to expose themfelves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclufions; and this feems the readiest folution of thefe difficulties.

NOTE [Q], p. 174.

THAT impious maxim of the ancient philofophy, Ex

nihilo, nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philofophy.Not only the will of the fupreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we know a priori, the will of any other being might create it, or any other caufe, that the most whimfical imagination can affign.

NOTE [R], p. 193.

THAT HAT property is a fpecies of relation, which produces a connexion between the person and the object is evident: The imagination paffes naturally and eafily from the confideration of a field to that of the person to whom it belongs. It may also be afked, how this relation is refolvable into any of those three, viz. caufation, contiguity, and refemblance, which we have affirmed to be the only connecting principles among ideas. To be the proprietor of any thing is to be the fole perfon, who, by the laws of fociety, has a right to difpofe of it, and to enjoy the benefit of it. This right has at least a tendency to procure the person the exercise of it; and in fact does commonly procure him that advantage. For rights which had no influence, and never took place, would be no rights at all. Now a person who difpofes of an object, and reaps benefit from it, both produces, or may produce, effects on it, and is affected by it. Property therefore is a fpecies of caufation. It enables the perfon to produce alterations on the object, and it fuppofes that his condition is improved and altered by it. It is indeed the relation the most interesting of any, and occurs the most frequently to the mind.

NOTE

NOTE [S], p. 238.

THIS fiction of a state of nature, as a state of war, was not firit started by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined. Plato endeavours to refute an hypothefis very like it in the 2d, 3d, and 4th books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary, supposes it certain and universally acknowledged in the following paffage. "Quis enim veftrum, judices, ignorat, ita naturam rerum tuliffe, ut quodam tempore homines, "nondum neque naturali, neque civili jure defcripto, fufi per agros, ac difperfi vagarentur tantumque haberent quantum manu ac viribus, per cædem ac vulnera, aut eripere, aut retinere potuiffent? Qui igitur primi virtute " & confilio præftanti extiterunt, ii perfpecto genere huma"næ docilitatis atque ingenii, diffipatos, unum in locum

66

6.6

congregarunt, eofque ex feritate illa ad juftitiam ac man"fuetudinem tranfduxerunt. Tum res ad communem "utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula "hominum, quæ poftea civitates nominatæ funt, tum do"micilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino " & humano jure, moenibus fepferunt. Atque inter hanc "vitam, perpolitam humanitate, & illam immanem, nihil "tam interest quam JUS atque VIS. Horum utro uti "nolimus, altero eft utendum. Vim volumus extingui? "Jus valeat neceffe eft, id eft, judicia, quibus omne jus "continetur. Judicia difplicent, aut nulla, funt? Vis do"minetur neceffe eft? Hæc vident omnes." Pro. Sext. 1.42.

NOTE [T], p. 245.

THE author of L'Efpirt des Loix. This illuftrious

writer, however, fets out with a different theory, and suppofes all right to be founded on certain rapports or relations; which is a fyftem, that, in my opinion, never will be reconciled with true philofophy. Father Malebranche, as far as Ι can learn, was the first that started this abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Cudworth, Clarke, and others; and as it excludes all fentiment, and pretends to found every thing on reason, it has not wanted

followers

followers in this philofophic age. See Section I. Appendix I. With regard to juftice, the virtue here treated of, the inference against this theory feems short and conclufive. Property is allowed to be dependent on civil laws; civil laws are allowed to have no other object, but the interest of society: This therefore must be allowed to be the fole foundation of property and juftice. Not to mention, that our obligation itself to obey the magiftrate and his laws is founded on nothing but the interefts of fociety.

If the ideas of juftice, fometimes, do not follow the difpofitions of civil law; we fhall find, that these cafes, inftead of objections, are confirmations of the theory delivered above. Where a civil law is fo perverse as to cross all the interests of fociety, it lofes all its authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural juftice, which are conformable to those interests. Sometimes alfo civil laws, for useful purpofes, require a ceremony or form to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run contrary to the usual tenour of justice; but one who takes advantage of fuch chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an honest man. Thus, the interefts of fociety require, that contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material article either of natural or civil juftice: But the omiffion of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a contract, in foro humana, but not in foro confcientiæ, as divines express themfelves. In these cafes, the magiftrate is fuppofed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of the origin of justice and of property, as affigned above.

NOTE [U], p. 247.

It is evident, that the will or confent alone never transfers

property, nor caufes the obligation of a promise, (for the fame reasoning extends to both) but the will must be expreffed by words or figns, in order to impose a tye upon any man. The expreffion being once brought in as fubfervient to the

will, foon becomes the principal part of the promise; nor will a man be lefs bound by his word, though he fecretly give a different direction to his intention, and with-hold the affent of his mind. But though the expreffion makes, on 'moft occafions, the whole of the promife, yet it does not always fo; and one who should make use of any expreffion, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he ufes without any fenfe of the confequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, though he know its meaning, yet if he ufe it in jeft only, and with fuch figns as evidently fhow, that he has no ferious intention of binding himself, he would not lie under any obligation of performance; but it is neceffary, that the words be a perfect expreffion of the will, without any contrary figns. Nay, even this we must not carry fo far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of understanding, we conjecture, from certain figns, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expreffion or verbal promife, if we accept of it; but muft limit this conclufion to those cafes where the figns are of a different nature from those of deceit. All these contradictions are easily accounted for, if justice arife entirely from its ufefulness to fociety; but will never be explained on any other hypothefis.

It is remarkable, that the moral decifions of the Jefuits and other relaxed cafuifts, were commonly-formed in profecution of fome fuch fubtilties of reafoning as are here pointed out, and proceed as much from the habit of fcholaftic refinement as from any corruption of the heart, if we may follow the authority of Monf. Bayle. See his Dictionary, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind rifen fo high against these cafuifts; but because every one perceived, that human fociety could not fubfift were fuch practices authorized, and that morals must always be handled with a view to public intereft, more than philofophical regularity? If the fecret direction of the intention, faid every man of fenfe, could invalidate a contract; where is our fecurity? And yet a metaphyfical schoolman might think, that, where an intention was fupposed to be requifite, if that intention really had not

place,

place, no confequence ought to follow, and no obligation be impofed. The cafuiftical fubtilties may not be greater than the fubtilties of lawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are pernicious, and the latter innocent and even neceffary, this is the reafon of the very different reception they meet with from the world.

It is a doctrine of the church of Rome, that the priest, by a fecret direction of his intention, can invalidate any facrament. This pofition is derived from a ftrict and regular profecution of the obvious truth, that empty words alone, without any meaning or intention in the speaker, can never be attended with any effect. If the fame conclufion be not admitted in reafonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is allowed to be of fo much lefs confequence than the eternal falvation of thousands, it proceeds entirely from men's sense of the danger and inconvenience of the doctrine in the former cafe: And we may thence obferve, that however pofitive, arrogant, and dogmatical any fuperftition may appear, it never can convey any thorough perfuafion of the reality of its objects,

or

put them, in any degree, on a balance with the common incidents of life, which we learn from daily obfervation and experimental reasoning.

NOTE [X], p. 255:

THE only folution, which Plato gives to all the ob

jections that might be raised against the community of women, established in his imaginary commonwealth, is Kanisa γαρ δη τετο καὶ λείεται και λελέξεται, ότι το μεν ωφελιμον καλόν. Το δε Βλαβερον αισχρον Scite enim iftud dicitur & dicetur, Id quod utile fit honeftum effe, quod autem inutile fit turpe effe. De. Rep. lib. v. p. 457. ex edit. Ser. And this maxim will admit of no doubt, where public utility is concerned; which is Plato's meaning. And indeed to what other purpose do all the ideas of chastity and modesty ferve? Nifi utile eft quod facimus, fruftra eft gloria, fays Phædrus. Καλόν των βλαβόρων «δεν, fays Plutarch. de vitiofo pudore. Nihil eorum quæ damnofa funt, pulchrum eft. The fame was the opinion of the Stoics. Dagur er of

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