SURETY.

does not suspend the remedy on the note, and therefore does not discharge the
surety. Brengle v. Bushey, 263.

12. A surety on a lease who notifies the landlord before the expiration of a
year, that he will not be bound beyond the current year, will not be liable if
tenant holds over. Pleasonton's Appeal, 263.

Id.

13. A surety cannot at will discharge himself from his contract.
14. The equitable right of a surety to subrogation, only goes so far as is
necessary for his protection. Matter of Attachment against Hewitt, 327.

15. Mere delay by a creditor to enforce his legal remedies does not dis-
charge a surety. Summerhill v. Tapp, 392.

16. A surety who signs a bond in blank, cannot in a suit on the bond, set
up a private understanding he had with the principal as to the filling up of the
blanks. Butler v. United States, 521.

17. A special act of the legislature, giving time to a particular tax collector
to collect and account for the taxes, operates to release his sureties. Johnson
v. Hacker, 730.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7; Duress, 1; MUNICIPAL COR-

TAXATION,
PORATION, 16.

1. An agreement by which a state surrenders its power of taxation must be
clearly and unequivocally shown. North Missouri Railroad Co. v. Maguire,

118.

2. The Act of legislature of Missouri of February 16th 1865, for the com-
pletion of the North Missouri Railroad, is not such an agreement. Id.

3. The ordinance of April 8th 1865, was a true exercise of the taxing power
of the state. Id.

4. The Act of the Missouri Legislature of December 25th 1852 created a
contract not to tax the Pacific Railroad. Pacific Railroad v. Maguire, 119.
5. The ordinance of July 4th 1865, levying a tax, impaired the obligation
of the contract and was void. Id.

6. The intention must be clear in order to exempt any particular property
from taxation. Freese, Pros. v. Woodruff, 263.

7. Bonds of a city issued under a special act, are not exempt by force of a
clause in the general charter, stating, "that bonds issued by the mayor, &c.,

8. An act taxing all railroads "doing business within the state," applies to
a railroad incorporated by another state, but having forty-five miles of its
road in the state which passed such act. Erie Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania,

527.

9. An agreement by a state to exempt from taxation, must be clear and un-
mistakable. Id.

10. In sec. 2, article 12, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the word
"public" is used in some instances to describe the ownership of property, in
others as merely descriptive of the use to which it is applied. Gerke, Treas-
urer v. Purcell, 753.

11. As applied to school-houses it is used in the former sense. Id.

12. The fact that the use of property is free is not a necessary element in
determining whether the use is public or not. Id.

13. A charity in a legal sense includes not only gifts for the benefit of the
poor, but endowments for the advancement of learning or encouragement of
science and art.

1d.

14. Schools established by private donations and carried on for the benefit
of the public, are public charities. Id.

15. The Constitution, in authorizing exemptions from taxation, has refer-

ence to property and the uses to which it is applied. Id.

16. The authority to exempt houses used exclusively for public worship,
carries with it the authority to exempt such grounds as are necessary for their
Id.

use.

17. A parsonage does not come within the exemption.

TELEGRAPH.

Id.

1. A condition exempting a telegraph company from liability for any cause,

TELEGRAPH.

is against public policy and void. Bartlett v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,

199.

2. In an action for the erroneous transmission of a message, the burden is
on the company of showing that the error was caused by some agency for
which it was not liable.

Id.

3. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY TELEGRAPH, 401.

TENDER. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 22.

TIMBER.

1. Timber cut upon land the title of which is in the state belongs to the
state. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 463.

2. When cut, though it becomes personalty, its title is not changed, it is the
property of the owner of the land.

Id.

3. In Minnesota, when logs cut from state lands are intermingled with
others, an equal amount may be replieved from the mass. Id.

TIME.

TITLE.

See SURETY, 9; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3.

See EQUITY, 1; GRANT, 1.

1. The title of the finder of lost goods, is good against all the world except
the owner. Lawrence v. Buck, 200.

TRESPASS. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 3.

1. If jury in trespass quare clausum, find a special verdict that the title is
in defendant, he is entitled to a general verdict. South Hampton v. Fowler,
395.

2. Lies for the continuance of a wrongful erection even after satisfaction of
a judgment for its erection. Russell v. Brown, 527.

3. Owners of animals kept in common are jointly liable for a trespass
committed by them. Jack v. Hudnall, 760.

TROVER. See EXECUTION, 3; Mortgage, 16; Receiver, 1.

TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 5; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 18, 19; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 14, 15; PARTNERSHIP, 15, 17.
1. Equity will relieve from a voluntary trust where its purpose has been
fulfilled and there is no other reason to preserve it. Tucker's Appeal, 264.
2. After husband's death wife will be entitled to a conveyance of property
conveyed by herself and husband in trust for her separate use. Id.

3. A purchaser is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money
when the testator's debts are charged on his estate. Dewey's Ex'r v. Rug-
gles, 327.

4. Otherwise if the executors have committed a breach of trust to which
the purchaser is a party.

Id.

5. Transfer of possession is not necessary in order to constitute the donor
of property a trustee of it. Eaton v. Cook, 327.

6. A direction by writing or parol to a debtor, to hold the money in trust
for a third person, creates a trust in favor of donee. Id.

7. Omission on the part of a trustee to give a bond required by statute
does not divest the legal estate of the trustee. Gardner v. Brown, 464.

8. The trustee in a trust deed, made by way of mortgage, is a necessary
party to any proceedings to foreclose. Id.

ULTRA VIRES.

It is not ultra vires for a canal company having the right to draw water
from a river, to agree to discharge its waste water at a certain point. Arm-
strong v. Penna. Railroad Co., 700.

USAGE.

1. A practice to treat a contract as binding, only at the convenience of
either party, cannot be upheld as a commercial usage, it is repugnant to the
principles of law. Randall v. Smith, 464.

2. A usage must be certain, general, known, reasonable and not repugnant
to the rules of law.

USURY.

Id.

BILLS AND NOTES, 43.

1. A debtor who in settling with the executors of an estate, allows usurious
interest and gives his notes to a legatee, is estopped in a suit on the notes from
setting up the usury as a defence. McCoy v. Stranahan, 200.

2. An intent on the part of the lender to stipulate for unlawful interest is
necessary to constitute usury. Grant v. Merrill, 711.

3. Where the lender knowingly accepted and retains such a contract, the intent
is established.

Id.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See DEED, 9.

1. Of Real Estate.

1. It is no defence to suit for purchase-money, that vendee has a deed with
covenants of title, and that there is an outstanding title, if it has not been
asserted. Buckles et al. v. Northern Bank of Kentucky, 63.

2. A sale of growing trees otherwise absolute, is not rendered conditional
by stipulation as to time of removal. Hoit v. The Stratten Mills, 326.

3. If no time is fixed, grantee has a reasonable time for removal. Id.
4. If grantee enters and removes the trees after expiration of reasonable
time, he is liable in trespass for the entry. Id.

5. It is a good defence to a suit on a note for the purchase-money, that the
vendee, at the request of vendor, deposited the money in the hands of a third
party to be paid when a conveyance was executed. Eads v. Murphy, 400.

6. Whenever damages may be recoverable by a vendee for matters arising
out of the contract of purchase, they may be insisted on as set-off. Id.

7. An administrator selling real estate under an order of the Orphans'
Court, will be required to make a proportionate abatement from the purchase
money for a deficiency in the lot of ground sold, but the sale will not be
rescinded. Carmody v. Brooks, 400.

8. A vendee who has the option of cancelling his contract any time before
payment of second instalment of purchase-money, if he assigns his interest
to a third party, abandons his right to terminate and remains liable to the
vendor. Stevens v. Millard, 712.

9. The release by a joint vendee of his right of action against the vendor,
is a release by the other vendee also. James v. Aiken, 760.

10. A vendor who assures a purchaser that the neighborhood is free from
sickness, when it is subject to fever and ague, cannot enforce an agreement to
purchase against the vendee. Holmes' Appeal, 760.

11. Such an agreement would not be enforced if the neighborhood was uu-
healthy, and no misrepresentation had been made by vendor. Id.

12. Where one joint vendee receives a certain sum for the release of his
right of action against the vendor, the other vendees are entitled to a share
therein. James v. Aiken, 760.

II. Of Chattels.

13. Insolvency of vendee at the time of purchase is not sufficient evidence
of fraud to set aside sale of goods, and enable the vendor to replevy. Rod-
man v. Thalheimer, 199.

14. There must be artifice, trick or false pretence in obtaining possession.
Id.

15. The doctrine of insolvency alone rescinding a sale does not obtain in
Pennsylvania, as it does in New York.

Id.

16. A purchaser takes the risk of quality unless there is fraud or warranty.
Whitaker v. Eastwick, 199.

17. In a sale of goods there is an implied warranty of title and of the
species, but not of quality. Id.

19. The relation of seller and buyer is not a confidential one.

Id.

20. A purchaser may recover so much of the consideration paid for the

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

sale of liquor, as is illegal under the statute; declaring "that all payments
for liquor sold in violation of law, shall be considered to be without considera-
tion and against equity." McGuinness v. Bligh, 393.

21. It is for the jury to determine, whether when goods are intrusted to a
carrier to be carried to a consignee, it is a delivery to the consignee for him-
self or as agent for another. State of Maine v. Intoxicating Liquors, 528.

22. It is for the jury to determine whether there has been a sufficient tender
by the vendor, of goods purchased on buyer's option as to time. Lockhart v.
Bonsall et al., 759.

23. It is purchaser's duty to give reasonable notice of the place of delivery
and to be there ready to receive the goods. Id.

24. The purchaser is not bound to accept more or less than his contract,
but if there is a larger quantity from which he might separate his purchase,
it is sufficient.

Id.

25. If the vendor offers to deliver in good faith, he is not bound to set
aside the precise quantity named, before offering to deliver. Id.

The declaration of the foreman in the presence of the jury, as to what they
intended to include in the verdict, may be used to correct an informal verdict.
South Hampton v. Fowler, 400.

VOTE. Sec BRIBERY, 1, 2; CITIZEN, 2, 7, 8.

1. An indictment charged that defendants unlawfully prevented, &c., from
voting at a municipal election in Petersburg, certain legally registered voters
qualified according to law. Another indictment charged that defendants re-
fused to register certain legally qualified electors of African descent, as voters
at the said election. On demurrer it was held, by BOND, Circuit J., that the
indictments were sufficient, and that the motive of hostility to race, &c.,
might be inferred from the acts charged; by HUGHES, J., contrà, that the
indictments were defective for not charging that the acts were done on nc-
count of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and that they should be
quashed. U. S. v. Judges of Petersburg Election, 105.

2. Per HUGHES, J. The 4th section of the Enforcement Act of May 31st
1870, is not founded on the Fifteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. Id.
3. The Federal Courts have no jurisdiction to protect rights which ac-
crue from the citizenship of a state, but only such as accrue from citizenship
of the United States. The right to vote belongs to the former class. It is
not a natural or inherent right but a privilege conferred or withheld by the
several states in their own discretion. The only guarantee of the United
States in this connection is under the Fifteenth Amendment, that no state
shall deny or abridge the privilege on account of race, color or previous con-
dition of servitude. The only case in which the Federal courts can entertain
jurisdiction of any question upon this right is where a violation of this guar-
antee is alleged. Id.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

1. The right of fishing in the tide-waters of New Jersey is prima facie
common to all the people of the state. Wooley v. Campbell, 128.

2. The legislature may grant the exclusive right to private individuals to
fish and plant oysters in lands under tide water Id.

WAR.

See CONFEDERATE STATES, 8; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11; COURTS,

9; LIMITATIONS, 4.

1. WAR CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 65.

2. THE LATE CIVIL WAR, ITS EFFECTS ON CIVIL REMEDIES, 129.

WARRANTY. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 17, 18.

1. Purchaser has a right to rely on warranty, though he may have an op-
portunity to examine the property. First National Lank v. Grindstaff, 61.
VOL. XXIII.-103

WARRANTY.

2. Where an article warranted proves utterly worthless, the vendee may
allege the warranty and worthlessness as a defence to the purchase-money,
without an offer to re-deliver it to the seller. Dill v. O'Ferrell, 61.

3. In an exchange of personal property, as well as in a sale, there is an
implied warranty of title. Hurst v. Sackett, 262.

4. The party who has the exchanged property taken from him under prior
encumbrance, may rescind the contract and sue either for the consideration,
or for goods sold and delivered.

Id.

5. The contract is not rescinded while any part of the property is retained
by the party bringing suit.

ld.

6. An action may be brought on the implied warranty without rescinding
the contract.

Id.

7. In cases of warranty, vendee may bring his action for recovery of
damages, or recoup for the breach, without returning the property or notify-
ing vendor. Bonnell v. Jacobs, 328.

8. Where the warranty of a furnace was, "that it would do the work effi-
ciently and heat the house," if vendee keeps it without notifying vendor that
it is defective, he waives his claim for any defect. Id.

9. It is a breach of the warranty against encumbrances when at the time
of the execution of the deed, the land is subject to the right of way of a rail-
road and a street. Burk v. Hill et ux., 591.

10. A grantee may recover though he had knowledge of the encumbrance
when he accepted the covenant. Id.

11. A covenantee is entitled to nominal damages only, until he has re-
moved the encumbrance or been injured by it. Black v. Coan, 591.

12. Until there has been a substantial injury there can be no ground for
substantial damages. Id.

WASTE.

1. Mortgagor will not be allowed to commit waste upon the mortgaged
premises. Coggill v. Millburn Land Co., 328.

WAY.

WILL.

2. No authority to commit waste will be implied from the price paid. Id.
See WARRANTY, 9.

See CHARITABLE USE; DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 5; EQUITY, 9.

1. An estate to his widow for her life, with reversion to his heirs, is not
such a provision by a testator, who has a posthumous child, as to prevent the
child taking under sect. 8th, R. S. c. 74 of Maine. Waterman v. Hawkins,

528.

2. There must be a specific provision made for the unborn child, in order
to relieve the judge of probate from assigning a share of its father's estate to
the child.

Id.

3. If the widow has waived the provision for her benefit, the share of the
child is to be taken wholly from the residuary legatee. Id.

4. That the executor has delivered the property to the legatee, before the
birth of the child, is no defence to a suit on his bond for the child's share.
ld.

5. Die without an heir,' means die without a child capable of inheriting
in certain cases. McGunnigle v. McKee, 754.

6. A child legitimated by Act of Assembly would take under such limita-
tion. Id.

7. A child legitimated, becomes, for all purposes of inheritance, a lawful
child. Id.

WITNESS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3; PRACTICE, 2.

1. Under the Act of July 2d 1864, providing that no witness shall be ex-
cluded "because he is a party interested in the issue," a witness may testify
by deposition. Cornett v. Williams, 328.

2. A party called as witness by his adversary, under the Act of 1869 of
Pennsylvania, may have leading questions put to him. Brubaker's Adm'r v.
Taylor, 524.

3. The party so called is to be considered as if originally examined on his
own behalf. Id.

Id.

4. His testimony may be contradicted by proof of inconsistent declarations.

་