fect of constant fear and refentment; it is evident, that Tigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, must have poffeffed his fteady and uniform appro bation. A statesman or patriot, who ferves our own country, in our own time, has always a more paffionate regard paid to him, than one whofe beneficial influence operated on diftant ages or remote nations; where the good, refulting from his generous humanity, being lefs connected with us, feems more obfcure, and affects us with a lefs lively fympathy. We may own the merit to be equally great, though our fentiments are not raifed to an equal height, in both cafes. The judgment here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it preferves us from error, in the feveral variations of images, prefented to our external fenfes. The fame object, at a double diftance, really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; yet we imagine that it appears of the fame fize in both fituations; becaufe we know, that, on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that the difference confifts not in the object itfelf, but in our pofition with regard to it. And, indeed, without fuch a correction of appearances, both in internal and external fentiment, men could never think or talk fteadily on any fubject; while their fluctuating fituations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into fuch different and contrary lights and pofitions *. The more we converfe with mankind, and the greater focial intercourfe we maintain, the more hall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could fcarcely be rendered intelli See NOTE [DD].. gible to each other. Every man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the averfions and defires, which refult from it, cannot be fuppofed to affect others in a like degree. General language, therefore be-. ing formed for general ufe, must be moulded on fome more general views, and muft affix the epithets of praife or blame, in conformity to fentiments,. which arife from the general interefts of the community. And if these fentiments, in moft men, be not fo ftrong as thofe, which have a reference to private good; yet ftill they must make fome diftinction, even in perfons the most depraved and felfish; and muft attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we fhall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and fympathy with perfons remote from us, much fainter than that with perfons near and contiguous; but for this very reafon, it is neceffary. for us, in our calm judgments and difcourfe concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render our fentiments more, public and focial. Befides, that we ourfelves often change our fituation in this particular, we every day meet with perfons, who are in a fituation different from us, and who could never converse with us, were we to remain conftantly in that position and point of view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourfe of fentiments, therefore, in fociety and converfation, makes us form fome general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or difapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the universal, abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to felf, or the perfons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a con-fiderable influence, and being fufficient, at least, for for discourse, ferve all purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools *. Thus, in whatever light we take this fubject, the merit, afcribed to the focial virtues, appears ftill uniform, and arifes chiefly from that regard, which the natural fentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interefts of mankind and fociety. If we confider the principles of the human make, fuch as they appear to daily experience and obfervation, we muft, à priori, conclude it impoffible for fuch a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byafs, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their mifery is evil, without any farther regard or confideratiHere then are the faint rudiments, at least, or out-lines, of a general diftinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the perfon is fuppofed to encrease, his connexion with those who are injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their mifery or happiness; his confequent cenfure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour. There is no neceffity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote gazette, fhould communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, on. placed at fuch a distance, is like a fixed star, which, though to the eye of reafon, it may appear as luminous as the fun in his meridian, is fo infinitely removed, as to affect the fenfes, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the perfons, or even by an eloquent recital of the cafe; our hearts are immediately caught, our fympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest fentiments of friendship and regard. Thefe feem neceffary * See NOTE [EE]. neceffary and infallible confequences of the general principles of human nature, as difcovered in common life and practice. Again; reverse these views and reafonings: Confider the matter à pofteriori; and weighing the confequences, enquire if the merit of focial virtue be not, in a great measure, derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the fpectators. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumftance of utility, in all fubjects, is a fource of praise and approbation: That it is conftantly appealed to in all moral decifions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the fole fource of that high regard paid to juftice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity That it is infeparable from all the other focial virtues, humanity, generofity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. It appears alfo, that, in our general approbation of characters and manners, the ufeful tendency of the focial virtues moves us not by any regards to felf-intereft, but has an influence much more univerfal and extenfive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in fociety, does always, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the fide of the focial virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter fo deeply into all our fentiments, and have fo powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest cenfure and applause. The prefent theory is the fimple refult of all these inferences, each of which feems founded on uniform experience and obfervation. Were it doubtful, whether there were any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for for others, yet when we fee, in numberless inftan ces, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interefts of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we, ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; fince it is impoffible for any thing to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there were, implanted in our nature,, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we fee,, in numberlefs inftances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that it is impoffible, but that every thing, which promotes the intereft of fociety, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneafinefs. But when thefe different reflections and obfervations concur in establishing the fame conclufion, must they not bestow an undifputed evidence upon .it? It is however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the prefent theory, by fhowing the rife of other fentiments of efteem and regard from the fame or like principles. SE C |