in strict accordance with fact, and this constitutes the Fundamental Paradox of Hedonism. And yet it is not so paradoxical as it would seem to be at first sight. For the social constitution and condition of mankind not only make it possible but render it inevitable that men shall find their own happiness in the happiness of others about them. The continuance of the race cannot be secured unless human beings associate together; and they will not associate together unless they find pleasure in each other's society; but they do associate and they do naturally delight in gregariousness to a greater or less degree. Therefore, one of the means of securing egoistic happiness is altruism. Holding up to one's self egoistic happiness as a principal end concentrates the attention upon self, and reduces the flow of benefits which comes from disinterestedness or rather from interest in the welfare of others, thus cutting off the supply coming from one great source of happiness. If such an end is kept before the mind as an ideal, the dispositions of the will are drawn towards it, intermediate ends range themselves under it, and the special objects of desire relate directly to self and selfish enjoyment. The virtues tend to disappear and the vices to increase. Charity faileth, and coldness, malevolence and cruelty take its place. Reacting upon the individual, this ensures towards him a like treatment to that which he visits upon others. The predatory impulses are revived and society tends to fall asunder, to the detriment of each one. But by altruistic dispositions and conduct the prosperity and happiness of each individual is increased and made more secure through the prosperous and happy condition of all. Thus, proceeding from the fact of the existence in man naturally of the primary original pleasure of society, creating an appetite for the presence and companionship of his fellows as necessary and as irresistib'e as the appetite for food or sleep, it appears that to cherish as a supreme end toward which the dispositions are consciously directed that ideal which, when realised, is the individual's Summum Bonum is to prevent such a realisation and defeat its own object. From the same fact it does not equally follow that to seek as an end the highest happiness of the greatest number or the chief good of the race is always the surest way to secure the individual's chief good. It does appear, however, that to hold up as a principal end the happiness of some others is a most certain means to the individual of attaining his Summum Bonum. How wide the circle of altruistic regards should be for the individual's happiness must be determined by circumstances. But maintaining as a principal end the highest happiness of the greatest number may throw an individual out of the pale of the sympathies of his immediate

neighbours and may bring upon him obloquy, persecution, and perhaps death, whereas a subserviency to the demands of his fellows near by may bring to him honour and prosperity, although the wants of his constituency are directly opposed to the maximum felicity of the maximum number. If, however, by inheritance or education we have so strong an altruistic constitution as to cherish the highest altruistic ideals before all others, to work for the happiness of the greatest number may be to him his own greatest joy, and beside this work and this joy, he will esteem as nothing perils, hardships and calamities. "Yea, doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things and do count them but dung that I may win Christ." In the spirit and enthusiasm of Paul a man may devote himself to the realisation of the most general of altruistic purposes and find therein his own most complete satisfaction. Objectively considered, this may not secure to a person his own individual Summum Bonum; subjectively regarded, however, it does so in such a case. And to establish such a state or habit of mind that the individual is happy only in devoting himself to the highest altruistic ends is for the interest of the race generally. The general ethical Summum Bonum is the maximum happiness of the greatest number; that such a good be realised is the greatest desideratum for human kind. Therefore in the education of individuals it is proper to inculcate as a principal end of volition and action the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Each man ought to make it a principal end; for the obligation indicated by the word ought arises from the social condition of mankind, and has no meaning except with reference to a man's connexion with sentient beings other than the Ego. A person ought to do this or that because the interests of others require that he should, and the ultimate reason for the force of this imperative is his subjective pleasure of society, demanding the presence, comfort, and help of his fellows. If then a person ought with respect to other sentient beings to make the ideal of highest general happiness a principal end, and can be made to take his greatest pleasure in doing what he ought, he has followed the best means to achieve his individual Summum Bonum. As the world progresses and the spirit of altruism becomes more farreaching and pervasive, this coincidence of the ethical Summum Bonum with the egoistic Summum Bonum grows more complete. While the coincidence is incomplete, however, it will not always be true that the happiness of self is best reached by seeking the happiness of the many as an end, though it will be true that egoistic happiness will be best secured by

aiming at the happiness of some others than self, and not by aiming principally at one's own happiness. Yet the interest of the many will unyieldingly demand that the highest happiness of the greatest number be cherished and favoured as a chief end by each individual, and this interest of society will always create an ethical imperative to follow this chief end, whose influence never can be wholly null upon any one, but which will be increasingly felt. The nearer any individual can come to making the ethical Summum Bonum his supreme end, the more fully will he satisfy the requirements of this social obligation.

If a person have no very general ends at all but is governed by more particular ones, nevertheless his particular ends will be determined for him by his circumstances, and his course so shaped by his environment as to make his life perhaps as happy as if he selected general ideal ends and consciously followed them. He drifts with the current, and its onward flow carries him forward and the stream constantly presents ends for him to direct his attention toward, though he may not know what will succeed them or whither they will take him. This is the situation of a very large fraction of mankind; they live from hand to mouth, from day to day, and know not what will become of them; but nature provides for and takes care of them, seeing to it that they do not fail to get a share of happiness. Sometimes they are happier indeed than many of those who seek to pilot their lives by general ideals and whose aims are grander, more intelligent, and seemingly more worthy.

In conclusion, therefore, let it be observed that in the light of psychological facts, brought out by the most accurate observation, and made more evident by a rigid analysis of mental phenomena, the Epicurean doctrines, amplified in some directions, to be sure, and limited in others, but still substantially unimpaired, furnish us with the key which solves the problems connected with the Summum Bonum; and that despite misunderstandings, and obloquy heaped upon it, theirs is after all, in the words of Balzac characterising the teachings of Francis Rabelais, "that good philosophy to which we shall always be obliged to return".

DANIEL GREENLEAF THOMPSON.

V.-REPLIES TO CRITICISMS ON THE DATA OF

ETHICS.

AN ethical writer who was required to treat of right and wrong conduct, while saying nothing about any purpose to be effected by conduct, would be greatly perplexed. Were he forbidden to bring in the thoughts of good, better and best, in relation to results, moral distinctions among actions would not be easily expressed. I make this remark because Mr. Sidgwick, in his article in MIND XVIII., entitled "Mr. Spencer's Ethical System," quoting from me the phrase, "conduct falling short of its ideal," remarks:

"The frankly teleological point of view from which, in this book, Mr. Spencer contemplates the phenomena of Life generally, seems worthy of notice; since in his Principles of Biology he seems to have taken some pains to avoid 'teleological implications"."

That a science which has for its subject-matter the characters of the ends pursued by men and the characters of the means used for achieving such ends, can restrict itself to statements in which ends are not implied, is a strange assumption. Teleology of a kind is necessarily involved; and the only question is whether it is of the legitimate or illegitimate kind. The contrast between the two may readily be shown by a biological illustration. If I speculate concerning the stony shell of a gromwell-seed, so hard that it is uninjured by the beak of a bird which swallows the seed and effectually resists the grinding actions of the bird's crop; and if I argue that this hard shell was provided for the purpose of protecting the seed, and thus securing its eventual germination; I am arguing teleologically in the vicious way. If, on the other hand, my interpretation is that among the seeds of some remote ancestral plant, one with an unusually thick shell passed away uninjured by a bird's beak and stomach, while the rest with thinner shells were broken up and digested; and if I infer that among the seeds of the plant originating from the undigested seed, generally inheriting this greater thickness, those most frequently lived and propagated which had the thickest or hardest shells, until, by survival of the fittest, shells of this extreme density, completely protective, were produced; and if I argue that maintenance of the species was throughout this process the end more effectually subserved; I am also arguing teleologically, but in the legitimate way. There enters the conception of a cause for the genesis of the hard shell, which is, in a sense, a final cause-not that proximate cause constituted

by the physiological processes going on in the plant, but a cause remote from these, which, nevertheless, so far determines them that in its absence they would not exist. And it is thus with biological interpretations of structures and functions in general. The welfare of the organism, or of the species, is in every case the end to further which a structure exists; and the difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate teleology is that, while the one explains its existence as having gradually arisen by furthering the end, the other gives no explanation of its existence other than that it was put there to further the end—a final cause of the "barren virgin" sort.

Throughout the Data of Ethics, as throughout every ethical treatise, ends are constantly in view, and the interpretations have unceasing reference to them. I have, indeed, in a chapter on "The Physical View" of Ethics, treated of conduct as low or high, according as it subserves in a less or greater degree, maintenance of a moving equilibrium; which is, I think, a more unteleological way of regarding it than has been followed by any ethical writer. In this chapter the evolution of that which we ordinarily conceive as higher conduct, is presented as a process expressible in terms of matter and motion. For the implication of the argument (in harmony with an argument contained in two chapters in the Principles of Biology on direct and indirect equilibration) is that, inevitably, those aggregates in which the moving equilibrium is the best, are those which remain outstanding when others disappear; and that so, by inheritance, the tendency is to the establishment of an everbetter moving equilibrium : higher conduct is defined apart even from consciousness-apart from alleged human ends or assumed divine ends. When, in the next chapter, it is shown that what we call, in physical language, a better moving equilibrium, is, in biological language, a better fulfilment of functions, and, consequently, a life which is at once wider and longer; the implication is that a wider and longer life being the end, conduct is to be judged by its conduciveness to this end; and throughout two subsequent chapters this point of view is maintained. But these chapters are nowhere illegitimately teleological. Had I accepted the moral-sense doctrine as ordinarily understoodhad I alleged in mankind a supernaturally-given consciousness of obligation-had I asserted that men are endowed with sympathy to enable them the better to co-operate in the social state; I should have been chargeable with teleological interpretation of the vicious kind. But since my interpretation is avowedly opposed to this-since I regard those faculties which produce a conduct favourable to welfare under the conditions imposed by the social state, as themselves the products of social life, and