two chapters (pp. 114-52) which Mr. Tylor devotes to Language in itself, seem to us to contain an almost unexceptionable statement of the best results of modern science, psychological and other, on the subject. We will note further only the particular conception of Anthropology which has guided the author in writing this introduction to its study. He would add it to the curriculum of education as a means of giving connexion and unity to the multitude of scattered subjects that are now taught without reference to their use for the purposes of life. There is not one of "the branches of education in knowledge and art which may not be the easier and better learnt for knowing its history and place in the general science of Man". The topics treated, in order, with this view are- -Man, ancient and modern; Man and other Animals: Races of Mankind; Language; Language and Race; Writing; Arts of Life (pp. 182-286); Arts of Pleasure; Science; The Spirit-World; History of Mythology; Society.

Sight: An Exposition of the Principles of Monocular and Binocular Vision. By JOSEPH LE CONTE, LL.D., Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. With Numerous Illustrations. ("International Scientific Series.") London Kegan Paul & Co., 1881.

This is, in its way, a noteworthy book. The author has been all his life interested in the subject of vision, and has long been occupied in making independent investigation of it from the physical and physiological side. Some of his results are new, while his exposition and mode of illustration are never other than original. He has not failed in his aim of producing a book that should "be intelligible and interesting to the thoughtful general reader, and at the same time profitable to even the most advanced specialist". Especially in dealing with the problems of binocular vision, he has given a more exact determination of some of the data than may be found elsewhere. At the same time, he certainly cannot be said to have reached the level of general interpretation that is maintained by an investigator like Helmholtz, who never neglects psychological considerations; or by one like Wundt, who always keeps them uppermost in his thought. What can be done for the explanation of vision without psychological analysis, the author has done; but not more. Not that he refuses to take account of psychology. It is done, however, in such wise as may be judged from sentences like these::

"If, therefore, these nerve-fibres [olfactory] are irritated in any way, even mechanically, they (!) do not feel but perceive an odour."

"It is wholly by virtue of this supplementary instrument [specialised peripheral structures in ear and eye] that we are able to hear not only sound but music, or to see not only light but objects." (Note the analogy

-music-objects.)

"The direct data [of sight] are only light, its intensity, colour, and direction. These are incapable of further analysis, and are therefore simple sensations." (Note the distinction of the first three, and the addition of such a fourth to them, as all alike "simple sensations".)

Bacon. By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., F.S.A., Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford; Fellow of Lincoln College. ("English Philosophers.") London: Sampson Low, 1881. Pp. 202.

Hartley and James Mill. By GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, B.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law; late Scholar of New College, Oxford. ("English Philosophers.") London: Sampson Low,

1881. Pp. 250.

The rule of this Series is to issue two volumes simultaneously at brief intervals. In the first of the present couple, Prof. Fowler seeks 46 to present the character of the revolution which Bacon endeavoured to effect in scientific method as well as the nature of his philosophical opinions generally, in a form intelligible and interesting to readers who have no acquaintance with logic or philosophy". A biographical sketch and general account of the works (filling together about a third of the volume) are followed by critical summaries of Bacon's survey of the sciences and reform of scientific method (pp. 66-158); and two concluding chapters are given to his philosophical and religious opinions, and influence on philosophy and science. More particularly in these last chapters, Prof. Fowler makes, as he says, free use of what he has already written in the Introduction to his edition of the Novum Organum, reproducing to a great extent verbatim. Some of his points, when first presented, were challenged in this journal (XIII., 125), but apparently he has seen no reason to change his mind on any of them, beyond inserting a passage (p. 166) which allows that at least Locke had doubts about the 'faculty '-hypothesis. (What important English thinker from Hobbes had not?) At p. 195 Huyghens and Boerhaave are hastily set down as Germans.

Mr. Bower, after his biographical sections, gives, in the largest part of his work (nearly 200 pp.), a face-to-face exposition of the more characteristic doctrines of Hartley and James Mill. In choosing this way of presentation he has not considered his own ease, and the result of his labour is all the more valuable, though there is necessarily a less distinct impression given of each man's work. But it would have been more to the purpose for the understanding of that Associationist movement in philosophy in which the two thinkers here conjoined have figured so prominently, if Mr. Bower-instead of sweeping up into his last part on "the value and influence of their opinions" everything in later writing that can (or cannot) be connected with them-had more accurately and sufficiently defined the relation of Hartley's thought to that of his predecessors, and more especially of his contemporary Hume. It needs to be explained how, after Locke, there began to be noted under the name of Association a general principle of mental synthesis, instead of a mere aspect of the phenomena of memory. Even if Berkeley's advances towards the wider conception had been left unmentioned, some pains should have been taken to explain how Hume, a few years before Hartley, was giving Association its widest possible application (though not in the same spirit of serious construction). All that Mr. Bower has to say

about Hume, beyond noting a reference to him by James Mill (p. 43), is the incidental remark (p. 225), that it is not "certain (according to Coleridge) that there was any originality in Hume's Essay on Association!" What he otherwise states, there or earlier, of Hartley's forerunners is of no value.

The Metaphysics of the School. By THOMAS HARPER, S.J. Vol. II. London: Macmillan, 1881. Pp. 757.

Father Harper continues his stupendous undertaking begun in 1879. His present volume, considerably larger than the first, covers the "Principles of Being" and the first two of the "Causes of Being' -Material Cause and Formal Cause. Efficient Cause will occupy the greater part of the next volume, and not till this appears will he be able fully to keep his promise of showing the harmony that exists between the metaphysics of the. School and the latest physical discoveries. He makes, however, considerable progress towards this end in the present volume, not only in running observations, but in a special Appendix (pp. 730-48) where he brings together the teaching of Aquinas touching the genesis of the material universe, and concludes "that there is nothing in the principle of natural evolution which is not in strict accordance with the teaching of St. Thomas and the Fathers of the Church. On the contrary, the latter [meaning St. Augustine] taught it some fifteen hundred years ago." It is otherwise part of Father Harper's plan to confront the scholastic doctrine with the dicta of later philosophers, and in the present volume this is more expressly done by the interpolation of a critical section (pp. 90-142) on the synthetical a priori judgments of Kant, led up to through a short review of Descartes and a longer review of Hume. There is no want of vigour or intelligence here in the author's polemic. To say nothing of his own speculative power, the care and labour he bestows on the general exposition of the scholastic doctrines are truly astonishing. It will be the duty of some courageous spirit, one day, to essay the task of tracking Father Harper along his whole course, and to give some compendious report, in this journal, on the vast regions of thought he has opened up for the spiritual reclamation of erring moderns. Meanwhile it is only possible to note that he is on his way, and has now accomplished half his task.

Kant and his English Critics. A Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy. By JOHN WATSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: Maclehose, 1881. Pp. 402.

This work (the first chapter of which, in slightly different form, appeared in Mind XII.) will be critically reviewed later on. The author describes it in the following terms:

"In this work an attempt is made to point out the misconceptions of its real nature that still prevent Kant's theory of knowledge from being estimated on its merits, notwithstanding the large amount of light recently cast upon it, and to show that the Critique of Pure Reason raises, and parti

ally solves, a problem that English Empirical Psychology can hardly be said to touch. I have thought it advisable to prepare the way for a defence of the Critical theory of knowledge, and for a comparison of it with Empirical Psychology, by a short statement of its main positions as contained in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and the corresponding sections of the Prolegomena, together with the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. To the 'Refutation of Idealism,' the principles of 'Substance' and 'Causality' and the Metaphysic of Nature,' in its relation to Mr. Spencer's First Principles, a good deal of space is . . allotted. The direct criticisms which I examine are those of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Sidgwick and Dr. Hutchison Stirling. By far the larger part

of the work is occupied with the exposition and defence of Kant's system, and with the contrast of Criticism and Empiricism in their fundamental doctrines. In the last three chapters, however, an attempt is made to show that while right in principle, the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique is not altogether free from incoherent elements incompatible with its unity and completeness."

The Creed of Science, Religious, Moral and Social. By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A., Author of Idealism: An Essay, Metaphysical and Critical. London: Kegan Paul, 1881. Pp. 412.

This is a work of unmistakable power on subjects of the highest and widest interest. The following sentences from the author's Introduction will, for the present, give some notion of its scope.

"I propose in the following pages to give the chief conclusions reached by Modern Science on the central questions of religion, morals and society -to state, in a word, the general creed of Science; and, as the scientific faith may still be fallible or of unequal degrees of merit, I propose, in the second place, to offer some criticism on some of its more doubtful articles with a view to their reconsideration and revision. In the absence

of any single and universally acknowledged authority on all articles of faith and doctrine, I have taken the consensus of scientific opinion amongst the few highest authorities on each particular article, and I have treated this as the orthodox teaching of Science-as what would have been the decision had all such authorities met together in Council to fix the faith.

On all questions concerning man himself, his virtues and vices, and the uniformity, such as it is, which his life in society presents, we are properly referred on the part of science to a different order of specialiststo the psychologist, the moralist, the sociologist, to such authorities as Mill, or Bain, or Herbert Spencer, who, in addition to their writings on the philosophy or logic of the sciences, have dealt expressly and from the scientific point of view with ethical and social questions. Our new scientific philosophies must be content to be valued by their powers of recommending themselves to the most developed human reason, including the universal human interests; and when they have been thus tried and valued, I venture to predict that none of our new interpretations of the universe will give full and final satisfaction."

Hindu Philosophy. The Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna. An

Exposition of the System of Kapila. With an Appendix on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika Systems. By JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), Member of the Royal Asiatic Society. London: Trübner, 1881. Pp. 151.

The work here translated is probably the oldest extant exposition of the philosophic system, called Sankhya, of Kapila, who is believed to have lived in the 7th or 8th century, B.C. The system contains, according to the translator, nearly all that India has produced in the department of pure philosophy; and "is the earliest attempt on record to give an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the world, the nature and relations of man and his future destiny". Iswara Krishna's exposition was previously translated into English by H. T. Colebrooke. The present new rendering is provided with considerable comments and notes, material as well as verbal; the translator being especially concerned to bring out the affinities between the philosophies of Kapila on the one hand, and of Spinoza, Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann on the other. The thought of the last two, he considers, "is mainly a reproduction of the philosophic system of Kapila in its materialistic part, presented in a more elaborate form, but on the same fundamental lines". A short supplementary account is given also of the Hindu logic and physic.

Materialism Ancient and Modern. By a late FELLOW of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan, 1881. Pp. 43.

The outcome of this short essay in which the different forms of materialism are reviewed may be gathered from the following extract"Comparing then the material hypothesis with that of an intelligent power, we find that, while the first accounts for some material phenomena but fails entirely to explain the existence of sensation or any other mental phenomenon, the second, if adopted, is sufficient to account for all phenomena, both mental and material.

If the author had followed the recent discussions on "Mind-stuff," he would hardly have written what stands on p. 27.

Definitions and Axioms of a Future Science of Existence or Ontology. A Study by KARL FRIEDRICH FRÖBEL. London and Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate, 1881. Pp. 160.

The author makes the following statement:-

"An attempt is made in this 'Study' to explain on reasonable groundsnot by presumed 'Causes '-the existence of stars, of the different chemical substances composing them, the geometrical regularity of the form and structure of crystals, the origin and evolution of cells, the growth of plants, the spontaneous motions and the senses of animals, the principle of all life-not as a product of 'living forces,' but-as the natural realisation of the eternal laws of space, time, and being, considered as the creative and evolving powers in material Nature ;-all this, on the assumed certainty that this world, the material object of consciousness and reason, is not a dream, but a given reality, the most certain of all certainties. This Study also tries to explain the reasonable relations of Mind and Body, of Spirit and Matter, and the rational conviction of the possibility of a future personal life after death. Moral power is defined as the realised union of the three natural powers in the human Self or Ego."