like electro-magnetic induction, if so gross a figure may be used in this transcendent connexion, the mere proximity of the soul aroused these possibilities into actual and active difference. "So Prakriti is changed into the principle called the Great One (Buddhi, intellect)." But it is not to be supposed that this occult quasi-solicitation implies desire or will or effort or force on the part of either eternal being, though it may be as if Prakriti had said, “I want to be seen,” and Atman, "I want to see". There is no "will to live" or desire to be manifest here, as in the German pessimism. And there is no force, persistent or casual, in the Sankhya, as there is with Mr. Spencer. In reflection, Kapila could only discern movement, and was content. Anything more was, perhaps, too difficult to find.

The book of genesis is now opened. Buddhi begets "Consciousness," which first procession reminds Mr. Davies-but as I think rather doubtfully-of the Cartesian "Cogito ergo sum". Nor can I see how this "Consciousness" only-begotten of "intellect" can be "nearly equivalent to the mind-stuff" of Prof. Clifford.

Considering its origin, it is more like a stage in the Hegelian evolution of thought into externality. And I do not see with Mr. Davies that any trace of Hegel there might have been in Kapila has been obliterated by his transcendent dualism, for there is the same absolute equipoise and opposition of subject and object in the Hegelian synthesis. Synthesis, in fact, necessarily implies such.

From "consciousness" proceed" sound, touch, smell, sight, taste," and the rest of the world and man. Are we to take this as metaphysic or cosmogony? Perhaps both. Finding in his reflection the nature of things to be consciousness, Kapila may very easily have taken that for a discovery of how things came to exist. But let it be metaphysic, and we have the world as phenomenon or representation, and there is a dim foreshadowing of Kant. The cosmic harmony and unity is effected by the mediation of intellect or thought. Buddhi may be the locus of the Kantian catagories; and Manas (mind?) which is with Kapila a further precipitate of Buddhi, and another intermediary, reminds one of Kant's schematising imagination. It can scarcely be as Mr. Davies seems to think, sensorium or central brain. With Kapila, the derivation is always downwards from thought. And even if it may be said that with him, in the order of knowledge, "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu," yet we cannot agree with Mr. Davies in associating Kapila with materialistic sensationalism; for always with him, in the order of existence, nihil est in sensu quod non prius fuerit in intellectu. the same reason, the quotations from Dr. Maudsley are not apt illustrations of the text; and "the spiritual body" of the authors of The Unseen Universe, though composed of highly attenuated matter, is rather too gross a companion for Kapila's "Linga," which is the permanent envelope of the pure subject whilst it exists and migrates -the innermost core, as it were, of the empirical Ego.

For

Again, it is surely a mistake to compare Kapila's soul to "the absolute Ego of Fichte," which is genetic and single-the one creative

ground of all that is. Even if Kapila had not rather gratuitously assumed many souls, there would remain the coeternal and uncreate object, constituting a polar dualism which is more suggestive of Schelling, in one of his many phases, and of Hegel. May I venture to say, by the way, that Hegel cannot be quite fairly represented by quotations from Morrell and Chalybäus?

In an interesting appendix Mr. Davies succeeds in showing that, apart from Kapila's assumption of an eternally detached and independent soul, he almost coincides with Spinoza. Prakriti corresponds to "Natura naturans "; manifested, it is "natura naturata"; and these two are one, only distinguished as essence and phenomenon (or Maya), but not separate.

Of course we must take Kapila as we find him; and no doubt as he stands out for us in this Karika, he is dualist and atheist. Yet, a very little gentle manipulation might exhibit his implicit monism, and bring him nearer to Spinoza. As existents, the many souls and the one Prakriti are one co-existence, the unity of Being and Knowing and as pure beings, they are absolutely indistinguishable from one another and from naught. For thought, they collapse into one, and that one sinks into non-being. What then remains is Vyakta, the phenomenal world of subject and object, coexistent, co-essential, and inseparable in their utter contra-distinction. And this residuum of Kapila exactly corresponds with the residuum of Spinoza, when his infinite attribute of thought or consciousness has absorbed and superseded all the other infinite attributes, rendering them gratuitous and otiose hypotheses-a result that is inevitable in the dialectic of reflection.

The main agreements and differences between Kapila and modern German pessimism have been pointed out. Mr. Davies enters fully into them in his last appendix. It only remains to signalise the last difference. With Kapila the end is differently brought about. Emancipation comes to him from pure contemplation or gnosis. This is put in graceful form towards the end of the poem.

"As a dancer, having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance, so does Nature."

Nothing is more modest than Nature. Saying 'I have been seen,' she does not expose herself again to the view of the soul."

"It has been seen by me,' says the one, ceasing to regard: 'I have been seen,' says the other, and ceases to act.”

J. BURNS-GIBSON.

Les Maladies de la Mémoire. Par TH. RIBOT.

Baillière, 1881. Pp. 169.

Paris: Germer

This little volume, the main conclusions of which were given in MIND XXII., 296, is an opportune presentment of the latest results reached in the physiology and pathology of Memory. It has an equal interest for the psychologist and the alienist. It is marked by accuracy of statement and caution in reasoning. It brings together a large number of curious facts; and it seeks to interpret

these by a skilful use of the most plausible current hypotheses of physiological psychology. In this notice I propose to confine myself to one or two points of special psychological interest raised by M. Ribot.

In

After the manner of contemporary physiologists the author extends the meaning of the word memory, regarding it as an endowment of the organism as a whole. According to this view consciousness is only an accidental accompaniment of the process of recollection. The essential thing is the trace or modification left in the nerve-elements (the "statical base"), and the connexions formed between different elements ("dynamical base"). M. Ribot, by the way, thinks (p. 14) that the second condition has not yet been recognised, though this is hardly correct, I imagine, with respect to English psychologists. The arguments in favour of the multiplicity of these "dynamic associations" are well put, and coincide with those recently employed by G. H. Lewes, as well as by Mr. Cyples in support of his theory of the "neurotic diagram". What accounts for memory ever being a process of conscious recollection is the presence of certain physical conditions, namely, the intensity and duration of the central actions. All this is, I think, just and indisputable. But is this enough? Given certain nerve-structures modified and connected in a particular way, is the whole of the phenomenon of conscious recollection straightway explicable? On the psychical side, to recollect is to pass from the present to the past, to reconstruct a piece of past experience by help of some present psychical fact. This is something more than the "recollection" involved in perceiving a familiar colour or tone. the act of recollection there is a process of antithesis, a setting up of a past over against the present, and yet the grasping of this past through some present representation, analogue, or 'link of similarity'. How do physiological conditions help us to seize this fact? M. Ribot simply says (p. 29) that in the case of conscious recollection the dynamic nervous associations play a much more important part. Here he seems to me to overlook the fact (only in appearance ever lost sight of by Professor Bain in his separation of the laws of Contiguity and Similarity), that memory always sets out with the identification of a present with a past similar mental state. How conceive this act of identification on its physical side? How much can physiology tell us as to the conditions of this consciousness of something past and recovered? May not its function be limited to defining the differences of conditions according as the act of recollection is now little more than an identification, as when I see a person, recall our last meeting, but only vaguely represent the attendant circumstances; or now is largely a moving away to contiguous circumstances as when a name calls up a whole visual picture of a place once visited? This seems to me to be the nut that wants cracking in the physiology of memory. M. Ribot's ingenious attempt, on the lines of M. Taine's well known speculations, to fix the conditions of definite localisation in the past, does not meet my difficulty, which applies to all recollection alike. May not the omission, if it is an

omission, be due to a momentary adoption of the present fashionable under-estimate of the method of introspection? By all means let us have a thoroughgoing physiology of mind. But let us remember that it is mind which we desire to explain, and let us ascertain what this contains by the most painstaking subjective analysis, and never slur over difficulties by falling back on the unscientific notion that the conscious operation is an accident, which we may as well leave out of sight in framing our theories. M. Ribot is too good a psychologist to follow E. Hering and his yet bolder English imitators in a complete assimilation of conscious' and 'unconscious' memory. Yet his keen desire for the scientific illumination which modern physiology appears to promise, seems to me to have led him to make too light of the special problems which first arise when we reach those complex conscious operations which scientific psychology, following popular psychology, has so far at least marked off as "remembering".

But M. Ribot may justly say that, his book being concerned with diseases of memory, he was not bound to give an exhaustive account of the normal processes. Looking at his work from this point of view I find in it much to admire, and hardly anything to criticise. Subjects like the derangement of the sense of identity and the illusory feeling of familiarity in new objects are treated with great freshness, and with a full knowledge of the facts of disease. I miss one or two points; for example, the curious disturbances in the sense of duration which sometimes appear in mental disorders. I may be allowed in closing to express a regret that M. Ribot's interesting monograph did not reach me in time to profit by it in my own recent labours in the same direction.

JAMES SULLY.

Von Dr.

Die Theorie der Erkenntniss oder die logischen Gesetze. HERMANN SCHEFFLER. Leipzig: Förster, 1880. Pp. 930. This extensive Third Part of the author's huge work Die Naturgesetze u. ihr Zusammenhang mit den Prizipien der abstrakten Wissenschaften, mentioned in MIND XXIII., 447, begins with the principles of science generally, and ends with a lengthy application to psychology, ethics, and social and political science. I cannot here attempt even an analysis of so large a scheme, and will merely give a few extracts and remarks sufficient to indicate the character and aim of the work so far as its more strictly logical principles are concerned. In indicating his departure from Kant as a sort of startingpoint, he substitutes for the well-known four heads of categories of that author five "Categoremata of Concepts": riz., Quantity, Inherence, Relation, Quality, and Modality. The analogy of each of these with a corresponding element in mathematics is worked out with great minuteness. Of these five, Quantity is taken in the ordinary sense, and forms the analogue of Quantity in mathematics. Inherence means the relation which a concept bears to some starting

"Its

point from which it may be considered to proceed, and is regarded as analogous to Position in geometry as referred to an origin. grammatical expression is predication or assertion. .

When

we say the green tree,' or predicate greenness of the tree, we express by this predicate green that the tree, which without a predicate might have been represented, say, by a figure ABCDE, is, with that predicate conceived as transferred parallel to itself to the position A'B'C'D'E'" (p. 60). Thus the vector AA' represents the effect of the predicate green. This process may be carried on repeatedly, and in a positive or negative direction. "The expression, Charles was clever and handsome but not rich, contains a double forward step and a single backward one" (p. 77).

The third Categorema is Relation. This corresponds to geometrical Direction, and signifies the relation of one object to another. It is consequently a wider conception than that of cause and effect. Scheffler has an elaborate scheme for representing these relations by means of angles, which gives occasion to above a hundred pages of explanation and illustration by means of exponential expressions, the various roots of ( + 1) or ( − 1) and all the rest to which one is accustomed in mathematical treatises upon such subjects. One example must suffice (the reader who is likely to follow it at all will probably be able to do so without a figure): Taking A as origin and Ac as axis, "let the angle BAC = a represent a certain causation, viz., that of begetting. Then AB is the begetter, AC the begotten, and the line CD which is the equivalent geometrically to a line transferred from the primitive direction AX along AC, corresponds to the concept. one who is begotten, say Alexander (CD) begotten of Philip (AX)” (p. 104). This employment of angular relation and its notation lends itself of course to the expression of repeated, and of inverse, conditions of relation.

The fourth Categorema is Quality, and its arithmetical analogue that of Powers. "Picture an individual, say a horse. It appears as a complex of connected conditions. Each of these forms a special or possible state of the concept to which we give the name of horse. This concept itself embraces what is common to them all, corresponding to a geometrical line which embraces all the points assigned under a certain condition. As a line has one more dimension than a point, or is a magnitude of a higher geometrical quality, so does this horse represent a conception of higher logical quality than any particular state in which the horse can appear to us" (p. 200). Or, more in detail, "there are four primary qualities corresponding geometrically to points, lines, surfaces, and volumes, and arithmetically to the four powers Ao, X, X2, X. These four logical primary qualities are, Being as an observed condition, as a concrete individual, as an abstract concept, and as an ideal concept" (p. 213). The fifth Categorema is Modality. His use of this term departs still more widely from the usual, either scholastic or modern, sense of it. "The manifold of representations which is combined into a single cognition, into a logical whole, into a system, represents a law, and the Modality indi