of driving the enemy's troops before him, and obtaining possession of the capital, Madrid. The French troops, in Spain, at that time, occupied a defensive line of positions, from Toledo to Salamanca. On the advance of Lord Wellington into Spain, they left their positions, and concen. trated their forces to oppose him. Lord Wellington marched, in the direction of Madrid, as far as Talavera; where he was obliged to stop for want of provisions, and the means of transport. The battle was fought, and the enemy for the moment repulsed. But the general object of the advance into Spain was lost. The enemy retained possession of the capital, and the British troops were obliged to retreat. It had been said that Lord Wellington had displayed great skill in the dispositions he made for battle. Lord Grey would not agree in that opinion. The position on the left had not been sufficiently secured or taken advantage of there was much also to blame in the conduct of Lord Wellington, with respect to the Spanish troops; though certainly the dispatch of the Spanish general, gave a very different account of the conduct of those troops, from that given in the dispatch of Lord Wellington. But if Lord Wellington believed the Spanish troops to be of such a description that they could not be trusted to meet the enemy in a situation of such imminent peril at Talavera; if Lord Wellington held such an opinion of the Spanish troops, why did he give the Spanish general the option, either of defending the

passes against the advance of the French army, under the Duke of Dalmatia, which threatened the flank and rear of the British, or taking care of our sick and wounded at Talavera? Why, also, had not Lord Wellington better information respecting the defence of the passes? Why trust to the ins telligence he received from the Spaniards, neglecting even the ordinary precaution of sending an officer of his own to ascertain whe ther the passes were properly defended? His Majesty's ministers, at the time that they trumpeted forth the battle as a splendid and decisive victory,were in the possession of Lord Wellington's dis patches, in which he stated the unfortunate situation of his army, the necessity of retreating, and the difficulties he had to encounter în' effecting a retreat.

The Marquis of Wellesley, after expressing his private feelings oir the present occasion, when he was called on to perform a public duty, by vindicating the character and conduct of so near and dear a rela tion as a brother, begged leave, in the outset, to observe, that the no-" ble earl (Grey) did not seem very clearly to understand the objects of Lord Wellington's operations. On the arrival of his brother in Portugal, he found that the ene-my was not only in possession of its northern provinces, but that a plan had been concerted, by which Victor and Soult were to advance from different points, into the south. The first object, therefore, was the deliverance of Portugal. The operation by which he expelled Soult was as able, as rapid,

. and

mons to put forth its penal powers. It was no time for civility. It was no time for ceremoniously waving the best interests of the state, in courteous compliance with the feelings of those who had either betrayed or endangered them. The present was not a time for shaping amendments to the imaginary niceties of those gentlemen who revolted at all idea of panishment. It was the time to speak out, and pursue with unwearied zeal public defaulters of every description.

Lord Castlereagh said, that conscious of the wise policy on which the expeditions, on which so much of that day's discussion turned,were formed, and the manner in which they had been directed to the attainment of their objects, he had more reason to court than to shrink from inquiry; nor did he fear the exercise of that penal justice, with which Mr. Ponsonby had threatened him. But he trusted, that the house would not, like the honourable gentleman, think it necessary, in order to furnish the grounds of charge, or subjects of inquiry, to recur to the whole course of the administration, in which he had lately a share. They would not attempt, he trusted, to bestow censure beyond the transactions of last year. It was not his intention to make any invidious comparisons; but in the military and naval strength of the country, much improvement had lately taken place. The Baltic was in our possession. The Brest fleet had been nearly annihilated. And the fleet of the Tagus had been brought into our ports; and, he would ask if Spain would have discovered that spirit of resistance and enthu

siasm against the common enemy's if she had not been conscious of acting in conjunction with this country? He would also ask whether, amidst the political misfortunes that surrounded us, this country was not only in a state of safety, but of unexampled prosperity?

With all our power and prospe rity, however, this was not, comparatively speaking, a military: country. We could not go to the continent as we did to sea. Our military efforts being directed to the continent, depended on the results of the efforts and engagements of other powers, to whom we could only be auxiliary. But whatever might have been the result of last year's campaign, the military glory of this country had been much promoted. The principles on which the late campaign: in the peninsula had been conducted, were far different from those on which the antecedent. Spanish campaign had been un-; dertaken, being particularly con nected with the security of Portugal. Lord Wellington had a discretionary power; and that power he most judiciously exercised. Had he not advanced to Talavera, he must have disgraced himself and the British army. Never had a greater victory been achieved than that at Talavera.-As to the expedition to Walcheren, the means were wanting to move it sooner, the transports not having arrived from Portugal till the 5th of July. It was impossible to transport 40,000 men to the North of Ger many; and had it been possible, in a military point of view it would have been improper, from the si tuation and the disposition of the neighbouring

neighbouring powers: The Scheldt appeared the most eligible point of attack, as more nearly connected with the commercial views of this country. Antwerp was an objeet of great political importance to France, and a descent there was mare likely to call forth Buona parte's attention than an attack on any other place. It was his practice to slight any distant diversions that might be made, and stedfastly pursue his main object. But when he should thus be attacked in a vital point, it was reasonable to suspect that it would operate powerfully in favour of our allies. He was not ignorant of the nature of the climate at that season of the year: but it was not intended that the army should be locked up there for such a length of time. It was a coup de main against the naval power of the enemy that was intended, and not the capture of Walcheren alone. It was expect ed that the army would be employed in a dry country, between Walcheren and Bergen-op-Zoom. No object of magnitude was expected to oppose our retaining Walcheren. It had never been considered as an axiom, that the risk attending the occupancy of that island should deter us from taking it. We held it thirty-one years, during the Barrier Treaty, and had since had it in our possession. With respect to the evacuation of the island, he had had no share in the measures of govern

ment.

General Tarleton thought that a most peculiar degree of responsibility lay upon Lord Chatham, who was at the same time a minister and commander of the expedition to Walcheren. That expe

dition had been attended with a greater expence of treasure, and sacrifice of human life, than almost any other in our history; and yet it had most completely failed in its objects. The expedition to Spain was equally a subject deserving inquiry. We first heard of Soult's army being completely defeated, or dispersed, in the north of Portugal. And yet this army appeared soon afterwards in the field, and made Lord Wellington retreat from Talavera. The march to Talavera was most im-prudent. When that able officer, the gallant Sir John Moore, was entering Spain, he was told that a body of 10,000 men would completely exhaust that part of the country of its provisions. The general stated, at length, the superior advantages which, he conceived, would have resulted from employing 30,000 British troops in a diversion in Italy, under Sir John Moore. This might not have been agreeable to the Wellesleys; but it might have prevented the army of Eugene Napoleon from joining Buonaparte, which would have been, in his opinion, the most important service that it was in our power to have rendered to Austria, and consequently to Spain.

Mr. Canning, after a great deal of prefatory matter, particularly sarcastical allusions to the conduct of the preceding administration, said, that he never would have consented to the expedition, if he had conceived that nothing greater would have been accomplished. But he did consider, that the pos session of the naval arsenal at Antwerp would have been an object of the first importance, as a British C 2

object

object; and also that no other point could have been selected where the force which it was in the power of this country to send, could have rendered more service to the common cause. He then shewed the advantages to have been expected, if the expedition had succeeded. If it were true, as some gentlemen stated, that Buonaparte was never to be diverted from the grand objects of his policy, by any expedition that this country could send out, such an objection would not be applicable particularly to the isle of Walcheren, but to all expeditions. If, however, it were true, that no expeditions of ours could divert Buonaparte from his other projects, could we not give some material annoyance to an enemy? As to the north of Germany, we had no right to stimulate other people to struggle, unless we were previously determined to support them with our utmost means, whether it might suit our convenience or not. And it would have been most impolitic to have come to such a determination in the present state of Europe. If we could have sent a great and substantial army, such as that which traversed Germany in the thirty years war, under Gustavus Adolphus, and afterwards his captains, carrying along with it its own magazines, then, perhaps, the north of Germany might have been the proper destination.

With regard to Spain, Mr. Canning observed, that we did not pretend to commit ourselves to the same extent that the Spanish nation was committed. It was always understood that the British army was lent to them as a trust

to be restored, not as a loan to be expended. At present there was no question about this country raising a general confederacy against France. That, in the present posture of affairs, would be an idle speculation. But if any country was resolved to make an effort to break its chains, that country became our ally. It had been said, why not endeavour to effect an internal change in Spain? Any condition almost might be coupled with assistance with less danger than an attempt at internal amelioration. As to an en

quiry into the affairs of Spain, however, he could give no opinion for or against it. If ministers thought it proper, he had no objection. He feared, however, that an enquiry into the expedi tion to Spain, which might throw blame upon the Spaniards for want of co-operation, might injure the interests of this country in its future connection with Spain.-He did not mean to speak against Lord Wellesley, when he said, that the march to Talavera was his own act. He approved of it, and of the honours conferred on that gallant officer. We ought not to undervalue the hero's lau rels, even though they were bar ren.

Mr. Whitbread said that Mr. Canning had spoken on the present subject with his accustomed fluency; but when his speech was analysed, it would appear that he meant only to justify the expedi tion which did take place, by comparing it with expeditions which did not take place. The expedition was so far from attracting the attention of Buonaparte to the most vulnerable parts of his em