there is fuch a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrify or difguife; though he may attempt, by a philofophical chymistry, to refolve the elements of this paffion, if I may speak, into those of another, and explain every affection to be felflove, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the fame direction to the original paffion; this is fufficient, even according to the selfish fyftem, to make the wideft difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I esteem the man, whofe felf-love, by whatever means, is fo directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him ferviceable to fociety: As I hate or despise him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you fuggeft, that thefe characters, though feemingly oppofite, are, at bottom, the fame, and that a very inconfiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithstanding thefe inconfiderable differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untranfmutable. And I find not in this more than in other fubjects, that the natural sentiments, arifing from the general ap-. pearances of things, are easily deftroyed by fubtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these appearances. Does not the lively, chearful colour of a countenance infpire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from philofophy, that all difference of complexion arifes from the most minute differences of thickness, in the most minute parts of the fkin; by means of which a fuperficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light, and absorb the others?

But though the queftion, concerning the univerfal or partial felfifhnefs of man be not fo ma

terial,

terial, as is ufually imagined, to morality and practice, it is certainly of confequence in the fpeculative fcience of human nature, and is a proper object of curiofity and enquiry. It may not, therefore be unfuitable in this place, to beftow a few reflections upon it*.

The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothefis, is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our moft unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest ftretch of philofophy to establish fo extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless obferver, there appear to be fuch difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; fuch affections as love, friendship, compaffion, gratitude. These fentiments have their caufes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and obfervation, and plainly diftinguished. from those of the selfish paffions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted; till fome hypothefis be discovered, which, by penetrating deper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely, from the love of fimplicity, which has been the fource of much false reafoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter into any detail on the prefent fubject. Many able philofophers have shown the infufficiency of these fyftems. And I fhall take for granted what, I believe, the fmalleft reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.

But the nature of the fubject furnishes the ftrongest prefumption, that no better fyftem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to ac count for the origin of the benevolent from the felfish affections, and reduce all the various emo

* See NOTE [00].

one.

tions of the human mind to a perfect fimplicity. The cafe is not the fame in this fpecies of philofophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothefis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate fcrutiny, folid and fatisfactory. Inftances of this kind are fo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philofopher*, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general prefumption for its arifing from the caufes, which are the leaft obvious and familiar. But the prefumption always lies on the other fide, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our paffions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The fimplest. and most obvious caufe, which can there be affigned for any phænomenon, is probably the true When a philofopher, in the explication of his fyftem, is obliged to have recourfe to fome very intricate and refined reflections, and to fuppofe them effential to the producton of any pasfion or emotion, we have reafon to be extremely on our guard against fo fallacious an hypothefis. The affections are not fufceptible of any impreffion from the refinements of reafon or imagination; and it is always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, neceffarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives, which the mind, from vanity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more prevalent: But there is no inftance, that a concealment of this nature has ever arifen from the abstruseness and intricacy of the motive. A man, that has lost a friend and patron, may flatter himfelf, that all his grief arifes from generous fenti

VOL. II.

A a

* Mof. FONTENELLE.

ments,

B

ments, without any mixture of narrow or interested confiderations: But a man, that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and protection; how can we fuppofe, that his paffionate tenderness arifes from fome metaphyfical regards to felf-intereft, which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and fprings, like thofe of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of paffion from fuch abftrufe reflections.

Animals are found susceptible of kindness, both to their own fpecies and to ours; nor is there, in this cafe, the leaft fufpicion of disguise or artifice. Shall we account for all their fentiments, too, from refined deductions of self-intereft? Or if we admit a difinterested benevolence in the inferior fpecies, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the fuperior?

Love between the fexes begets a complacency and good-will, very diftinct from the gratification of appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, in all fenfible beings, is commonly able alone to counter-balance the strongest motives of felf-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What intereft can a fond mother have in view, who lofes her health by affiduous attendance on her fick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the flavery of that attendance?

Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality? Have we no fatisfaction in one man's company above another's and no defire of the welfare of our friend, even though abfence or death fhould prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and prefent, but our affection and regard to him?

Thefe and a thousand other instances are marks

of

of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real intereft binds us to the object. And how an imaginary intereft, known and avowed for fuch, can be the origin of any paffion or emotion, feems difficult to explain. No fatisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability, that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable fuccefs.

But farther, if we confider rightly of the matter, we fhall find, that the hypothefis, which allows of a difinterested benevolence, diftinct from felf-love, has really more fimplicity in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to refolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neceffarily precede all fenfual enjoyment, and carry us directly to feek poffeffion of the object. Thus, hunger and thirft have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of thefe primary appetites arifes a pleafure, which may become the object of another fpecies of defire or inclination, that is fecondary and interested. In the fame manner, there are mental paffions, by which we are impelled immediately to feek particular objects, fuch as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to intereft; and when these objects are attained, a pleafing enjoyment enfues, as the confequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal frame and conftitution of the mind, give an original propenfity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquifition, or pursue it from motives of felf-love, and a defire of happiness. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praife: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not an