were not entitled to sue under the provisions of the Loan Fund Acts. The court held that, it not ap pearing on the pleadings that the note was given for a loan, the case did not come within the summary jurisdiction created in the Act; and, therefore, that the trustees could sue, in the superior courts. In Timins v. Williams, on the other hand, the note appeared (in evidence) to be for a loan, and in all respects cenformable to the Act, and the action was brought by the treasurer. The court held that under such circumstances the peculiar remedy provided by the statute must be pursued; that relief could only be had on a complaint by the treasurer to a justice of peace; and that no such action as was brought could be entertained in the superior courts. In Albon v. Pyke the case was as plainly not within the peculiar and summary jurisdiction created by the Act as in Timins v. Williams it clearly was. There two cases, therefore, are not only consistent with each other, but perfectly support the view I have taken of the effect of the provisions of the 18th and 30th sections of our Act. It seems indeed difficult to understand how, consistently with the provisions of the 30th section of the Loan Fund Act, on the one hand, and the ordinary rules of law on the other, a process could be brought in the Assistant-Barrister's court, on such a note as the present. 1. It bears no stamp. How can this court admit it as a promissory note, its admissibility in that form being apparently confined to its production before the justice of the peace? 2. It is not for a sum certain; therefore, it cannot be deemed a promissory note at all, nor a document which an action would lie (see the judgment in Nolan v. Keogh (2 Ir. Jur., N.S. 33, 34, citing Ayrey v. Fearusides). 3. The plaintiff may not be a party to the instrument, how then can he be allowed to sue here? (Judgment, p. 34, citing Timins v. Williams.) 4. Though a joint and several promissory note, yet, according to the Act, two out of three of the makers may be sued; and the suretics in preference to and to the exclusion of the principal; how can these anomalies be permitted in any court regulated by the general rules of law? 5. Although the most extravagant rate of interest may be recovered by the plaintiff he can get costs to no greater amount than two shillings; and yet whatever decree the Assistant-Barrister may give cannot be with less than the full costs prescribed by statute. 6. The execution under the 30th section is different from what it would be under a civil bill decrec-whether, therefore, we consider the nature and legal effect of the instrument itself (called a promissory note, though certainly not such in legal parlance), or the persons who may sue or be sued thereon, or the sum that may be recovered or the costs that can be given, or the mode of execution that may be resorted to, it is evident that a process on such a note cannot be maintained in the civil bill court, or a decree given thereon, without violating rules of law, uniformly recognised and acted on therein, and express statutory enactments relating thereto. On the whole of this case I am of opinion that the provisions of the 35th section of the 14th and 15th Vic., have not the effect recently contended for by the plaintiff; or that they preserve a jurisdiction in the Assistant-Barrister in this case, which is taken from the superior courts; and therefore, that the reasons given and authorities cited in my judgment in Nolan v. Keogh are applicable in their full extent to this case. It follows that the plainti cannot sue the defendant upon this promissory not in the civil bill court, and that his process therein cannot be maintained. A question of difficulty arises as to the form in which the judgment should be given. To dismiss the process, with costs (anl with costs it must be, if dismissed at all, by the 111th s. of the 14th and 15th Vic., c. 57), is substantial to decree for the defendant to the amount of six shillings; and this seems hardly consistent with declaring at the same time that I have LO jurisdiction to entertain the case. By the 79th section of the English County Court Act (9 and 10 Vic., c. 95), the judge is empowered to non-suit the plaintiff on failure of proof of his demand, and to award him costs. (This non-suit seems to be equivalent to our dismiss without prejudice.) In the very recent case of Lauford v. Partridge (26 L. J. Ex. 147, cited also in Cass. C. B. 150), the county court judge, finding that title to land was involved, and considering he had, therefore, no jurisdiction, non-suited the plaintiff, and gave de fendant costs. On application by plaintiff to the Court of Exchequer for a prohibition, that court held that the county court judge had no power to award costs in any case which he had not jurisdiction to hear and determine. It is true there is this difference between the English and Irish enactments, that by the former the court may give costs when they non-suit; here the Assistant-Barrister must.give costs if he dismisses. Still if the principle enunciated in Lawford v. Partridge be sound, viz.: that costs cannot be given in a case where the court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine," it will follow that this court ought not to dismiss; for that would be equiualent to giving costs; since here, at least, costs must follow as a necessary appendage to that judgment. But, however this may be, let us consider in what form the dismiss (if one can be granted) should be given? By the 111th section it would seem that it must be either "without prejudice" or "on the merits," a distinction, however, only of importance as to ulterior proceedings in the civil bill court, for a dismiss in either form, if unappealed from, is a bar to any proceedings for the same cause of action in the superior courts (14 and 15 Vic., sec. 143). In this case how can a dismiss without prejudice be granted, the court deciding that it has no jurisdiction? It is to say, in the same breath, to the plaintiff, "I dismiss you because I have no power to hear you, but without prejudice your coming in here again, which of course must be utterly vain and useless, as I could no more you then, thau now." It it surely a manifest absurdity and contradiction in terms to say "go away now, you may come again, but I shall never be able. to hear you. hear The second objection to grantng a dismiss without prejudice in this case is, that no appeal would lie could only appeal to the judge of assize, and afte Let the process be nilled-no costs on Legal Intelligence. ORDERS OF COURT, COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. cellor and the Right Hon. the Lord Justice of Appeal, that It is ordered by the Right Hon. the Lord High Chanin future all appeals and re-hearings shall be brought before the Court of Appeal in Chancery, by petition, which petition shall be drawn and signe by council, and shall state concisely the grounds on which the order complained of is sought to be set aside or varied. from my decision (14 & 15 Vic., c. 57, s. 126), which I am most anxious to afford the plaintiff every opportunity of questioning before another tribunal. A third objection to a dismiss without prejudice is, that not only no appeal will lie, but no action in the superior courts could be brought on the promissory note; the dismiss in whatever form, being as I have already stated, final when not appealed from, and not to be questioned by any court whatever; and as no appeal will lie from a dismiss without prejudice, it necessarily follows. that in no way whatever, can the decision of the Assistant-Barrister dismissing the process without prejudice be questioned, or the opinion of a superior court had on the point of law by bringing an action on the promissory note. In this respect, the dismiss without prejudice more completely shuts out further investigation before any other tribunal than a dismiss on the merits; for that can be appealed from; not so as to the dismiss without prejudice; and either, when not appealed from, equally bars the superior court from entertaining the case in any form. Now, with regard to a dismiss" on the merits," it is true, as has been stated, that from it an appeal will lie; but how can such a judgment be pronounced in a case which the merits have not been inquired into at all? ROYAL where the very ground of the dismiss of the plaintiff is that he was not, because he could not be heard as to the merits, in any shape. That every appeal and re-hearing shall be set down for hearing in the Registrar's office, and three copies of the Petition of Appeal shall be lodged at the same time, and book to be kept in his office according to the date of the the Registrar shall enter such appeals and re-hearings in a lodgment thereof. (Signed) JOSEPH NAPIER, CHANCELLOR, Dated 28th April, 1858. Capital-£2,000,000, in 100,000 Shares of £20 each. Trustees: John Shaw Leigh, Esq.; John Naylor, Esq. Directors, &c., in Liverpool: Charles Turner, Esq., Chairman; J. Bramley-Moore, Esq., M.P. and Ralph Brocklebank, Esq., Deputy Chairmen. FIRE BRANCH. Annual Premiums £130,000, exceeding almost every Office in the Losses Promptly and Liberally Paid. Security of a Large Capital actually paid up. IMPORTANT TO THE PROPRIETORS OF CORN AND Risk of this description acceptea on a most liberal scale of rates Forfeiture of LIFE BRANCHI. Stamps on Policies not Charged. Medical Fees Paid-Moderate Premiums. Large BONUS declared 1855, The absurdity in this instance is of a different kind, but not less striking than in that of a dismiss without prejudice. There the dismissal was accompanied by the seeming assumption of an impossible future (viz., that he would be heard on another occasion); now, it is built on the assumption of an impossible fact, viz., that the merits of the case had been heard. The merits have not been, could not have been, inquired into, so far as the court can know anything of them, they are all on the side of plaintiff, who brings a process as payce against the makers of a promissory note given to secure repayment of a loan which has never been repaid surely so far as any merits in the case can be known to the court, they are all on the plaintiff's side. How then can his process be dismissed " the merits." It appears to me, therefore, that in this case the regular and proper course is to nil the process: in other words simply strike out the case; THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF I shall thus avoid the seeming inconsistency of giving costs, and thereby assuming jurisdiction in a case in which I think I have none. I shall escape the absurdity of dismissing the plaintiff as not having any right to hear him, and at the same time expressly permitting, almost inviting, him to come back again. Thirdly, I shall not be guilty of the inconsistency, indeed I may say in truthfulness, LAW LIBRARIES purchased for Cash, by on of dismissing the process on the merits, whilst the merits, so far as I know anything about them, are all on the plaintiff's side; and lastly, I shall afford the plaintiff the power of bringing an action, if he pleases, on this promissory note in the superior courts, and of having this very important question of law fully argued and considered by the highest tribunals in the land; whereas after a dismiss on the merits he Amounting to £2 per Cent. per Annum on the sum Assured, being on Every Five Years, from 31st December in each year. A. M'NEILE, 34 WESTMORELAND-ST., Agent. The THIRTY SECOND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the STANDARD LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY was held at Edinburgh on THE HE MANAGER of the Company submitted the following Statements to the Meeting: Balance Sheet certified by the Auditor and three of the Directors, in accordance with the Acts of Parliament constituting the Company. Report by the Directors as to the Progress of the Business during the year ended 15th November, 1857. THE Directors, in their Report, congratulated the Meeting on the great progress of the Company's Business, and the satisfactory position of its affairs, and the following results were communicated with reference to the operations during the past year: SUMS Proposed for Assurance during the year, contained in 997 Proposals.... SUMS Assured, contained in 840 Proposals, exclusive of Annuity Transactions.... CLAIMS by Death paid during the year, exclusive of Bonus Additions.. From Premiums.... From Interest on the Company's Invested Funds... ACCUMULATED FUND, invested in Government Securities, in Land, in Mortgages, &c... .£664,513 7 5 £574,839 75 .£202,818 16 10 £62.551 11 4 £1,451,822 9 3 The following TABLE was submitted, in illustration of the progress of the business generally since 1847-that is, from the twenty-second to the thirty-second year of the Company's business: PROGRESS OF THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS FROM 1846 TO 1857. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE £131,316 10 7 15,145 15 6 14,886 9 3 192,928 16 10 59,322 13 0 84,445 17 0 16,650 0 2 218,968 16 5 89,428 13 10 3,15,827 11 4 4,138,868 56 4,388,339 39 4,648,751 4 9 4,877,378 0 8 5,153,364 8 5 1855 716,383 7 11 609,323 7 11 20,047 18 0 237,450 1 9 75,640 8 0 5,556,106 17 4 1856 669,801 6 7 5,871,276 10 0 1857 664,513 7 5 574,839 7 5 17,916 3 6 265,370 8 2 87,925 13 3 6,186,187 6 11 Attention was drawn to the fact that during the last nine years the average amount of new business transacted by the Company was upwards of Half a Million sterling, and the average number of New Policies above 900 per annum. The Manager submitted a calculation showing the Expected and Actual Mortality among the Lives Assured during the last two years of which the following is an abstract: A result which cannot fail to have an important effect on the Company's Profits now Accumulating for Division in 1860. THE Report, which contained various other particulars, was unanimously approved of, and a vote of thanks was presented to the Board of Directors, which was acknowledged by the Chairman, who said it would be the aim of the Directors to maintain the STANDARD in the leading position which it occupies among the Life Assurance Institutions of the country. The BOARD of DIRECTORS beg to congratulate all connected with the Institution on the satisfactory results communicated in the Annual Report submitted at the General Meeting. The STANDARD has now been established for upwards of thirty-two years; it has attained its present high position in the Assurance world by the soundness of its principles and the liberality of its practice, and it has led they way for some years in all those important changes which have tended to render a Policy of Assurance a safe and reliable security under all circun stances. The Directors claim support then, in the first place, for sound principles of management and liberality of dealing, but, in the second place, they claim for the STANDARD a no less prominent position with reference to the benefits it confers on Assurers, in connection with the profits realised in the course of the business, and which are at least commensurate with those afforded by the most successful Institutions of the day. Dublin, 66 Upper Sackville-street. SPECIAL NOTICE. WILLIAM THOS. THOMSON, Manager. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, with reference to a late decision in the Court of Confmon Pleas in England, request attention to the following regulations, adopted in 1856, as to the A Policy, of five years' standing on the Books, cannot be forfeited unless the Annual Renewal Premium remains unpaid for thirteen months. Thirty days is the regular period allowed for payment, but the arrears can be paid at any time within thirteen months from the date when the premium fell due on payment of a fine, without a medical certificate. Should death take place within the thirty days or thirteen months, the Company hold themselves liable, on payment of the arrear and fine, whether before or after death. After the expiry of the thirteen months the Policy is forfeited, but the surrender value is held at the disposal of the parties interested for five years from the regular date of renewal. These regulations apply to all Policies of five years' standing, with certain exceptions mentioned in the Company's Prospectus The privileges of renewal under Policies of shorter duration than five years are very liberal, and the following clause in the Company's Policy applies to them :- or the heirs. "In case any person assured shall die within the space of thirty days, and the party holding the Policy from the Company, executors, or assignees of the Assured, or any other person on his or their behalf, shall pay the Premium due thereon before the expiration "of such thirty days, the Policy will be as valid and effectual as if the Premium had been paid when due, and in the lifetime of the person "Assured." DUBLIN BRANCH, 66 UPPER SACKVILLE-STREET. JOSEPH BOYCE, Esq., D.L., 52 Upper Mount street, Chairman. Days of Grace and Renewal of Policies. THE DIRECTORS of the COLONIAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, with reference to the late decision in the Court of Common Pleas in England, beg attention to the following Clause in the Policies of Assurance granted by this Company: THOMAS RICHARDSON, Esq., Linen Hall. SAMUEL SMYLIE, Resident Secretary. Orders for the IRISH JURIST left with E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COL LEGE-GREEN, or by letter (post-paid), will ensure its punctual delivery in Dublin, or its being forwarded to the Country, by Post, the day of publication. to the Editor, with the Publisher, E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COLLEGE-GREEN All communications for the IRISH JURIST are to be left, addressed Correspondents will please give the Name and Address, as the columns of maluof the Paper cannot be occupied with answers to anonymous comiru. "In case any person Assured shall die within the said space of thirty days, and the party holding the Policy from the Company, or his "Representatives, or any other person on his or their behalf, shall pay scripts, &c. "the Premium due thereon before the expiration of such thirty days, "the Policy will be as valid and effectual as if the Premium had been "paid when due, and in the lifetime of the person Assured." TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION (payable in advance): Single Copy 58. and printed at the Dublin Steam-Press Printing Office, 65, Upper Published by EDWARD JOHNSTON MILLIKEN, 15. College-green Resident Director. Sackville-street, by ROBERT G. SOUTER, Agent, who is authorised to receive orders for Advertisements.--June 15, 1858. 74 The Irish Jurist. DUBLIN, JULY 1, 1858. A QUESTION of considerable importance has been It is only necessary to refer to the able judg. ment of that learned judge to satisfy the mind of the soundness and good equity of the conclusion at which he arrived. He granted the injunction, and in doing so, said: argue 'I have very little doubt as to the proper order to be made on this motion. The defendant has been an officer who has had a grant of a pension from the crown, and the Paymaster-General has received the warrant of the crown for paying to the defendant the pension at the rate of £100 a year. The defendant being entitled to this pension has, for valuable consideration, assigned it to the plaintiff, and has entered into covenants with the plaintiff, without breach of which the defendant cannot receive the pension. The defendant's counsel declined to argue the question whether the pension was assignable, and I think he very properly declined to it, because this is not one of those cases of half-pay or pensions for future services, in which it has been held that such pay and pensions are not assignable, and of which courts of justice have considered it their duty to hold that no valid assignment can be made. This is the case of a grant by the Crown as a reward—not a grant to secure any future services, but as a reward for that which is past. The only doubt which has been raised in my mind arises from the memorandum which is annexed to the declaration, or rather from the form of the declaration which has been forwarded from a public department to the defendant. The defendant in the usual manner received from the War-office a printed form of declaration which he was obliged to make upon each occasion when the payment of the pension became due; and at the bottom of the printed form is this memorandum:— This allowance cannot be assigned as a security for a loan of money.' Now, if anything corres- It But, in the worst faith, and in breach of his covenant, this defendant revoked that power of attorney, by proceeding personally to receive the pension himself. is needless to make any observation on this conduct of a person in the position of a late officer of the army, beyond this, that this court will not allow covenants to be broken, where they relate to the enjoyment of property which has been assigned for valuable consideration. That is precisely this case; and no considerations of public policy intervene. All that was argued on behalf of the defendant was, that to grant an injunction would be without precedent, and have no good effect, because it would not give the plaintiff enjoyment of the property. it is the constant course of this court to restrain breaches of covenant, where those breaches of covenant are accompanied with pecuniary injury to the person complaining. Here, unless I grant the injunction, not only will the covenant have been broken, but the property, which is clearly the plaintiffs, will be taken and enjoyed by the defendant. That is a course which the court will not tolerate. The receiver cannot be granted; the court will, by injunction, restrain the defendant from receiving this pension, and will not permit this late officer of the army to do anything further to break a contract which he has deliberately made. The order will be to restrain the defendant from this pension, and also from executing any power of attorney, authorising or permitting any other person, except the plaintiff, to receive it. costs." No order as to |