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SECTION I.

Of the DIFFERENT SPECIES of PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL philofophy, or the science of human

nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, inftruction, and reformation of mankind. The one confiders man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and fentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which thefe objects feem to poffefs, and according to the light in which they prefent themfelves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this fpecies of philofophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their fubject in an eafy and obvious manner, and fuch as is beft fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most ftriking obfervations and inftances from common life; place oppofite characters in a proper contraft; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the foundeft precepts and moft illuftrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts

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to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other fpecies of philofophers confider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a fubject of fpeculation; and with a narrow fcrutiny examine it, in order to find thofe principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our fentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond controverfy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and fhould for ever talk of truth and falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of these diftinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular inftances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at thofe original principles, by which, in every fcience, all human curiofity must be bounded. Though their fpeculations feem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wife; and think themfelves fufficiently compenfated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover fome hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of pofterity.

It is certain that the eafy and obvious philofophy, will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abftrufe; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common

life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into bufinefs and action, vanishes when the philofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into oper day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paffions, the vehemence of our affections, diffipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philofopher to a mere plebeian.

This alfo must be confeffed, that the moft durable, as well as jufteft fame, has been acquired by the eafy philofophy, and that abstract reasoners feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupport their renown with more equitable pofterity. It is eafy for a profound philofopher to commit à mistake in his fubtile reafonings; and one mistake is the neceffary parent of another, while he pushes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philofopher, who purposes only to reprefent the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and fecures himfelf from any dangerous illufions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at prefent; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYERE paffes the feas, and ftill maintains his reputation: But the glory of MALEBRANCHE is con

fined