on any fide, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of affurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from feveral different causes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witneffes; from the manner of their delivering their teftimony; or from the union of all thefe circumstances. We en tertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneffes contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an intereft in what they affirm; when they deliver their teftimony with hefitation, or on the contrary, with too violent affeverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or deftroy the force of any argument, derived from human teftimony. Suppofe, for inftance, that the fact, which the teftimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits of a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fact is more or lefs unusual. The reason, why we place any credit, in witneffes and hiftorians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between teftimony and reality, but because we are accuftomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft of two oppofite experiences; of which the one deftroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of affurance in the teftimony of witneffes, gives us alfo, in this case, another degree of affurance against the fact, which they they endeavour to eftablish; from which con tradiction there neceffarily arifes a counterpoize, and mutual deftruction of belief and authority, I fhould not believe fuch a story were it told me by Cato; was a proverbial faying in Rome, even during the life-time of that philofophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate fo great an authority. The Indian prince, who refufed to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reafoned justly; and it naturally required very strong teftimony to engage his affent to facts, that arofe from a ftate of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore fo little analogy to those events, of which he had had conftant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it t. But in order to encrease the probability against the teftimony of witneffes, let us fuppofe, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fuppofe alfo, that the teftimony, confidered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof, in that cafe, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but ftill with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has eftablished these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can poffibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men muft die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended *PLUTARCH, in vita Catonis. pended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common courfe of nature. It is no miracle that a man, feemingly in good health, fhould die on a fudden: becaufe fuch a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently obferved to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man fhould come to life; because that has never been obferved, in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwife the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the exiftence of any miracle; nor can fuch a proof be deftroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior *. The plain confequence is (and it is a general maxim of our attention), "That no teftimony is "fufficient to establish a miracle, unless the tef"timony be of fuch a kind, that its falfehood "would be more miraculous, than the fact, which "it endeavours to establish: And even in that "cafe theres a mutual deftruction of arguments, "and the fuperior only gives us an affurance "fuitable to that degree of force, which re"mains, after deducting the inferior." When any one tells me, that he faw a dead man restored to life, I immediately confider with myfelf, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, fhould really have happened. See NOTE [K]. I weigh I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the fuperiority, which I difcover, I pronounce my decifion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falfehood of his teftimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. In the foregoing reafoning we have fuppofed, that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may poffibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falfehood of that teftimony would be a real prodigy: But it is eafy to fhew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceffion, and that there never was a miraculous event eftablifhed on fo full an evidence. For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attefted by a fufficient number of men, of fuch unquestioned good-fenfe, education, and learning, as to fecure us against all delufion in themfelves; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all fufpicion of any defign to deceive others; of fuch credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lofe in cafe of their being detected in any falfehood; and at the fame time, attefting facts, performed in fuch a public manner, and in fo celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requifite to give us a full affurance in the teftimony of men. Secondly. We may obferve in human nature a principle, which, if ftrictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the affurance, which we might, from human teftimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reafonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble thofe, of which we have; that what we have found to be moft ufual is always most probable; and that where there is an oppofition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to fuch as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unufual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the fame rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly abfurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumftance, which ought to deftroy all its authority. The paffion of furprize and wonder, arifing from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a fenfible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes fo far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleafure immediately, nor can believe thofe miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the fatisfaction at fecond-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others. With what greedinefs are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of fea and land monfters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the fpirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human teftimony, in these circumstances, lofes all pretenfions to authority. A religionist may be an enthufiaft, and imagine he fees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to be falfe, and yet perfevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the fake of promoting fo holy a cause: Or even where this delufion has not place, vanity, excited by fo ftrong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the reft |