1. It is actionable to say of the
plaintiff he moved the line and
he made a new line, if they be
laid to be spoken in a conversa-
tion of and concerning certain
bound trees and allowed land
marks forming the boundary.
line, and the evidence of the
boundary line between the plan-
tations of the plaintiff and defen- 1. Though the rule in general is,
dant. Todd v. Rough.
2. The words " you have killed |
A. B., you have poisoned him,
and I can prove it," are action-
able, though it appear by the
plaintiff's witnesses that at the
time when the words were spo-
ken A. B. was alive in a distant
part of the country. Eckart v.
Wilson, 44.
3. In slander, words subsequent to
those laid in the narr, charging
a distinct felony are not admis-
sible in evidence to show malice
in the defendant.
that a survey having been once
returned, no other survey can
be made on the same warrant
without a new order, yet if a
new survey be made and accept-
ed and warrant issued it is good,
if no third person's claim in-
tervened but that of one who
consented to such new survey
and encouraged the purchaser to
make improvements. Light v.
Woodside.
4. A declaration against two in the 1. The act of 1705, relating to
swine running at large, applies]
only where they are voluntarily
suffered to go at large, not
where they escape from the
owner without his default: and
if the proceedings do not state
this, they will be quashed.
It is not necessary that proceed-
ings by a justice under this act
should contain any adjudication:
nor is the appointment of ap-
praisers process, which the
constitution requires to be in
the name of the commonwealth.
A certiorari lies from the Supreme
Court to remove the proceed-
ings of a justice under the act
of 1705, relative to swine run-
ning at large. Commonwealth
v. Fourteen Hogs.
of a house for a year, and un-1. The verdict recorded in court
1. If there are articles of agree-
ment for the sale of lands, in
which no time is stipulated for
delivery of possession, but be-
fore the day of payment of the
purchase money the vendee ob-
tains possession by the consent
of the vendor, and the purchase
money not being paid the ven-
dor obtains possession unlaw-j
fully by the act of a third per-
son, the vendee may recover in
ejectment without tendering the
purchase money or bringing it
into court. Harris v. Bell. 39
2. A sale of the land of an intes-
1. A location calling for land" on
the north side of Blacklick
creek," is not to be considered
as a shifted location, merely be-
cause it is surveyed on land
which does not bound on the
creek.
When a warrant calls for an
improvement, without saying
when that improvement com-
menced, the title under such
warrant cannot be carried far-
ther back than its date.
An application for an improve-/2. The defendant cannot call a
ment, mentioning the year when
it began, is good, though it does
not state the day or month when
it commenced.
Whether a right of pre-emption
founded on improvement is lost
by laches, is a matter for the
jury, where its determination
depends on a variety of facts.
A recovery cannot be had in eject-
ment, of lands on the west side
of the Allegheny river, without a
survey: but on the east side of
that river one who has a right
of pre-emption, and has desig-
nated his boundaries, may re- 4.
cover without a survey. Mickle
v. Lucas.
WATERCOURSE.
See DEED, 2. MILLS.
WILL.
See EVIDENCE, 17.
person on his behalf as a wit
ness, where the plaintiff has
contracted that the witness's
right shall depend on the event
of the question to be determined
in the suit. Robinson v. Eld-
ridge.
140
3. In a suit against the surety in a
recognizance for a stay of exe-
cution, one of the defendants
against whom judgment was ob-
tained in the original suit, is not
a competent witness for the de-
fendant. Milliken v. Brown.
An agent is competent wit-
ness to prove his own authority
by parol, to make a parol lease.
MGunnagle v. Thornton. 251
5. One who had been a stock-
holder in a company, and had
transferred his nine shares of
stock therein to the company,
with a guarantee that they should
sell at par, is not a competent
witness for the company, in a
suit brought by them to recover
the amount due by a person who
subscribed to their stock, if such
shares are still held by the com-
pany, and the market price is
under par. Grayble v. York, &c.
Turnpike Company.
1. In ejectment, the probate of a
will is prima facie evidence.
Dornick v. Reichenbach.
84
2. Mere feebleness of intellect,
short of what might by many be
supposed to amount to idiocy, 6.
is insufficient to render a will
void.
Where grants are made of the
same land to contending claim-
ants, with a general warranty,
the widow of the grantor is a
witness in an ejectment by one
against the other, for her inte-
rests are in equilibrio. Brindle
v. M'Ilvaine.
7. In a suit against an agent to re-
cover back money improperly
paid to him, on the ground that
there was nothing due to the
principal on whose account he
received the money, the princi-
pal is a witness for the agent
who alleges payment over with-
out notice. Seidel v. Peckworth.
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