Held, that the defendant not having exercised his right of removing the fixtures during the period of the tenancy, nor within a reasonable time after the expiration thereof, nor during a period of posTo a writ of revivor of a judgment recovered in session by him, in which he had a right to consider 1844, a plea by way of equitable defence, stating himself as tenant, they became vested in the landthat the plaintiffs had by deed assigned the judg-lord as part of the freehold, and could not be carried ment, of which assignment the defendant had away by the defendant. Penton v. Robert, 2 East. received notice, was set aside, with costs. No 88, disapproved of. Deeble v. M Mullen, 3 Ir. Jur. memorial of the assignment had been enrolled. N.S. 80. Southill and Shaw v. Evanson, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 415.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, see MAGISTRATES. fixtures. Ib.

cultivated the lands until 1831, when a deed of
partition was executed, and A. gave his moiety to
the eldest son of B., and from that period A. exer-
cised no control over the land; the rent having
been paid by B.'s family up to its expiration in
1849. B. died in 1848, and his family remained
in occupation for three years and a half after his
death. Receipts for the rents were passed in A.'s
name up to 1848, when a sum of £65 was paid by
A. In 1851 a writ issued against A. for arrear of
this rent. To this action A. took defence, denying
his liability, and, subsequently, by agreement, a
sum was paid on account. A was not then in occu-
pation, and directed the agents of the landlord to
take possession. Held, that no action was main-
tainable against the representatives of A., for
occupation of the premises after the expiration of
the lease, and that on this evidence the judge ought
not to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, and that it
was no misdirection leaving a question to the jury,
whether A. had assented to such over-holding
(Crampton, J. dissentiente). Mahony v. Lewis, 6
Ir. C.L.R. 475.

his property for the benefit of his creditors then the said term should cease and determine absolutely. A. becoming embarrased, proposed to assign his property, comprising the interest in the lease, to trustees, for the benefit of his creditors; and several of the creditors, including the lessor, assented to the proposal. A deed poll of composition, referring to a deed of assignment, of even date therewith, was executed by the assenting creditors, including the lessor. The deed of assignment was not executed, but it had been engrossed and consented to by the several creditors, the lessor included. The deed poll contained a proviso, that if the same was not executed by three-fourths of the creditors of A. within six months from the date thereof, the same should be void and of no effect. A. subsequently committed an act of bankruptcy, by leaving the country; and upon a special case stated to the court, under the 20 & 21 Vic. cap. 60, sec. 355: Held, that the proviso in the lease was severable; and that the lessor, by licensing the breach of one condition in the proviso, did not license the breach of the others; that, by the act of bankruptcy, not licensed, the lease was forfeited, and that the landlord might lawfully enter, but that not having thought proper to await the decision of the court, he should bear his own costs. Re Moore, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 142, B. C.

A., in 1765, leased lands for lives renewable for ever to B., reserving the right to quarry limestone, making compensation for the injury done to the surface. B.'s interest, previous to 1824, vested in R. (a feme sole), and A.'s interest vested in D. In 1824, R. leased the lands to Y. for her (R.'s) life, with liberty to Y. to quarry, without making compensation. D. obtained an injunction, restraining the parties from quarrying. Subsequently, in 1831, Y. obtained a lease of the quarries from D. for the term of R.'s life, and proceeded to quarry. In 1832, B.'s interest vested in trustees (the plaintiffs). Y.'s leases expired in 1850, by the death of R. D. died in same year. In an action for damages for injury to the surface, by quarrying, between the years 1836 and 1846, by the trustees against the personal representative of D

Held, that the lease of 1824 operated as a sus pension of the right of action by R., or the trustees claiming under her, for any injury done to the surface during the continuance of that lease. Day v. Hales, 3 Ir. Jur N.S. 367, Q.B.

Held, that the lease of 1831 operated as a confirmation of the defeasible title to work the quarries, granted by the lease of 1824, and, that the quarrying was done under the joint operation of the two leases. Ib.

Held, that a general right of action would be admitted by payment of money into court on a part of a whole cause of action. Ib.

Held, that an assignee cannot sue for a breach of covenant which was occasioned previous to the assignment. Ib.

By lease bearing date the 11th of November, 1818, certain premises were demised to A. and B.

LARCENY, see CRIMINAL LAW.

LEASE,

Certain mines were demised by the plaintiffs for a term determinable upon three months' notice. In the lease was contained a provision that at the end of ths term, the lessor might purchase all machinery in the mines, "they having given six months previous notice of their intention," ""at a fair valuation, to be set thereon by two indifferent persons, one of whom should be named by the lessors, and the other by the lessees; and in case of any difference arising between them, then by an umpire to be named by such referees." There was also a covenant that, in the event of the above notice of surrender being given by the lessees, the machinery should not be removed for six months after the giving of it, in order to enable the lessors to find a purchaser for the machinery, at a valuation to be fixed as aforesaid. On the 2nd of April, 1856, the assignees of the lessees served notice, as above mentioned, of their intention to surrender, and in September, 1856, were removing the machinery from the mine. On the 8th of that month, a petition was filed praying an injunction. Held, that the injunction should not be continued beyond the end of six months from the 2nd of April, 1856, as the court has no means of enforcing the sale of the machinery to the lessors, as provided by the lease. Hamilton v. Dunsford 6 Ir. Ch. R. 412.

Every lease, required by law to be in writing, must, under the provisions of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, sec. 3, be made by deed. The word "release," in the proviso to that section, must be construed as bearing its ordinary meaning. Gilman v. Crowley, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 393, Q.B. Of Tithes], see TITHES.

as joint tenants for a term of thirty-one years. A. LEASEHOLD CONVERSION ACT, see REbecame a party to this lease as security for B. who

NEWAL.

LEASING POWER, see POWER.

LEGACY.

A testatrix bequeathed a sum to H. which she
directed should be "paid and retained by him, in
the first instance, without any delay or deduction,
immediately after her decease, and after payment of
the above," she gave other legacies. She appointed
H. her executor and residuary legatee. The assets
being deficient, Held, that no priority was given
to H., but that his legacy must abate rateably with
those given to the other legatees. Roche v. Harding,
3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 253, R.

When charged on realty], see WILL.

LIBEL, see PLEADING.

A communication is privileged if made by a party
bona fide, in compliance with a request made by a
party who has no interest in the matter, or if in
discharge of legal or moral duty. Owens v. Roberts,
2 Ir. Jur. N.S. 82; S. C. 6 Ir. C.L.R. 386, C.P.
Action for a libel published by the defendant in
a newspaper. The defendant pleaded that he was
a guardian of the poor of a certain union, and at
a meeting of the board of guardians for that union,
a discussion arose in reference to the plaintiff, and
that speeches were made by several of the guar-
dians, including the defendant, and by the plaintiff
on his own behalf, and that the defendant spoke in
discharge of a public duty, without malice, &c.,
also, that in order to assist the newspaper reporter,
who attended for the purpose of reporting the
proceedings, to publish a correct account of them,
he handed to him a correct report of his own speech,
and that the proprietor of said newspaper published,
without any communication with the defendant or
his consent, a portion of said speech only. Held,
as to the first defence, that the defendant was not
privileged, as it appeared on the defence itself that
the report of the proceedings was not a fair one,
the speeches of the other guardians, or of the
plaintiff himself, not having been given. Held, also,
that, if the privileged occasion failed, the denial of
malice did not constitute a defence. Held, as
to the second defence, that the defendant was
responsible for the fair publication of the pro-
ceedings, when he gave a report of his own speech
for publication. Pierce v. Ellis, 6 Ir. C.L.R. 55.

A plea of justification in libel need not neces-
sarily meet the exact words of the libel, but may |
adopt the sense of the inuendo, and justify that;
therefore, where a count in libel complained, that
the defendant had published of the plaintiff the
following words "how he next appeared in Bun-
crana as curate and tutor, how he gave out while
there, that he was a graduate of Oxford, a captain
of dragoons, &c.," meaning that the plaintiff had
been guilty of wilful falsehood and misrepresenta-
tion of facts, and the defendant pleaded that the
plaintiff had falsely represented that he was a
graduate of Oxford, and had been a surgeon in the

navy, &c., the plea was, on demurrer, held to be
good. O'Connor v. Wallen, 6 Ir. C.L.R. 378.

To an action for libel, charging the defendant
with printing and publishing a libel, of and con-
cerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning him
in his occupation and business, the defendant
pleaded that he did not print or publish, or cause
to be printed or published, the libel of and con-
cerning the plaintiff, or of and concerning him in
his trade and business. Held, on appeal, that the
proper issue on such pleadings was, whether the
defendant printed and published the libel, of or
concerning the plaintiff in his trade and business.
Held also, that a party appealing from the issue
settled by a judge, is not entitled to a postponement
of the trial, or a stay of execution on verdict and
judgment, when the judge at the trial approves of
the issues. Held also, that on an appeal motion,
affidavits subsequently filed cannot be used, and-
be traversed without an affidavit, but it must be
(Per Moore, J.) every material fact in a plaint may
done by separate defences. Boshell v. Anderson, G

Ir. C.L.R. 1.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

R. B. died in 1819, seised in fee of C. East, and
of other lands, and having also a life interest in the
lands of C. West, the reversion of which belonged
to L.-R. B. by will devised all his real estates to
the widow of his brother P., for life, with a power
of appointment, in fee, to whichever of her sons
(G. E. B. or S. B.) she pleased. Upon the death
of R. B., G. E. B. (disputing the title of his
mother) entered upon the lands, including C. West,
adversely as regards the latter to the title of L.,
and continued in undisputed possession until 1825;
from 1825, until 1841, the lands of C. West were
under receivers, appointed by the Court of Chan-
cery, at the instance of the judgment creditors of
R. B. and others. The judgments against R. B.
had been revived against the heir and terre-tenants
of R. B., and G. E. B. was served as terre-tenant.
From 1840, until his death in 1844, G. E. B. was
in the actual enjoyment of the rents and profits of
C. West, and upon his death P. B., his son and
heir-at-law, succeeded to the possession, and con-
tinued in possession until he was evicted thereout,
as well as out of the other devised estates, in 1850,
by the present defendant, claiming as eldest son
and heir-at-law of S. B. the appointee of his mother,
under the will of R. B. A cross ejectment was
brought in 1857 by P. B., and a mortgagee of G.
E. B. (who had not been a party to the former suit)
upon the ground that G. E. B. had gained an estate
in fee by an uninterrupted possession of twenty
years, within 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, secs. 2-3, 34.-
At the trial the judge told the jury in his charge
that the possession of the lands of C. West, by
receivers appointed at the instance of the creditors
of R. B., was such an interruption of the twenty
years' possession as would prevent the statute from
transferring to G. E. B. and his heirs an estate in
fee simple. The jury found that R. B. had only a
life interest in C. West, but that G. E. B. and the

LAW AND EQUITY INDEX. [Limitations, Statute of

Limitations from operating in his favour. Grome v.
Blake, 3 Ir. Jur. N.S. 430, Ex. Ch.

Against estate of married woman], see MARRIED
WOMAN.

MAGISTRATES.

was summoned before the magistrates, by whom the
summons was dismissed, and the apprentice ordered
to be discharged from his indenture, he having at-
tained his age of 21 years: Held, upon an appeal
under the Act to improve the administration of the
law, so far as respects summary proceedings before
justices of the peace, that the order should be set
aside, and that an apprentice desiring to be dis-
charged from his indentures upon his attaining his
age of twenty-one years, must give his master a
reasonable notice of his intention to leave his em-
ployment before doing so. Coughlan, app. Callaghan,
resp., 3 Ir. Jur. N. S. 111.

Where a creditor has instituted a suit in the
Court of Chancery, which suit has been put an
end to by a sale in the Incumbered Estates Court
Where an apprentice continued for a year and a
of the lands, the subject matter of the suit, such halfafter he had attained his full age of twenty-one
creditor will be entitled to the same rights, and years in his master's employment, and then ab-
will as far as possible be placed in as good a posi-sented himself from his employment, for which he
tion in the Incumbered Estates Court, as if he had
been permitted to continue the proceedings instituted
by him in the Court of Chancery. C. having in
1816, obtained an assignment of an annuity,
charged upon certain lands belonging to G., subse-
quently obtained an order in a suit in the Court of
Chancery, appointing a receiver over the lands,
until the arrears of the annuity should be paid.
In 1852, G., the owner, filed a petition for sale of
the lands in the Incumbered Estates Court, and an
absolute order for sale was made in May, 1853.
The term for which the annuity was granted had
expired in March, 1853. Held, that the Statute
of Limitations did not apply so as to restrict C.'s
It appeared by affidavit that J. L. had been sum-
claim to such arrears as had accrued within six moned to attend the Petty Sessions at A. as a wit-
years before the filing of the petition in the Incum-ness, and that the magistrates, conceiving him to
bered Estates Court, but that he was entitled to
whatever amount he might have recovered in the
Court of Chancery, if the suit there had not been
interfered with. This court will not decide a legal
question in order to give effect to an equity, unless
such equity be plain. In re Glover, 6 Ir. Ch. R.

587.

A continuous possession by a trespasser for
twenty years will give him a good title even as
against the true owner. Keeffe v. Kirby, 6 Ir.
C.L.R. 591; S. C. 2 Ir. Jur. N.S. 184, C.P.

Where a writ of revivor prayed a revival of a
judgment recovered in 1819 and revived in 1842, a
defence which alleged the recovery between the
same parties of a judgment in the same court, of
the same date, and for the same amount, that
neither of said judgments were, in fact, revived, as
it did not appear by the record of the judgment of
revivor numbered in the present writ, of which
judgment the revival took place and that the said
present writ of revivor had not been sued out
within twenty years after the recovery of the said
judgments, or either of them. Held, first that the
plea contained no matter sufficient to contradict
the averment in the writ of the revival in 1819
of the judgment now sought to be revived, and that
at all events, to have availed himself of any ambi-
guity, the defendant should have pleaded nul tiel
record. Held, also, that assuming the judgment
of 1819 to have been revived in 1842, the plea of
the Statute of Limitations, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 113,
s. 20, was inapplicable, as the 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c.
27, s. 40, is still in force, and the 20th section of
the former statute relates only to actions by sum-
mons and plaint. Held, also, that the law esta-
blished by the cases of Farran v. Beresford, 10 Cl.
& Fin. 319; and Farrell v. Gleeson, 11 Cl. & Fin.
702, with respect to the effect of judgments of
revivor, remains unaffected by the 20th section of
the Common Law Procedure Act. Johnston v. Bell,
6 Ir. C. L. R. 526, S C 2. Ir. Jur. N. S. 77, Q. B.

be implicated, as a culprit, in the case on which he
was summoned to give evidence, without any other
snmmons or complaint, changed his name from the
witness column to the defendant's column in the
Petty Sessions Book, and then sentenced him to
imprisonment. Held, a certiorari should go; and
that the magistrates appeared to have acted with-
out jurisdiction. Reg. v Justices of Peace of Queen's
County, 3 I. Jur. N. S. 249, Q. B.

This court has no jurisdiction to compel justices
of the peace to sign a certificate of character to
enable a party to obtain a spirit license under 17 &
18 Vict. c. 89. Therefore a motion for a manda-
mus directing the justices of the peace to grant the
certificate will be refused with costs. Reg. v. Jus-
tices of Peace of King's County 3, Ir. Jur. N. S.,
294.

MANDAMUS, see MAGISTRATES; POOR LAW
COMMISSIONERS.

MARRIAGE.

A. by will devised land to G. and B., in trust for
F. A. for life, with a power of jointuring, provided
he married with the consent of G. B. and E. A.,
who were appointed executors, and E. A. also the
guardian. E. A. alone proved the will, the other
two executors having renounced. F. A., while still
a minor, intermarried with L. The consent of the
executors or guardian to the marriage had not been
obtained, and the marriage itself was one voidable
by the institution of a suit by the guardian within
the year. Some days after, the marriage ceremony
was again solemnised between them in a regular
manner, and E. A. consented to this marriage.
F. A. subsequently executed the power in favour of
L. Held, first, affirming a decision of the Master
of the Rolls, that the consent of E. A. alone was
sufficient; second, reversing his decision that E.
A.'s consent to the subsequent ceremony was not a