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| Every fructifying institution of a social character takes unto itself different forms, in conformity with the habits and nature of the people. Even the Christian religion produced very different re

England, and so it is with representative government. The habits and genius of the people in continental Europe produced from representation a very different result from that which was achieved in England. The cities of the middle ages were governed by a form of representation materially different from the modern manifestation of the same political development. The nobles of the city generally composed its senate, in imitation of the Roman system, and councils were chosen in the main by the guilds, of which in Florence there were twenty-one; but at a later period only twelve of these possessed governmental powers. What corresponds to the mayor of the city was in Florence the gonfalonier. So jealous was Florence of its magistrates that it selected them by lot, and gave them power but for two months. The citizens met in the great square and voted directly upon measures. The selfishness of the nobility and the turbulence of the guilds' train bands, the jealousies of the guilds of each other, the corrupting influence of the wealth of the great merchants, all conspired to undermine this form of government. The great wars

the actual possessor of the peerage. Sons of peers | had to take the place of direct participation, and from the time of the Norman conquest were com- the alternative was representation or despotism. moners, and on a perfect equality, as regards legal and political privileges, with the humblest citizen. Even the heir to the peerage, though he might bear a title by courtesy, was still, so long as his father was alive, a commoner like his younger broth-sults in Spain from that which it produced in ers. No restraint was laid upon free intermarriage in all ranks, and the highest offices of state were always legally open to all freemen. "This made the knight the connecting link between the baron and the shopkeeper." The oldest son even of the earl of Bedford, one of the proudest titles of nobility in England, offered himself, in the reign of Henry VIII., for a seat in the house of commons. The house of commons in that way became the representative not only of a single order in the state, says Langmead, but, with the exception of the peerage titles, represented the whole nation, and, as a natural consequence, has drawn to itself the predominant authority in the state. - During the reign of Edward III. the commons established these three great rights: first, that all taxation without the consent of parliament was illegal; second, the necessity for the concurrence of both houses in legislation; and third, the right of the commons to inquire into and amend abuses of the administration. — The Tudor sovereigns, arbitrary rulers that they were, did not feel strong enough to dispense with the representative body, but they sought to obtain control over it by creating a large number of in-between the powerful monarchies, which trained significant boroughs for the purpose of increasing the influence of the crown in the house of commons. The same authority says, that between the reigns of Henry VII. and Charles II. no less than 180 members were added to the house of commons by royal charter alone. The last instance of this abuse of prerogative was the creation of the borough of Newark by Charles II. | Thenceforth the house of commons took the issue of writs into its own hands, and no new borough was created in England and Wales until the reform act of 1832.-At the date of the union with Scotland the number of members was 513, this act of union having added 45 Scottish representatives, and the act of union with Ireland added 100 Irish members. Since that time Scotland has added to its contingent fifteen members, and Ireland five. The house of commons has now about 656 members. To England the world owes the development of representative institutions, as it did, at an earlier period than any other modern government, confer upon its representative body the sovereign power of the state. The development of the principle of representation proceeded with less continuity and upon different lines in other countries. A representative system is the only one by which large communities can enjoy the advantages of self-government. The ancient system of direct participation in law-making was possible only in a very circumscribed domain. The moment the domain became larger than that of a single city, representation necessarily

their soldiers to feats of arms, of which the mili tia of free cities were utterly incapable, gradually made it impossible for the independent mediæval cities to put a force into the field to contend against the warriors of the great monarchs. Charles V. and Philip II., and, before them, the rulers of the Roman empire and the popes, gradually destroyed the freedom of such Lombardian cities as still had the vestiges of self-government left. The constitutions of these municipal states are, however, interesting studies to the investigator of representative government, as they present a form of representation which has a merit ignored in the modern representative system, and which, in one way or another, should be sought to be re-established, and that is, the representation of the community in conformity with its actual natural affinities when acting independently of governmental interference. Society classifies itself even under its most democratic form, and these classes have to the community and commonwealth differ ent values. A complete representation would take some note of such natural classifications of society, and seek to incorporate them as natural constituencies for representation. In the Florentine republic, and, indeed, in all the cities in the Lombardian and Hanseatic league, the representation of the trade guilds, in proportion to their numerical strength and their importance to the commonwealth, was conforming the theory of representation to the natural classification of the community, and therefore, in that particular, representa

tion was more thorough in those cities than it is in the modern state. Creating artificial entities by drawing geographical lines around them, and giving to a majority in such entities the sole right of representation, is utterly to disregard these natural affinities of a community, and to base representation upon geographical lines instead of the interests of the community, and makes a representative body so constituted far from being what Mirabeau says it should be, a reduced photo graph of the whole community. - In Switzerland and in France representation took unto itself again a different form. From the time of the overthrow of the Roman empire the mountain cantons of Switzerland maintained forms of self-government, and without the intervention of chiefs, these mountaineers assembled in the open air, voted their own laws, and elected their own magistrates to execute them. The larger towns of Switzerland, being favored more especially by Count Rudolph of Hapsburg, were made municipalities early in the thirteenth century. On his death, the apprehension that his successors might attempt to impair the liberty of the cantons and the self-government of the towns, caused an alliance to be entered into by them for the freedom of Switzerland. The Swiss confederation was formed in 1351, and from that time the Swiss uninterruptedly maintained a republic, with a considerably developed system of representation. In the rural and mountain cantons there was but little representation. The town meeting was assembled whenever occasion required. Every inhabitant above sixteen years of age was permitted to vote, and they acted directly upon the laws which were to govern them. The federal constitution of the Swiss government down to 1848 was that of a confederation but loosely banded together. The Sonderbund revolution, which sought to dismember the Swiss confederation in the interest of the Jesuits, was the means to strengthen it, and it caused the adoption of a new constitution wherein the supreme legislative power was intrusted to a federal assembly consisting of two deliberative bodies, the national council and the council of state, the one representing the entire Swiss nation, and the other the sovereign bodies of the Swiss cantons. No federal law could be made without the concurrence of both of these chambers. These bodies nominate the federal authorities; they declare peace and war; they regulate the postoffice and the coinage. The executive power was confided to a federal council of several members elected by the assembly, its president being the president of the confederation. Every man aged twenty not expressly deprived of the rights of a voter by the laws of his own canton, was entitled to vote, and was himself eligible to the national council. (May's "Democracy in Europe," vol ii., p. 410.) The Swiss do not fully confide matters of legislation to their representatives, but, by the instrumentality of the referendum, reserve a veto power in the following form. Whenever 30,000 qualified voters demand it, any law passed by

the Swiss congress must be submitted for ratifica tion or rejection to the people, and many instances have occurred in the recent history of that republic where the people rejected laws which the legis lature had adopted. In the several cantons the referendum has also been made part of the organic law, so that upon all the more important measures affecting the cantons the people have repeatedly vetoed the measures enacted by the representative bodies of the cantons. This system of referendum has its inconveniences, but so long as representation is limited to majorities only, and those of arbitrary geographical divisions, which makes of modern representative bodies an artificial and unnatural representative body, the referendum is perhaps the only corrective of so faulty a method of representation. — In France the estates of the realm of the middle ages were councils of barons and prelates. In 1302 Philip the Fair summoned the third estate, who were delegates from the towns, to meet the nobles and prelates of Notre Dame. This was the first convention of the states general. They were afterward assembled irregularly in times of national difficulty and danger, or when the necessities of the kings drove them to demand extraordinary subsidies. (May, vol. i., p. 95.) Again, in 1484 the states general were convoked so as to insure a national representation, and embraced delegates from the country as well as from the towns. These deliberations were conducted, not by orders, but in six bureaus, which comprised the representatives of all the orders according to their territorial divisions. (May, vol. i., p. 96.) The municipalities of France could not long survive the centralizing spirit of the French monarchy. So little of the spirit of selfgovernment existed in France that when, in 1692, Louis XIV. abolished all municipal elections and sold the right of governing towns to the rich citizens, there was scarcely a murmur heard. The states general, although from time to time convoked, never had and never asserted any rights as against the crown. They laid their complaints at the foot of the throne, which were treated as the throne saw fit, to be spurned, or to be enacted into law. The states general had no rights which they could maintain against the crown. The French parliaments were not representative bodies. They were nominated by the crown, and were really high courts of justice. For several hundred years representative government was unknown in France; when, by the reforms under Turgot, at the time of Louis XVI., the provincial assemblies were once more revived, and local self-government was again endowed with life and vigor. At the suggestion of the parliament of Paris the states general were again convoked, which was the beginning of the French revolution, and led to the national assembly; the national assembly led to the convention, which was elected by universal suffrage; the convention led to a directory; and the directory again to an empire. The theory of representation became, however, formally estab lished from the period of the French revolution in

| It has been observed by Lieber, that representation for the state at large constitutes one of the essential differences between the deputative mediæval estates and the modern representation by legislatures. The representative is not substituted for something which would be better were it practicable, but has its own substantive value. It is a bar against absolutism of the executive on the one hand, and of the domination of the demos on the other. It is the only contrivance by which it is possible to introduce at the same time an essentially popular government and the supremacy of the law, or the union of liberty and order. It is an invaluable high school to teach the handling of the instruments of free institutions. It is the one most efficacious preventive of the growth of centralization and bureaucratic government, without which no clear division of the functions of government can exist. Many examples may be cited from Grecian history to show how little the sense of responsibility was connected with the di

the constitutions of France, and, under one form of government or another, representative bodies were thenceforth permanent institutions of the nation. Under the first empire the citizens of each arrondissement designated a tenth of them as electors. These were the communal notabilities. From this list the public functionaries of the arrondissement were chosen. These, in turn, selected a tenth of their number for the purpose of furnishing the functionaries of the departments. These new tenths selected on their part again a tenth, which formed a list of the national notabilities, from which the public functionaries for the nation were taken. The presidents of all electoral colleges, all grand officers, commanders, and officers of the legion of honor, and all heads of departments, the emperor selected without reference to an election. -Under the restoration a chamber of deputies of 430 members was constituted, of which 258 were elected by the colleges of arrondissement, and 172 by the colleges of departments. A census of a very high order limited the voting power to a small pro-rect voting, and how easily the general populace portion of the French people. This was all swept away by the July (1830) government. The electoral system under the republic of 1848 suppressed all property qualification, and every Frenchman twenty-one years of age, subject only to the condition of a residence of six months, was invested with the right of voting. The vote was taken by ballot. Subsequently, modifications were made in this universal suffrage by raising the time of residence to three years, and imposing again a property qualification. It was the combination between President Napoleon and the class of citizens who were disfranchised by the act of the republic, which made Napoleon at first dictator and then placed him upon the throne of France as Napoleon III. — In The Netherlands, ever since 1815, the laws have been enacted by representative bodies, who are elected by the inhabitants above twenty-three years of age, and who pay some small direct tax. - In Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Portugal the representative bodies were mainly representative of special interests, such as nobles, clergy, towns, etc., and were not true representatives until a very recent period, when, by the amended constitutions of those countries, some approximation was made to representation upon the English and American model. - Representative institutions are everywhere gaining ground. England has been the pattern, and America the most prominent example, of the successful operation of representative government. The organization of the people for purposes of representation, adopted by these two nations, forms the model on which reforms in representation in other countries are gradually introduced. Government by representatives is much more than a makeshift, adopted, in consequence of the extent of modern communities, to secure power to the people and yet not take their direct votes on the laws which are to govern them, inasmuch as this method is obviously impracticable where the community is larger than that of a single town.

could be misled by the demagogues, and at the assembly at the agora be cheated or cajoled out of their votes in favor of measures which they regretted almost as soon as enacted. The representative system checks and prevents such hasty action, and is, therefore, an institution which in itself secures good government. The representation makes the fact of government being a trust a vital and realizable truth. It is, however, of vital importance that a representative organization of the community be properly made, and that the representative body should be truly the best exponent of the popular will, because otherwise the majority of the people would not possess the reins of government, and the administration would fall into the hands of cabals, juntas or political organizations, which misrepresent it. The American model of representation is twofold. I. National. The president of the United States under the American system is elected by a supposed electoral college, constituted in a manner to be designated by the legislatures of the various states. It meets in the several states, and is composed of the same number that the state has representatives in con gress, who determine in these several states upon their choice for president of the United States. These electoral colleges have in time become mere registering machines of party will, and are not deliberative bodies in any sense. Immediately after the electoral colleges are constituted at the general election with reference to which they are to perform their function, the election is practically determined in advance of their meeting. There is but a single instance in the history of the United States of an elector refusing to cast his vote in conformity with the party dictate which elected him. The senators of the United States are elected by the legislatures of the states. Members of congress of the United States are elected by the voters in contiguous representative districts artificially created, one from each district, each district containing, as nearly as possible,

about 131,000 inhabitants. The apportionment of | of the numerous candidates presented for differthese districts is left to the legislature of the state, to be fixed after each decennial census. The state representative bodies are generally a senate and an assembly or house of representatives. The senate, the smaller body, is elected by larger districts, also geographically contiguous, and the house of representatives by smaller districts. In different states different provisions exist, making the term of service of senators a longer period than that of the members of the lower house. With the exception of Illinois, which has adopted the plan of the three-cornered constituencies, electing three members from each district-as a rule, but one member is elected from each district-the majority or plurality, as the case may be, of the district elects a member. Local representative bodies, like town or city councils, are elected by smaller districts, composed of contiguous territory | equal in population, one from each district; and the majority or plurality, as the case may be, in the district elects such representative. Where executive officers are to be elected, whether municipal or state, they are elected by the whole city or by the whole state, and the majority of the voters, or a plurality, if there be more than two candidates, secures the election of its candidate. The French system of double election has never taken root either in England or America, and seems to be but ill adapted to the genius of our people. The only instance attempted is the one of the electoral college, which has proved abortive, and has become a mere simulacrum. - The qualifications for a voter in the United States are, as a general rule, that he must be twenty-one years of age; if not born in this country he must have resided therein five years, within the state one year, and within the district about thirty days. Such as have come to this country during minority are admitted to the suffrage in a shorter period. The few qualifications that survive from colonial times, either of education or of property, have been and are being to a considerable extent gradually swept away. This, in theory, places the elective franchise in the United States, for all officers whose actions affect the commonwealth either as lawmakers or executors of the law, into the hands of all the male population above twenty-one years of age. Universal manhood suffrage has been the rule in this country.-Even the selection of judges (who, in the history of the United States, were, down to 1846, as a general rule, appointed by the governor of the state, in order to secure more intelligent officers and more direct responsibility in such selection) has, by the growth of the democratic spirit, been taken out of the hands of the governor, and their elevation to the bench, except United States judges, given to the people, and their terms of service shortened from life tenure to a few years. Elective officers have been unduly multiplied, to such a degree that it becomes almost impossible for the voter busily occupied with the demands upon him of his business, to determine intelligently upon the merits

ent offices by political organizations. This highly artificial system of arbitrary districts for purposes of political activity which wholly disregard the natural affiliations of the people arising from their vocations, their political convictions or their status in society, has resulted in giving to the political organization an abnormally strong power in determining the personnel of the government of the United States. - In a very intelligent arraignment of existing political conditions in the United States, written by Mr. Charles C. P. Clark, in a work entitled "The Commonwealth Reconstructed," the author says that the plan of direct popular election in large constituencies results in three frauds: first, that the elector knows whom he is voting for; second, that he comprehends what he is voting about; and third, that his vote will have its proper weight without preliminary consultation and arrangement with other voters; each of which assumptions, he says, in the vast majority of cases is absolutely false. The present actual fact is, that at the dictate of leaders whom we have not chosen, we vote for candidates whom we do not know, to discharge duties that we do not understand. And as the law pays no heed to natural political organization, and gives it no direct encouragement nor recognition, the consequence has been that the political organization has taken possession of the machinery of legislation and is substantially the only thing that is represented. Unless he is the member of a caucus, has a seat in the convention, or takes an active part in the nominating committee, the individual voter is a cipher in politics, and the only function he has to perform is to register his aye or nay as to the individuals who have been put forward by the political organizations. When this system was originally constituted, in a community of farmers, both the caucus and the conventions were voluntary forms of gathering the public will to make an intelligent choice of candidates. They were unrecognized, informal meetings of citizens to discuss public affairs and to select their neighbors for public office. In the early history of the United States public office was a burden which men accepted in consequence of the honor and dignity of the station, for which honor and dignity they were willing to sacrifice the more material advantages of private life. The division of employments, the growth of wealth, the great tide of emigration and consequent existence of a proletariat class, and the diversified interests and intensity of occupation which have been evoked by the modern industrial system, have made of the homogeneous community of a century ago one of the most diversified peoples in industrial employment and occupation, as well as disparity of means, that exist on the face of the carth. By the testimony of every close observer, it is a community of which the more intelligent elements are more intently occupied and have less hours of leisure than that which exists anywhere on the face of the earth. The consequence is, that the men who are most deeply interested in

the welfare of society no longer have time to meet | early history of the United States, in such cenand discuss the political situation with their neigh-tres of population as may be termed strictly agribors, and to talk over and determine which of their cultural communities. In great cities, however, neighbors they desire to select for public office. where the division of employment has been carThe division of employments has created a poli- ried to its extreme development, representative tician class to attend to that business for them, as institutions have become mere shams. The govit has a class of lawyers and divines to expound ernments of those cities are in the hands of offithe law and look after the spiritual welfare of the cers selected from the various political organizacommunity. The caucus and the convention, tions which for the time being obtain control. therefore, have, from being the mere aids to polit- The political organizations form a very small ical organization, grown in time to be the organi- minority of the whole people, but the members zation itself. The law which secures the political thereof have devoted themselves to the building rights of the citizens is still the same that it was up of a political organization as a matter of busiin the early history of the United States; indeed ness, as others of their fellow-citizens devote it has become more liberal in admitting a larger themselves to the business of banking, to manucircle of human beings within the domain of facturing boots or shoes or hats. This situation political enfranchisement than in the early history becomes aggravated with increased population, of the United States. The power, however, has and its mischief increased by the large criminal become so centralized in political organizations and pauper classes which exist in every densely that a development has taken place in that func- populated centre. They are the camp followers of tion similar to that which has taken place in the political organizations, precisely as they would railway interests by amalgamations and consolida- have been the camp followers of a medieval army tions, so that, notwithstanding the rapid increase for purposes of plunder only, and assume the name of population in the United States, fewer and few of the political organization, not because of any er men, in both political organizations, determine belief in principles, but because of their conviction who shall be elected by the people, precisely as, in that that particular organization will take care of railway transportation, fewer and fewer men de- them in the distribution of office. As the United termine, notwithstanding increased mileage, what States look forward with much confidence to the rates shall prevail. The amount of time which early attaining of a population of a hundred must be given, and the money it requires success- million of souls, it will readily be seen that some fully to establish a political machine, are both so change must be made adapting representative govgreat that, in the absence of a large leisure class in ernment to the needs of a community wherein the the United States which is emancipated from the division of employment will be still further denecessity of daily toil by the inheritance of ancestral veloped with every increase of population, and wealth, it has become practically impossible for the wherein life is not likely, within any short period industrial and commercial classes in the communi- of time, to be less onerous and exacting in its dety to give that time or money. In municipalities and mands upon the whole attention of the person in states the owners of property therein feel that who devotes himself to a particular vocation. It there is a constant increase of the ratio of taxation must be quite clear, therefore, that evils which without an equivalent in better service performed have already made themselves apparent, arising by the government for the individual in return for from the inadaptiveness of the existing political such taxation. The increase of municipal taxes has organizations to the natural development of the been within a generation upward of 200 per cent., community, must become intensified and intolerand yet the tax payer prefers to submit to the able if the cause which has produced them not exactions of the tax gatherer rather than to impose only continues but is increased in activity, so that upon himself the greater immediate tax, which there must come a greater and wider divergence would be involved in the devotion of the neces- between the people who supply the taxes and sary time and money to emancipate himself from those who have control of the governmental mathe control of the political organization which he chinery to expend the taxes. These evils have knows to be tyrannous and feels to be mischievous. been recognized by every thoughtful writer upon Political patronage is the reward in the business the more recent manifestations of American instiof creating a political machine, and the politician tutions. They have by some been regarded as an finds in the control of the public office a return evil attending the influx of emigration; by such it for the labor and money investment which he is is claimed that the community has taken in more compelled to make in establishing and perfecting of the foreign element than it can comfortably his machine. As this system of political organi- absorb, and that, therefore, there is a large voting zation has grown, within the past thirty years, to constituency in every community in the United gigantic proportions, it becomes a serious question States not thoroughly trained on the American whether the representative institutions of this model as to the rights and duties of citizenship, country do not contain in themselves a fatal defect and who are, therefore, a hindrance to good govby reason of their not being adapted to the present ernment. Others have supposed the evil to result organization of society in the United States. In- from excluding one-half of the population dependent political action is still possible where women-from the exercise of political suffrage, conditions prevail such as they did prevail in the and have supposed that the cure of malrepresent

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