SECTION X. Of MIRACLES. THERE PART HERE is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the real prefence, which is as concife, and elegant, and strong as any argument can poffibly be fuppofed against a doctrine, fo little worthy of a ferious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, fays the learned prelate, that the authority, either of the fcripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the teftimony of the apostles, who were eye-witneffes to thofe miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine miffion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Chriftian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in paffing from them to their difciples; nor can any one reft fuch confidence in their teftimony, as in the immediate object of his fenfes. But a weaker evidence can never deftroy a ftronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real prefence ever fo clearly revealed in fcripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of juft reasoning to give our affent to it. It contradicts fenfe, though both the fcrip ture ture and tradition, on which it is fuppofed to be built, carry not fuch evidence with them as fense; when they are confidered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breaft, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Nothing is fo convenient as a decifive argument of this kind, which muft at least filence the most arrogant bigotry and fuperftition, and free us from their impertinent folicitations. I flatter myself, that I have difcovered an argument of a like nature, which, if juft, will, with the wife and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of fuperftitious delufion, and confequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For fo long, I prefume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, facred and profane. Though experience be our only guide in reafoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in fome cafes is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, fhould expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reafon justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself miftaken. However, we may observe, that, in fuch a cafe, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly. informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent obfervation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their fuppofed caufes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been conftantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and fometimes to disappoint our expectations; fo that, in our reafonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of affurance, from the highest highest certainty to the loweft fpecies of moral evidence. A wife man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of affurance, and regards hiş past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with more caution; He weighs the oppofite experiments: He confiders which fide is fupported by the greater number of experiments: To that fide he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, fuppofes an oppofition of experiments and obfervations, where the one fide is found to overbalance. the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the fuperiority. A hundred inftances or experiments on one fide, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though an hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty ftrong degree of affurance. In all cafes, we must balance the oppofite experiments, where they are oppofite, and deduct the fmaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the fuperior evidence. A To apply these principles to a particular inftance: we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of reafoning more common, more useful, and even neceffary to human life, than that which is derived from the teftimony of men, and the reports of eye-witneffes and fpectators. This fpecies of reafoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the rela tion of caufe and effect. I fhall not dispute about a word. It will be fufficient to observe, that our asfurance in any argument of this kind is derived. from no other principle than our obfervation of the veracity of human teftimony, and of the ufual conformity conformity of facts to the reports of witneffes. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunction, it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human teftimony, whofe connexion with any event feems, in itself, as little neceffary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame, when detected in a falfehood: Were not thefe, I fay, difcovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we fhould never repofe the leaft confidence in human teftimony. A man delirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us. And as the evidence, derived from witneffes and human teftimony, is founded on past experience, fo it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into confideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate ftandard, by which we determine all difputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any fide, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mutual deftruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or uncertainty; and when we difcover a fuperiority on |