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M ORAL philofophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action ; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and 4ccording to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the inost amiable colours ; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundeft precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts
Ariking ace Oppo into the direcs
philosophy he foundatia for ever tasand deformity
to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their Jabours.
The other species of philosophers confider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, 'excite our sentiments, and inake us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controverfy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties ; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all humari curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves fufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover fome hidcien truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.
It is certain that the easy and obvious philofophy, will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as inore agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into 'common
. "in life;
Species of Philosophy. 5 life ; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on à turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into opera day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our parsions, the vehemence of our affections, diffipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher' to a mere plebeian.
This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justert fame, has been acquirect by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reason -ers seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit à mistake in his subtile reasonings, and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred froin embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther ; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural senriments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at present; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYER E passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of MALEBRANCHE is con