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reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries farther, and defre a reason, why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.
Perhaps, to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that bead, he will answer, because he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an abfurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum ; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its iminediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection.
Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely, for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys; it is requisite that there should be fome sentiment, which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice' and viriue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happinefs or aroiding misery : Tafte, as it gives plea
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Sentiment. 347 sure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown : After all circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The ítandard of the other, arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived froin that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence.
A P PENDIX II.
| HERE is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly incoinpatible with all virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved disposition, so in its turn it tends still further to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that all benevolence is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, fidelity a fnare to procure trust and confidence; and that, while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these fair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be poffefsed of who professes such principles, and who feels no internal sentiment that belies so pernicious a theory, it is easy to imagine: And also, what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a fpecies, whom he represents under such odious colours, and supposes so little susceptible of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we should not ascribe these principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must, at least, account for them from the most careless and precipitate examination. Superficial reasoners, indeed, observing many false pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own disposition, might draw a general and a hafty conclusion, that
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all all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed from all other species of existence, admit of no' degree of good or bad, but are, in every instance, the same creatures under different disguises and appearances.
There is another principle, somewhat resembling: the former; which has been much insisted on by philosophers, and has been the foundation of many a system; that, whatever affection one inay feel, or imagine feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most dangerous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in schhmes for the liberty and happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we seem to take part in the interests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish considerations: But, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare. - . · Whoever concludes from the seeming tendency of this opinion, that those, who make profession of it, cannot poslibly feel the true sentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himself, in practice, very inuch inistaken. Probity and honour were no strangers to Epicurus and his sect. Acticus and Horace seein to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and friendly dispositions as any disciple of the austerer schools. And among the modern, Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of morals, lived irreproachable lives;, though the former lay not under any restraint of religion, which might supply the defects of his philosophy.
An Epicurean or a Hobbist readily allows, that