APPENDIX I.

CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT.

IF the foregoing hypothefis be received, it will

now be easy for us to determine the question firft started, concerning the general principles of morals; and though we poftponed the decifion of that queftion, left it fhould then involve us in intricate fpeculations, which are unfit for moral difcourses, we may refume it at prefent, and examine how far either reafon or fentiment enters into all decifions of praise or cenfure.

One principal foundation of moral praise being fuppofed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action; it is evident, that reafon must enter for a confiderable fhare in all decifions of this kind; fince nothing but that faculty can inftruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial confequences to fociety and to their poffeffor. In many cafes, this is an affair liable to great controverfy: Doubts may arife; oppofite interefts may occur; and a preference must be given to one fide, from very nice views, and a Imall overbalance of utility. This is particularly reinarkable in questions with regard to juftice; as is, indeed, natural to suppose, from that fpecies of utility, which attends this virtue †. Were every fingle instance of juftice, like that of benevolence, ufeful to fociety; this would be a more fimple ! VOL. II. ftate

Ꮓ

* Sect. I.

i

+ See Appendix III.

ftate of the cafe, and feldom liable to great controversy. But as fingle inftances of juftice are often pernicious in their firft and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to fociety refults only from the obfervance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of feveral perfons in the fame equitable conduct; the cafe here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumstances of fociety; the various confequences of any practice; the various interefts, which may be propofed: Thefe, on many occafions, are doubtful, and fubject to great difcuffion and enquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the queftions with regard to juftice: The debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are all directed to the fame purpofe. And a very accurate reason or judgment is often requifite, to give the true determination, amidst fuch intricate doubts arifing from obfcure or oppofite utili

ties.

But though reafon, when fully affifted and improved, be fufficient to inftruct us in the pernicious or ufeful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone fufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we fhould feel the fame indifference towards the means. It is requifite a fentiment fhould here display itself, in order to give a preference to the ufeful above the pernicious tendencies. This fen'ment can be no other than a feeling for the happinefs of mankind. and a refentment of their mifery; fince thefe are the different ends which virtue. and vice have a tendency to promote. Here, therefore, reafon inftructs us in the feveral tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a diftinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.

This partition between the faculties of underftanding and fentiment, in all moral decifions, feems clear from the preceding hypothefis. But I fhall fuppofe that hypothefis falfe: It will then be requifite to look out for fome other theory, that may be fatisfactory; and I dare venture to affirm, that none fuch will ever be found, fo long as we fuppofe reason to be the fole fource of morals. To prove this, it will be proper to weigh the five following confiderations.

I. It is eafy for a falfe hypothefis to maintain fome appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes ufe of undefined terms, and employs comparisons, inftead of inftances.

This is

particularly remarkable in that philofophy, which afcribes the difcernment of all moral diftinctions to reafon alone, without the concurrence of fentiment. It is impoffible that, in any particular inftance, this hypothefis can fo much as be rendered intelligible; whatever fpecious figure it may make in general declamations and difcourfes. Examine the crime of ingratitude, for inftance; which has place, wherever we obferve good-will, expreffed and known, together with good-offices performed, on the one fide, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices or neglect on the other: Anatomize all these circumstances, and examine, by your reafon alone, in what confifts the demerit or blame: You never will come to any iffue or conclufion.

Reafon judges either of matter of fact or of relations. Enquire then, first, where is that mat, ter of fact, which we here call crime; point it out; determine the time of its exiftence; defcribe. its effence or nature; explain the fenfe or faculty, to which it difcovers itself. It refides in the mind of the perfon, who is ungrateful. He muft, therefore, feel it, and be confcious of it. But nothing

is there, except the paffion of ill-will or abfolute indifference. You cannot fay, that thefe, of themfelves, always, and in all circumftances are crimes. No: They are only crimes, when directed towards perfons, who have before expreffed and displayed good-will towards us. Confequently, we may infer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual fact; but arifes from a complication of circumstances, which, being prefented to the fpectator, excites the fentiment of blame, by the particular ftructure and fabric of his mind.

This reprefentation, you fay, is falfe. Crime, indeed, confifts not in a particular fact, of whose reality we are affured by reafon: But it confifts in certain moral relations, difcovered by reafon, in the fame manner as we difcover, by reafon, the truths of geometry or algebra. But what are the relations, I afk, of which you here talk? In the case stated above, I fee firft good-will and goodoffices in one perfon; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between thefe, there is the relation of contrariety. Does the crime confift in that relation? But fuppofe a perfon bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in return were indifferent towards him, or did him good-offices: Here is the fame relation of contrariety; and yet my conduct is often highly laudable. Twift and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never reft the morality on relation; but muft have recourfe to the decifions of fentiment.

When it is affirmed, that two and three are equal to the half of ten; this relation of equality, I understand perfectly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the other; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as many units as that compound number. But when you draw thence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a lofs to understand

you.