court did not decide this question, but merely refused to interfere summarily on motion. (a) 6 Bingh. 291. Heath 1831. POWELL บ. EASON. Heath Serjt. was on the same side. TINDAL C. J. I think the verdict for the Plaintiff ought to stand. The question arises on the construc-: tion of the insolvent (debtors' act, and we are to take the description of the debts from which the insolvent is to be discharged from the tenth and forty-sixth sections! of the act. The tenth, which authorizes the insolvent's petition, describes them as "the demands of all persons who shall claim to be creditors of such prisoner at the time of presenting such petition." as And s. 46. authorizes his discharge from custody 66 to the several debts and sums of money due or claimed to be due at the time of filing such prisoner's petition." Then, was the Plaintiff a creditor of the Defendant at the time of presenting his petition? There was no debt as between him and the Defendant; the debt was due from the Defendant to Bell, the Plaintiff was no more than a surety, and consequently no creditor at the time of the discharge. As a confirmation of this view of the subject, we find that in an act passed the year before, the bankrupt act 6 G. 4. c. 16., a machinery is employed to relieve the bankrupt from the claim of a surety, for he may pay the debt and stand in the place of the original creditor. There is no such clause in the present act, from which we may infer that the legislature intended to discharge a bankrupt from such claims, but not an insolvent. GASELEE J. I am of the same opinion. There is no possibility for a surety to claim under the insolvent debtors' act, except by paying the debt before the insolvent's discharge. BOSANQUET J. The Plaintiff is entitled to retain his verdict: the debt for which he sues, became due subsequently 1831. POWELL v. EASON. sequently to the discharge of the insolvent, and there are no words in the act which relieve the insolvent from such a claim. The relief is confined to debts due at the time of the discharge. As to debts to become due by bond, annuity, or otherwise, the fifty-first section, which applies to them, cannot include a debt like this, for it says the Court shall ascertain their value, "regard being had to the original price given for such sum or sums of money, deducting therefrom such diminution in the value thereof as shall have been caused by the lapse of time since the grant thereof to the time of filing such prisoner's petition." ALDERSON J. The fifty-first section was meant to benefit annuity creditors, by enabling them to claim for the whole amount, instead of the mere arrears due at the time of the discharge. Rule discharged. Nov. 12. Defendant, upon certain terms favour THORNE V. Marquess of LONDONDerry. THIS cause, an action for an assault on a female servant, was entered for trial by a common jury at the able to Plain sittings after last Trinity term; it was twice called on late in the day, and as often postponed on the reprea special jury sentation of the Defendant's counsel, that it would occupy after the cause a long time. The cause having been made a remanet tiff, was allowed to have had stood for trial by a com- to this term, the Defendant now obtained a rule for a mon jury dur- special jury; which rule ing a whole sittings, and had been twice postponed at the instance of the Defendant. Wilde Serjt. moved to discharge, on the authority of the rule of Court, which requires that the rule for a special special jury be served two days before the adjournment day after each term (a). The application should have been made before the adjournment day of the last sittings. Jones Serjt., on the part of the Defendant, offered judgment of the term, the production of certain witnesses, and other facilities to the Plaintiff, as the condition of retaining the special jury. These terms were not acceded to; but The Court allowed the Defendant to retain his special jury upon condition of his fixing the cause for trial on a certain day, giving judgment of the term, and bringing up certain witnesses required by the Plaintiff. Rule to set aside the rule for a special jury (a) R. T. 52 G. 3. 4 Taunt. 600. 1831. THORNE ย Marquess of DERRY. Mayor and Corporation of NORWICH v. GILL. Nov. 16. THE sheriffs and coroners of Norwich being members Practice. of the corporation, Taddy Serjt. moved that the Court would enjoin the prothonotary to approve or appoint elisors to whom process should be directed; the prothonotary thinking he could not do so without an order from the Court. The Court acceded to the application, and made the rule absolute in the first instance. Rule absolute. Elisors. 1831. Nov. 16. Practice. Nov. 16. SCRUTON V. DAWSON. JONES Serjt., upon the usual affidavit, moved to change the venue from London to the city of Norwich, unless the Plaintiff would consent to try in the county of Norfolk; but The Court refused to accede to the application, except on an affidavit disclosing special grounds for it, and Jones (a) See Walton v. Hutton, 1 Chitty's Rep. 14., and 1 Tidd's Pr. 655. (8th ed.) in not. Also Took nothing. (a) 15 Petersdorff's Ab. tit. Venue, in not. WILLIAMS v. LEWSEY. execution As against an EXECUTION being issued in this cause against the Defendant's goods, the sheriff, before the goods creditor, a landlord is en- were sold, received notice from the Defendant's landtitled to a full lord to retain 450l. for a year's rent. year's rent, although he has been used to remit some portion of it to his tenant. The sheriff, under an indemnity, refused to retain more than 360%., on the ground that the landlord had abated his rent to that amount. On a motion calling on the sheriff to pay over the 450%. to the Defendant's landlord out of the proceeds of the Defendant's goods, the landlord deposed, that though on account of hard times he had made a voluntary reduction in the Defendant's rent, yet he always considered himself entitled to demand the full amount, and |