fible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themfelves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true; if men attempt the difcuffion of queftions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual fyftem or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitlefs contefts, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the question regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would thing, could preferve the difpute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which keep the antagonists still at a diftance, and hinder them from grappling with each

other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed queftion concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the fame opinion with regard to this fubject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvaffed on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiftry, that it is no wonder, if a fenfible reader indulge his eafe fo far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of fuch a queftion, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the ftate of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promifes at leaft fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much difturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning.

I hope,

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of neceffity and of liberty, according to any reasonable fenfe, which can be put on thefe terms; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doctrine of neceffity.

It is univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precisely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other effect, in fuch particular circumstances, could poffibly have refulted from it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prefcribed with fuch exactnefs, that a living creature may as foon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as motion, in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of neceffity, we must confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

It seems evident, that, if all the scenes of nature were continually fhifted in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any refemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might fay, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effect muft be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could poffibly have accefs to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes

entirely

entirely from the uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar objects are conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances orm the whole of that neceffity, which we ascribe

matter. Beyond the conftant conjunction of tfimilar objects, and the confequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any neceffity, or connexion.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that thefe two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of neceffity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumftance, the conftant and regular conjunction of fimilar events; we may poffibly fatisfy ourselves by the following confiderations. It is univerfally acknowleded, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains ftill the fame, in its principles and operations. The fame motives always produce the fame actions: The fame events follow from the fame caufes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity, friendfhp, generosity, public spirit; these paffions, mixed in various degrees, and diftributed through fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and ftill are, the fource of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been obferved among mankind. Would you know the fentiments, inclinations, and courfe of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations, which you have made

with regard to the latter. Mankind are fo much the fame, in all times and places, that hiftory informs us of nothing new or ftrange in this particular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the constant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fhewing men in all varieties of circumftances and fituations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular fprings of human action and behaviour. Thefe records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience; in the fame manner as the phyfician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by Ariftotle, and Hippocrates, more like to thofe, which at prefent lie under our observation, than the men, described by Polybius and Tacitus, are to thofe, who now govern the world.

Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted men, who were entirely divefted of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generofity, and public spirit; we fhould immediately, from thefe circumstances, detect the falfehood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions, afcribed to any perfon, are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch circumstances, could ever induce him to fuch a

conduct.

conduct. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be fufpected, when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his fupernatural force and activity, by which he was able to refift them. So readily and univerfally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to inftruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expreffions, and even gestures; and again, defcend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general obfervations, treasured up by a courfe of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pafs for the fpecious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect difintereftedness, so often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; feldom in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment, which we could form of this kind, irregular and anomalous, it were impoffible to collect any general obfervations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digefted by reflection, would ever ferve to any purpofe. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner, but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain,

and