A respondent having filed an affidavit in one the solicitor. Bradford v. Roche, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. suit, cannot rely in another suit upon the same affi- 75. affidavit, as evidence of the facts stated therein. Galbraith v. Cooper, 6 Ir. Eq. R. 518.

Appeal.] The court will not hear an appeal against a Master's rulings in a case under the 15th section of the Chancery Regulation Act; the order must be made up. Cullen v. Nicholson, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 212, R.

An appeal from an order of the Incumbered Estates Court to the Court of Appeal in Chancery is an appeal under the Incumbered Estates Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 77, s. 51, and must, therefore, be brought within one month of the making of the order appealed from. Ashe v. Dwyer, 6 Ir. Ch. R. | 177; S. C. 2 Ir. Jur. N. S. 217, C. of Ap.

Liberty to appeal to the House of Lords, after the expiration of a year from the decree, will not be granted where the Lord Chancellor is satisfied that the decree is right, and the only reason alleged for the delay is the pendency of negociations, not with the parties to the cause, but with persons represented by them, which have not misled the person aggrieved by the decree, and have not prevented proceedings being had under the decree which would be made useless if the decree were reversed. Attorney-General v. Corporation of Belfast, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 27.

Where the parties entitled to a fund had for a long series of years dealt with it in a particular way, it was held, in the absence of any positive evidence to show what their shares in the fund were, that they must be taken to have been entitled to it, in the shares pointed out, by their mode of dealing with it. Sneyd v. Steward, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 105.

Where, on an appeal from a Master's order, the court considered that certain matters had not been properly put in issue before the Master, it gave the appellant liberty to file and use, upon the appeal motion, a supplemental charge, putting the matters in issue. Ib.

Commission to examine witnesses.] The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to order a commission to examine witnesses abroad, before the hearing of the cause. Druitt v. Druitt, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 171; S. C. 2 Ir. Jur. N. S. 420.

Evidence.] On an application for leave to examine witnesses viva voce, supported only by an affidavit that counsel had advised that such examination was necessary, the motion was ordered to stand over till the hearing of the cause. It is not an answer to such an application that the applicant had previously been refused permission to file additional affidavits made by the proposed witnesses. Murphy v. Longfield, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 566.

The motion for leave to examine a witness under the provisions of the 11th General Order of May, 1857, may be made to the Lord Chancellor. Ormsby v. Edgar, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 295.

Notice, service of] Where it is sought to substitute service of the summons and notice of a cause petition upon a party out of the jurisdiction, by serving a person who is a solicitor on record in other matters, notice of motion should be served on

The Masters have jurisdiction to make orders for substitution of service, in cases referred to them under the 15th section of the Chancery Regulation Act. The Master of the Rolls will not make such orders in those cases. Splaine v. Splaine, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 316, R.

Petition.] A petitioner must state his case fully upon his petition, and cannot put matters on which he means to rely, in issue by his affidavits in reply to the respondent's affidavit in answer. Murphy v. Jackson, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 132, R.

Where a purchaser of lands waives his right to have proof of the vendor's title, and a suit for specific performance of the contract is instituted by the vendor, the latter ought, if he wishes to take advantage of the waiver, to put the question in issue by his cause petition. The point should not be raised by a subsequent affidavit. Meara v. Rogers, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 108.

As a general rule, each party to a contract for the purchase of lands should employ a separate solicitor, and the same solicitor ought not to act for both. Ib.

Where a petitioner prays relief on a particular agreement, and a different agreement is produced, the proper course to be taken is for the party to amend his petition, abandoning the relief originally prayed, and praying relief on the agreement produced. If he continues to rely on the original agreement, and seeks relief in the alternative, the petition must be dismissed. Daly v. Coghlan, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 150.

Where the petitioner intends to rely upon a waiver by the respondent of a right arising out of the contract, the waiver must be specifically put in issue by the petition. Barry v. Burns, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 97.

Petitions under s. 15.] The jurisdiction given by the 15th section of the Chancery Regulation Act does not extend to a petition for the appointment of a new trustee, where it prays the removal of an existing trustee. Mills v. O'Loghlin, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 565.

A., entitled to the lands of Greenacre devised them to B., B. mortgaged Greenacre and Blackacre to C. A. was at the time of his death indebted to D. On a petition, filed by D., praying for an administration of A.'s assets, and that C.'s mortgage might be thrown on Blackacre in the first instance: Held, that the suit came within the jurisdiction conferred by the 15th section of the Chancery Regulation Act (1850). Murray v. Madden, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 228.

Security for costs.] Where the period for answering expires during the vacation, and together with notice of the affidavit in answer being filed, the respondent serves notice of a motion to obtain security for costs, the right to move is not waived by the step taken in the cause by filing the affidavit. Alker v. Alker, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 50, R.

Suggestion.] In the case of a person under disability to bring the case before the court, the course is to file the suggestion, and serve a copy on the

had thereunder, on the ground of an alteration

Advances by Commissioners of, to tenant for life], having been made in same subsequent to its being see TENANT FOR LIFE.

issued and sealed. Freeman v. Kellett, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 295, Q. B.

Semble, even where no writ has issued, and the defendant appears at the trial, endeavours to sustin his case, and fails, the court will not afterwards, on motion of the defendant, set the proceedings aside. Ib.

Semble, where a record of the court has been altered or tampered with by any person without leave of the court, on such person being brought before the court it will visit him with the severest punishment. Ib.

of Chancery." Peyton v. Lambert, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 31; S. C. 2 Ir. Jur. N. S. 217, C. of Ap.

The Lord Chancellor has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for liberty to use new evidence upon a re-hearing of a cause before the Court of Appeal. Such evidence must be put in issue by a supplemental petition, in the nature of a bill of review, and the application for liberty to file such petition must be made at the Rolls Court. Barton v. Sampson, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 71.

Where a supplemental petition, in the nature of a bill of review, has been filed, this court has jurisdiction, under the 19 & 20 Vic. c. 92, to hear the supplemental petition along with the re-hearing of the decree in the original cause, and the proper practice is to set down such petition for hearing before the Court of Appeal, along with the re-hearing of the decree appealed from. Barton v. Sampson, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 71, C. of Ap.

RENEWAL.

A demised certain lands to B, for three lives, with a covenant for perpetual renewal. The last renewal bore date in the year 1838, and was made to C, who, in the year 1840, mortgaged the lands to D. In the year 1841 one of the cestuis que vies named in the last renewal died. In 1850 A served a notice under the Tenantry Act upon C, the tenant in possession, calling on him to renew; and C, having in the year 1852 filed a cause petition against A for a renewal, that petition was dismissed. Four years afterwards J. G., the heir-at-law and executor of D, filed another petition against A for a renewal. J. G. had not been served with notice of the demand of fines under the Tenantry Act. The petition charged that J. G. was the person entitled to take out the renewal, and that he was not bound by the notice served on C.

Held, that the notice served on C. was a sufficient demand within the Tenantry Act, so as to work a forfeiture of the tenant's interest, though the legal estate was outstanding in the mortgagee. Galbraith v. Cooper, 3 Ir. Jur. Ñ. S. 69, C.

The mortgagee out of possession is not the "assignee" within the meaning of the Tenantry Act. Ib.

A made a lease for three lives, containing a covenant to the following effect: "I, A, bind myself and my heirs on the decease of any of the three above-mentioned lives, to put in another person's life in the said lease." All the lives having dropped, Held, that the lessee was entitled to have a new life added to the lease. Murphy v. Jackson, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 307; S. C. 2 Ir. Jur. N. S. 362, R.

A party will not be relieved on the ground of unavoidable accident against the non-performance of a condition to demand a renewal of a lease, within a certain time after the dropping of a life, upon a mere statement that he was out of the country when the event occurred, and that he had not heard of it till long after. Murphy v. Jackson, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 132, R.

A lease for three lives contained a covenant by the lessor, upon the decease of any of the lives, to

put in another person's life, the lessee, his heirs or assigns giving notice within twelve months of the decease of the said life. The lessee's own life was the last surviving life in the lease, and his son and heir-at-law having been in America when that life dropped, did not hear of his father's death until after the expiration of twelve months from the date of that event, and did not in the interval serve any notice to renew:

Held, affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls, that the party so absent was not entitled to relief on the ground of unavoidable accident. Murphy v. Jackson, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 288, C. of Ap.

Semble, upon the construction of the above covenant, the word "any" was not referable to the last surviving life, and that any new life to be inserted, pursuant to the covenant, should be so inserted within the proper time after the dropping of the first or second life. lb.

A lease for three lives, dated June, 1, 1715, contained the following covenant for renewal, "And the said Alexander Montgomery doth, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, covenant, grant, conclude, and agree, to and with the said James Green, his heirs, executors, and administrators, that, as often as any of the said lives shall fall, to renew to the said James Green, his heirs and assigns, any other new life that he or they shall name, if demanded within six calendar months after the fall of any such life as shall happen to drop, provided that the said James Green, his executors, administrators, or assigns, does pay to the said Alexander Montgomery, his heirs and assigns, all the rents and arrears that shall then be due, and pay as a fine for every new life, as this demise shall be renewed for ever, he paying 16s. 8d. sterling, for inserting the same." The last renewal was executed in the year 1780, and between that date and the year 1856, the representatives of the original lessee were ignorant of their right to renewal, the land being in the possession of a sub-lessee, who paid the rent to the head landlord. In that year they first became acquainted with their rights, by being named respondents to a petition filed by the sub-tenant against the head landlord, praying that he might be directed to execute a renewal to the respondents, in order that the respondents might renew to them, pursuant to an alleged covenant in the sub-demise. The petition of the sub-tenant was dismissed with costs, and the representative of the original lessee thereupon claimed a renewal from the head landlord. The renewal was refused; and, under the advice of counsel, the owners of the original lease took no defence to proceedings ou ejectment. The long vacation and assizes intervening, and also a notice of a Chancery petition by parties claiming a right to renewal paramount to the title of the owners of the lease, they remained passive until it was seen that the adverse petition was likely to drop, and then filed their own petition, in December, 1857. Held, 1st: That the covenant in the above lease was a covenant for perpetual renewal. 2nd: That, on the above state of facts, the representatives of the original lessee had not disentitled

themselves, by laches, to the benefit of the renewal. that if the lessee, his heirs, &c., should not, within Roberts v. Mayne, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 353, C.

M, a minor and ward of the court, was entitled to a renewable leasehold interest, there being in the minor matter a receiver and guardian appointed by the court. All the lives in the lease having dropped, F, the landlord, served a notice under the Tenantry Act, stating the amount of fines, and requiring a renewal to be taken out within one month from that date, or in default, that the right to renewal would be considered as forfeited. This notice was not addressed to any one, and was served on the receiver only. The receiver brought the matter before the Master, of which F was made aware; but, owing to the forms of the court, and the state of the minor's property, a period of more than a year elapsed before the report, sanctioning the taking out of a renewal, was confirmed. F, in the meantime, had commenced proceedings by ejectment, without having obtained the leave of the court. M presented a petition for the renewal of the lease. Held, that he was entitled to the relief prayed. Mansergh v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 168, C.

Semble, that the service of notice of demand upon the receiver only was not sufficient. Ib.

Quære, whether the service of the notice by F was not a contempt of court. Ib.

Where a petition was filed under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act, in which the petitioner alleged that no demand had been made on him under the Tenantry Act, and the respondent, though served with notice, neglected to appear on the hearing, and an order for a fee-farm grant was made, the court allowed the petition to be re-heard and varied its order, on an affidavit by the respondent, showing that the petitioner had suppressed a letter addressed to him by the respondent several years before, which might be held to be a demand under the Tenantry Act. In re Renewable Leasehold Act, ex parte Bell, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 332.

Waiver of a demand, if intended to be relied on

six months, nominate a new life and pay the fine, the lessor might refuse to add and insert the life. There was a covenant for quiet enjoyment during the continuance of the lease. Held, that the lease was for lives renewable for ever. Ex parte Magennis, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 59.

A, the tenant of a lease for lives renewable for ever, assigned his entire interest by way of mort gage, but remained in possession of the lands. The lessor served upon A a notice under the Tenantry Act, but did not serve it upon the mortgagee. A omitted for a considerable period to renew the lease. A petition filed by A for a renewal, was dismissed on the ground of laches. Held, that the mortgagee could not sustain a subsequent petition for a renewal, on the grouud of the omission to serve him with the notice. Held, that in the mortgagee's suit the lessor could not rely on his affidavit filed in A's cause, as evidence of the facts stated in the affidavit. Galbraith v. Cooper. 6 Ir. Ch. R. 518. Barring of estate tail by], see ESTATE TAIL.

RENT.

Fee Farm, partition of], see PARTITION.

REPAIRS

Of dwelling-house], see PLEADING.

REPLICATION, see PLEADING.

REPORT.

Exception to.] Where, on exceptions to the Master's report, an issue is directed, upon which a verdict favourable to the excepting party is given, the ordinary rule respecting costs of the exceptions applies, and each party must bear his own costs of the issue. Nixon v. Dane, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 226,

by a petitioner, should be put in issue by the peti- RESIDENCE, see BILL OF SALE; JUDGMENT; tion' and not by an affidavit in reply. Ib.

A lease was to hold for three lives, named, and "for the lives of all and every such other person or persons as, by virtue of the covenant for renewal hereinafter contained, shall, from time to time, successively and for ever be added during this demise." The lessor covenanted, that upon the death or fall of any of the aforesaid lives, and the nomination of the life of any other person, by the lessee, to be put and inserted in the place and stead of the person so happening to die, within six months after the fall or death of such person so dying, and the payment of a fine, to add and insert to the time and term of the lease, the life of such persons so nominated in the place and stead of the person so happening to die, as aforesaid. The lessce covenanted that within six months after the fall of the life or lives of any of the persons named in the lease, or of any of the lives which thereafter should be inserted, in pursuance of the covenant for renewal therein contained, he, his heirs, &c., should nominate to the lessor a new life and pay the renewal fine; and it was agreed

MORTGAGE.

RETAINER.

When an attorney's authority is denied, he may establish it by parol evidence; and it is not neces sary that it should be in writing except where, upon the evidence, the authority is doubtful. Connors v. Kennedy, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 127.

RETURN.
False return], see SHERIFF.

REVIEW.
Bill in nature of], see RE-HEARING.

REVIVOR, (WRIT OF.)
Defence to], see STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

SALE, see VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Bill of, see BILL OF SALE.