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SETTLEMENT, UNDER THE
1. An United States tax is not a
public tax, the payment of which
gives a right of settlement un-
der the act of 1771. Directors of
Bucks v. Overseers of Columbia.
See SCIRE FACIAS.
See NEW TRIAL. JURY.
1. It is actionable to say of the
plaintiff he moved the line and
he made a new line, if they be
laid to be spoken in a conversa-
tion of and concerning certain
bound trees and allowed land
marks forming the boundary)
line, and the evidence of the
boundary line between the plan-
tations of the plaintiff and defen-
dant. Todd v. Rough.
2. The words "you have killed
A. B., you have poisoned him,
and I can prove it," are action-
able, though it appear by the
plaintiff's witnesses that at the
time when the words were spo-
ken A. B. was alive in a distant
part of the country. Eckart v.
usual form of a declaration in
slander, except stating the words
to be spoken by them by a con-
spiracy between them had, is
still an action of slander, and not
of conspiracy, and being a joint
of action of slander against two
persons, is bad on writ of error.
Glass v. Stewart.
1. The entry of a judgment in Fork
county on the first instead of the
third day of the term in a pro-
ceeding under the statement law
is cured by the act of 21st Fe-
bruary, 1822, though a writ of
error had issued before the pas-
sing of the act.
2. In a proceeding on a bond con-
ditioned for the payment of mo-
ney, under the statement act,
judgment may be entered for the
STAY OF EXECUTION.
Though the rule in general is,
that a survey having been once
returned, no other survey can
be made on the same warrant
without a new order, yet if a
new survey be made and accept-
ed and warrant issued it is good,
if no third person's claim in-
tervened but that of one who
consented to such new survey
and encouraged the purchaser to
make improvements. Light v.
3. In slander, words subsequent to
those laid in the narr, charging
a distinct felony are not admis-
sible in evidence to show malice
in the defendant.
4. A declaration against two in the 1. The act of 1705, relating to
swine running at large, applies
only where they are voluntarily
suffered to go at large, not
where they escape from the
owner without his default: and
if the proceedings do not state
this, they will be quashed.
It is not necessary that proceed-
ings by a justice under this act
should contain any adjudication:
nor is the appointment of ap-
praisers process, which the
constitution requires to be in
the name of the commonwealth.
A certiorari lies from the Supreme
Court to remove the proceed-
ings of a justice under the act
of 1705, relative to swine run-
ning at large. Commonwealth
v. Fourteen Hogs.
1. There is no personal liability
for taxes due on unseated lands.
Query, how far lands are to be
considered as unseated lands,
from which profits were once
drawn, but have been after-
wards abandoned for a long
time by the owner.
If a tax be assessed on seated land
in the name of the owner, and
the name of the tenant given as
matter of description, and in
the duplicate, the name of the
tenant be omitted, the variance
is immaterial. Stokely v. Boner.
See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1.
1. No tender is a substantial one
but a legal tender, and the only
effect of a tender and refusal
where the plaintiff has a direct
cause of action is to expose the
plaintiff to the loss of the costs,
if the defendant pleads the ten-
der, and brings the money into
court. Cornell v. Green.
It is not necessary, in a suit
against a purchaser of land at
sheriff's sale, brought to reco-
ver the purchase money, to aver
a tender of a deed acknowledg-
ed. Unless other conditions are
specified, it is a cash sale, and
the delivery of the deed is an
act subsequent to the payment
of the money. Negley v. Stewart.
1. Devise of a moiety of a tract to
be taken off the side nearest the
testator's brother, and the other
moiety to another: the devisees
are tenants in common, and
either may support ejectment.
When one tenant in common en-
ters on the whole, and takes the
profits, and claims the whole
exclusively for 21 years, the
jury ought to presume an actual
ouster though none be proved.
Frederick v. Gray.
One in possession may main-
tain trespass sgainst a wrong-
doer and the latter, on the plea
of not guilty, cannot shelter
himself under the title of a
third person: he should spe-
cially plead such title, and aver
a command or authority from
terthe owner to enter. Stambaugh
TREATY OF PEACE.
See ATTAINDER, 1.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
1. If there are articles of agree-
ment for the sale of lands, in
which no time is stipulated for
delivery of possession, but be-
fore the day of payment of the
purchase money the vendee ob-
tains possession by the consent
of the vendor, and the purchase
money not being paid the ven-
dor obtains possession unlaw-
fully by the act of third per-
son, the vendee may recover in
ejectment without tendering the
purchase money or bringing it
into court. Harris v. Bell. 39
2. A sale of the land of an intes-
tate on a judgment against an
executor de son sort is void. But
to raise an equity in the pur-2.
chaser under the judgment, evi-
dence is admissible in eject-.
ment for the land, to show the
judgment and execution, and
sale; that the purchaser took
WARRANT AND SURVEY.
1. A location calling for land" on
the north side of Blacklick
creek," is not to be considered
as a shifted location, merely be-
cause it is surveyed on land
which does not bound on the
a person pay the fees for a sur-
vey on an indescriptive location,
and it is made, but fraudulently
returned by the deputy surveyor
for another person, it is to be
considered as returned for the
holder of such location, and his
title is good against a bona fide
purchaser, if he has not been
guilty of laches, or acquiesced
in the other's right. Boyles v.
When a warrant calls for an
improvement, without saying
when that improvement com-
menced, the title under such
warrant cannot be carried far-
ther back than its date.
See DEED, 2.
An application for an improve-12.
ment, mentioning the year when
it began, is good, though it does
not state the day or month when
Whether a right of pre-emption!
founded on improvement is lost
by laches, is a matter for the
jury, where its determination
depends on a variety of facts.
A recovery cannot be had in eject-
ment, of lands on the west side
of the Allegheny river, without a
survey: but on the east side of
that river one who has a right
of pre-emption, and has desig-
nated his boundaries, may re- 4.
cover without a survey. Mickle
The defendant cannot call a
person on his behalf as a wit-
ness, where the plaintiff has
contracted that the witness's
right shall depend on the event
of the question to be determined
in the suit. Robinson v. Eld-
3. In a suit against the surety in a
recognizance for a stay of exe-
cution, one of the defendants
against whom judgment was ob-
tained in the original suit, is not
a competent witness for the de-
fendant. Milliken v. Brown.
An agent is competent wit-
ness to prove his own authority
by parol, to make a parol lease.
M Gunnagle v. Thornton. 251
5. One who had been a stock-
holder in a company, and had
transferred his nine shares of
stock therein to the company,
with a guarantee that they should
sell at par, is not a competent
witness for the company, in a
suit brought by them to recover
the amount due by a person who
subscribed to their stock, if such
shares are still held by the com-
pany, and the market price is
under par. Grayble v. York, &c.
Where grants are made of the
same land to contending claim-
ants, with a general warranty,
the widow of the grantor is a
witness in an ejectment by one
against the other, for her inte-
rests are in equilibrio. Brindle
See EVIDENCE, 17.
1. In ejectment, the probate of a
will is prima facie evidence.
Dornick v. Reichenbach.
2. Mere feebleness of intellect,
short of what might by many be
supposed to amount to idiocy,
is insufficient to render a will
7. In a suit against an agent to re-
cover back money improperly
paid to him, on the ground that
there was nothing due to the
principal on whose account he
received the money, the princi-
pal is a witness for the agent
who alleges payment over with-
out notice. Seidel v. Peckworth.