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8. When the foul applies itself to the perform ance of any action, or the conception of any objects. to which it is not accustomed, there is a certain un pliableness in the faculties, and a difficulty of the spirits moving in their new direction. As this dif ficulty excites the fpirits, it is the fource of wonder, furprize, and of all the emotions, which arife from novelty; and is, in itself, agreeable, like every thing which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But though furprize be agreeable in itself, yet, as it puts the spirits in agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affections, but also our painful, according to the foregoing principle. Hence every thing that is new, is moft affecting, and gives us either more pleasure or pain, than what, ftrictly fpeaking, fhould naturally follow from it. When it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the paffions fubfide; the hurry of the fpirits is over; and we furvey the object with greater tranquillity.

9. The imagination and affections have a clofe union together. The vivacity of the former gives force to the latter. Hence the profpect of any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure, which we may own fuperior, but of whofe nature we are wholly ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: The other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure.

Any fatisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are decayed and almost obliterated.

A pleasure, which is fuitable to the way of life, in which we are engaged, excites more our defire and appetite than another, which is foreign to it.

Nothing is more capable of infufing any paffion. into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in the strongest and most lively colours. The bare opinion of another, especially

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when

when enforced with paffion, will caufe an idea to have an influence upon us, though that idea might otherwise have been entirely neglected.

It is remarkable, that lively paffions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this respect, as well as in others, the force of the paffion depends as much on the temper of the perfon, as on the nature and fituation of the object.

What is diftant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and contiguous.

I pretend not to have here exhausted this fubject. It is fufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of paffions, there is a certain regular mechanifm, which is fufceptible of as accurate a difquifition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydroftatics, or any part of natural philofophy.

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ΑΝ

AN

ENQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

PRINCIPLES

MORAL S.

SECTION I.

Of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES of MORALS.

DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obftinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irkfome; except, perhaps, those with perfons, entirely difingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controverfy, from affectation, from a fpirit of oppofition, or from a defire of fhowing wit and ingenuity, fuperior to the rest of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the fame contempt of their antagonists; the fame paffionate vehemence, in inforcing fophiftry and falfehood. And as reafoning is not the fource, whence either difputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which fpeaks not to the affections, will eyer engage him to embrace founder principles.

Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the difingenuous difputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this dif

ference

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