1. It is actionable to say of the plaintiff he moved the line and he made a new line, if they be laid to be spoken in a conversa- tion of and concerning certain bound trees and allowed land marks forming the boundary. line, and the evidence of the boundary line between the plan-
tations of the plaintiff and defen- 1. Though the rule in general is,
dant. Todd v. Rough. 2. The words " you have killed | A. B., you have poisoned him, and I can prove it," are action- able, though it appear by the plaintiff's witnesses that at the time when the words were spo- ken A. B. was alive in a distant part of the country. Eckart v. Wilson, 44.
3. In slander, words subsequent to
those laid in the narr, charging a distinct felony are not admis- sible in evidence to show malice in the defendant.
that a survey having been once returned, no other survey can be made on the same warrant without a new order, yet if a new survey be made and accept- ed and warrant issued it is good, if no third person's claim in- tervened but that of one who consented to such new survey and encouraged the purchaser to make improvements. Light v. Woodside.
4. A declaration against two in the 1. The act of 1705, relating to
swine running at large, applies] only where they are voluntarily suffered to go at large, not where they escape from the owner without his default: and if the proceedings do not state this, they will be quashed.
It is not necessary that proceed- ings by a justice under this act should contain any adjudication: nor is the appointment of ap- praisers process, which the constitution requires to be in the name of the commonwealth. A certiorari lies from the Supreme Court to remove the proceed- ings of a justice under the act of 1705, relative to swine run- ning at large. Commonwealth v. Fourteen Hogs.
of a house for a year, and un-1. The verdict recorded in court
1. If there are articles of agree- ment for the sale of lands, in which no time is stipulated for delivery of possession, but be- fore the day of payment of the purchase money the vendee ob- tains possession by the consent of the vendor, and the purchase money not being paid the ven- dor obtains possession unlaw-j fully by the act of a third per- son, the vendee may recover in ejectment without tendering the purchase money or bringing it into court. Harris v. Bell. 39 2. A sale of the land of an intes-
1. A location calling for land" on the north side of Blacklick creek," is not to be considered as a shifted location, merely be- cause it is surveyed on land which does not bound on the creek.
When a warrant calls for an improvement, without saying when that improvement com- menced, the title under such warrant cannot be carried far- ther back than its date.
An application for an improve-/2. The defendant cannot call a
ment, mentioning the year when it began, is good, though it does not state the day or month when it commenced. Whether a right of pre-emption founded on improvement is lost by laches, is a matter for the jury, where its determination depends on a variety of facts. A recovery cannot be had in eject- ment, of lands on the west side of the Allegheny river, without a survey: but on the east side of that river one who has a right of pre-emption, and has desig- nated his boundaries, may re- 4. cover without a survey. Mickle v. Lucas.
WATERCOURSE.
See DEED, 2. MILLS. WILL.
See EVIDENCE, 17.
person on his behalf as a wit ness, where the plaintiff has contracted that the witness's right shall depend on the event of the question to be determined in the suit. Robinson v. Eld- ridge. 140
3. In a suit against the surety in a recognizance for a stay of exe- cution, one of the defendants against whom judgment was ob- tained in the original suit, is not a competent witness for the de- fendant. Milliken v. Brown.
An agent is competent wit- ness to prove his own authority by parol, to make a parol lease. MGunnagle v. Thornton. 251 5. One who had been a stock- holder in a company, and had transferred his nine shares of stock therein to the company, with a guarantee that they should sell at par, is not a competent witness for the company, in a suit brought by them to recover the amount due by a person who subscribed to their stock, if such shares are still held by the com- pany, and the market price is under par. Grayble v. York, &c. Turnpike Company.
1. In ejectment, the probate of a will is prima facie evidence. Dornick v. Reichenbach. 84 2. Mere feebleness of intellect, short of what might by many be supposed to amount to idiocy, 6. is insufficient to render a will void.
Where grants are made of the same land to contending claim- ants, with a general warranty, the widow of the grantor is a witness in an ejectment by one against the other, for her inte- rests are in equilibrio. Brindle v. M'Ilvaine. 7. In a suit against an agent to re- cover back money improperly paid to him, on the ground that there was nothing due to the principal on whose account he received the money, the princi- pal is a witness for the agent who alleges payment over with- out notice. Seidel v. Peckworth.
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