virtues and talents, vices and defects; and should explain the reafon and origin of that diftinction. But in order to excufe myself from this undertaking, which would, at laft, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I fhall fubjoin the four following reflections, which fhall contain all that I intend to fay on the prefent fubject. 1 First, I do not find, that in the English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects, or that a precife definition can be given of the one as contradiftinguifhed from the other. Were we to fay, for inftance, that the esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the appellation of virtues; we fhould foon recollect the qualities of courage, equanimity, patience, felf-command; with many others, which almoft every language claffes under this appellation, though they depend little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which prompt us to act our part in fociety, are entitled to that honourable diftinction; it muft immediately occur, that these are indeed the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the focial virtues; but that this very epithet fuppofes, that there are alfo virtues of another fpecies. Should we lay hold of the distinction between intellectual and moral endowments, and affirm the laft alone to be the real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should find, that many of those qualities, ufually called intellectual virtues, fuch as prudence, penetration, difcernment, difcretion, had also a confiderable influence on conduct. The diftinction between the beart and the bead may alfo be adopted: The qualities of the firft may be defined fuch as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling or fentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: But industry, frugality, temperance, fecrecy, perfeve rance, rance, and many other laudable powers or habits, generally ftiled virtues, are exerted without any immediate fentiment in the perfon poffeffed of them; and are only known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this feeming perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot poffibly be of any importance. A moral, philofophical difcourfe needs not enter into all thefe caprices of language, which are fo variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the fame dialect. But on the whole, it feems to me, that, though it is always allowed, that there are virtues of many different kinds, yet when a man is called virtuous, or is denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his focial qualities, which are, indeed, the moft valuable. It is, at the fame time, certain, that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, œconomy, industry, understanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, honest man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever fay, except by way of irony, that fuch a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead? But, fecondly, it is no wonder, that languages fhould not be very precife in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices and defects ; fince there is little diftinction made in our internal eftimation of them. It feems indeed certain, that the fentiment of confcious worth, the felf-fatisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character; it seems certain, 1 fay, that this fentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper name in our language*, arifes from the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and diffolutenefs, and feels not a fecret fting See NOTE [SS]. ΟΙ or compunction, whenever his memory prefents any paft occurrence, where he behaved with stupidity or ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish conduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They still haunt his folitary hours, damp his moft afpiring thoughts, and fhew him, even to himfelf, in the moft contemptible and most odious colours imaginable. What is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than fuch blunders, infirmities, and meanneffes, or more dread to have expofed by raillery and satire? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or addrefs, our taste or abilities? These we difplay with care, if not with oftentation; and we commonly fhow more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the focial virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of such fuperior excellence. Good-nature and honefty, especially the latter, are fo indifpenfably required, that, though the greatest cenfure attends any violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows fuch common inftances of them, as feem effential to the fupport of human fociety. And hence the reason, in my opinion, why, though men often extol fo liberally the qualities of their heart, they are fhy in commending the endowments of their head: Because the latter virtues, being fuppofed more rare and extraordinary, are obferved to be the more ufual objects of pride and felf-conceit; and when boafted of, beget a ftrong fufpicion of these fentiments. It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's character most by calling him a knave or a coward, and whether a beaftly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a selfish, ungenerous mifer. Give me my choice, and I would rather, for my own happinefs and felf-enjoyment, have a friendly, friendly, humane heart, than poffefs all the other virtues of Demofthenes and Philip united: But I would rather pass with the world for one endowed with extenfive genius and intrepid courage, and should thence expect ftronger inftances of general applause and admiration. The figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend as much upon his good fenfe and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. Had a man the best intentions in the world, and were the fartheft removed from all injuftice and violence, he would never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate fhare, at least, of parts and understanding. What is it then we can here difpute about? If fense and courage, temperance and induftry, wifdom and knowledge confeffedly form a confiderable part of perfonal merit: if a man, poffeffed of thefe qualities, is both better fatisfied with himself, and better entitled to the good-will, esteem, and services of others, than one entirely deftitute of them; if, in fhort, the fentiments are fimilar, which arife from these endowments and from the focial virtues ; is there any reafon for being fo extremely fcrupulous about a word, or difputing whether they be entitled to the denomination of virtues? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the fentiment of approbation, which thofe accomplishments produce, befides its being inferior, is alfo fomewhat different from that, which attends the virtues of juftice and humanity. But this feems not fufficient reafon for ranking them entirely under different claffes and appellations. The character of Cæfar and that of Cato, as drawn by Salluft, are both of them virtuous, in the ftricteft and moft limited fenfe of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the fentiments entirely the fame, which arife from them. The one is amiVOL. II. Bb able able; the other awful: We fhould wish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner the approbation, which attends temperance or industry or frugality, may be fomewhat different from that which is paid to the focial virtues, without making them entirely of a different fpecies. And, indeed, we may obferve, that these endowments, more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the fame kind of approbation. Good fenfe and genius beget efteem and regard: Wit and humour excite love and affection * Most people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, affent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet. Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool) Is fenfe and spirit with humanity †. What pretenfions has a man to our generous affiffance or good offices, who has diffipated his wealth in profufe expences, ide vanities, chimerical projects, diffolute pleafures, or extravagant gaming? Thefe vices (for we fcruple not to call them fuch) bring misery unpitied, and contempt on every one addicted to them. Achæus, a wife and prudent prince, fell into a fatal fnare, which coft him his crown and life, after having used every reasonable precaution to guard himself against it. On that account, fays the hif torian, he is a juft object of regard and compaffion: His betrayers alone of hatred and contempt ‡. The precipitate flight and improvident negligence of Pompey, at the beginning of the civil wars, appeared fuch notorious blunders to Cicero, as quite palled his friendship towards that great man. In the Jame manner, fays he, as want of cleanliness, decency, or difcretion in a miftrefs are found to alienate our affections. * See NOTE [TT]. The Art of preferving Health, Book 4. |