state constitution reserved the power to so amend | Columbus, and the state government was removed it as to make the Maumee the terminus of the east and west line. Before Michigan was admitted as a state, it was ascertained that a direct eastward line, as originally proposed, would enter Lake Erie so far east as to give to Michigan about half of Ohio's lake coast, and a valuable strip of land in the north, including the city of Toledo. Michigan pressed her claim, and the dispute rose to such a height as to be given the popular title of the "Toledo war." It was settled by the act of June 15, 1836, to admit Michigan as a state: its first section provided that the northern boundary of Ohio should not be a direct east and west line, but should trend to the north far enough to strike the most northerly cape of Maumee bay, thus giving Ohio the territory in dispute. Michigan at first rejected but afterward accepted admission on these terms. - CONSTITUTIONS. The first constitution, mentioned above, made manhood suffrage universal, on one year's residence; provided for a house of representatives to number not less than twenty-four nor more than seventytwo members, to serve one year, and for a senate not more than one-half nor less than one-third the number of the house, to be chosen by districts and to serve two years; made two-thirds of each house a quorum to do business; gave the gov-| ernor a term of two years; and prohibited slavery. The governor was to be chosen by popular vote, but was to have no veto power, nor any other power than to grant reprieves and pardons, convene extra sessions of the legislature, command the state forces, commission appointees, and temporarily fill vacancies occurring when the legislature was not in session. The secret of this restriction upon the governor's powers, which was continued in the constitution of 1851, may probably be found in the frequent disagreements which had taken place between Governor St. Clair and the territorial legislatures. — A new constitution was framed by a convention at Columbus, May 6-July 9, 1850, and Cincinnati, Dec. 2, 1850 - March 10, 1851, and was ratified, June 17, by a popular vote of 126,663 to 109,699. Its main alterations were that the sessions of the legislature were now to be biennial; a complicated apportionment system, apparently modeled on that of Massachusetts, was introduced; state officers, except the governor, were to be chosen by the legislature; the legislature was forbidden to loan the state's credit to corporations or to create corporations by special laws; and the judiciary was made elective. A new constitution was framed by a convention at Columbus, May 14- Aug. 8, 1873, and Cincinnati, Dec. 2, 1873May 14, 1874; but it was rejected by very heavy popular majorities, Aug. 18. A subsequent attempt to revise the judiciary system was also a failure. — Chillicothe was the state capital until 1810, and Zanesville until 1812. In February, 1812, the legislature accepted the offers of a land company to lay out a capital, and erect a state house and penitentiary. The new city was called

|

thither in December, 1816. The constitution of
1851 formally designated it as the capital. -
GOVERNORS. Edward Tiffin, 1802-8; Samuel
Huntington, 1808-10; R. J. Meigs, 1810-14; Thos.
Worthington, 1814-18; Ethan A. Brown, 1818-
22; Jeremiah Morrow, 1822-6; Allen Trimble,
1826-30; Duncan McArthur, 1830-32; Robert
Lucas, 1832-6; Joseph Vance, 1836-8; Wilson
Shannon, 1838-40; Thomas Corwin, 1840-42; Wil-
son Shannon, 1842-4; Mordecai Bartley, 1844-6;
William Bebb, 1846-50; Reuben Hood, 1850-54;
William Medill, 1854-6; Salmon P. Chase,
1856-60; William Denison, 1860-62; David Tod,
1862-4; John Brough, 1864 -6; J. D. Cox, 1866–8;
R. B. Hayes, 1868–72; Edward F. Noyes, 1872-4;
William Allen, 1874-6; R. B. Hayes, 1876-8; R.
M. Bishop, 1878-80; Charles Foster, 1880-84.-
POLITICAL HISTORY. Ohio was admitted to the
Union at a time (1802-3) when there was practi-
cally but one party in the country, outside of
New England; it was therefore of necessity a
republican (or democratic) state from the begin-
ning. It was such of choice also; the great dem-
ocratic features of policy at the time, the acquisi-
tion of Louisiana, the war of 1812, and the oppo-
sition to a national bank, were all very popular in
Ohio, and for thirty years there was little or no
opposition to the democratic party in the state's
elections. In local politics the most noteworthy
features were due to the great mass of power
which the constitution had concentrated in the
legislature. That body, provoked by certain de-
cisions of the state judges on the validity of state
laws, passed its so-called "sweeping resolution,"
Jan. 7, 1810, declaring that, as the state had been
organized in 1802, and as the judicial term of
office was 66
seven years," the seats of all state
judges were now vacant, no matter when their
incumbents had been appointed. The judges
held to their offices, and the "sweeping resolu-
tion" failed, except in causing a momentary con-
fusion. Again, in 1818, the legislature attacked
the state branch of the United States bank (see
BANK CONTROVERSIES, III.), but the attempt was
defeated by the United States supreme court, and
was finally abandoned under cover of several
angry resolutions. — Schemes of internal improve-
ment, chiefly in the form of roads and canals,
early found favor in Ohio, so that, when the new
distribution of national parties took place in
1824-30, a strong vote was developed for Adams
and Clay, and the policy of internal improvements
and a protective tariff which they represented.
In 1824 Clay obtained the electoral vote of the
state by a slight plurality over Adams and Jack-
son; in 1828 and 1832 Jackson obtained a major-
ity of only of 1 per cent. of the popular vote.
In 1829 a Clay governor was elected, and the state
government was nominally whig until 1838. The
electoral vote of the state was given to Harrison
in 1836. In 1837-8 began a general course of
democratic success in the state, which lasted until
1855, with but two important breaks, the presi-

|

secretary of the treasury under Harrison 1841, and of the interior under Taylor 1849-50; Thomas Ewing (son of the preceding), democratic congressman 1877-9; Joshua R. Giddings, anti-slavery whig and free-soil congressman 1838-59, and consul general of Canada 1861-4; Walter Q. Gresham, postmaster general in 1883; Wm. S. Groesbeck, democratic congressman 1857-9; Joseph W. Keifer, republican congressman 1877-85, and speaker 1881-3; William Lawrence, republican congressman 1865-71 and 1873–7; Stanley Matthews, republican United States senator 1877-9, and justice of the United States su

the period 1868-75 the political contests of Ohio were of national importance from the attitude of the parties. In the democratic party the "Ohio idea," that United States bonds not specifically payable in coin should be paid in "greenbacks," and that national bank notes should be superseded by government issues of paper money, had obtained control, under the leadership at first of Pendleton, and then of Ewing; and the republican party had been gradually forced to take a "hard money" attitude. The Allen-Noyes and HayesAllen canvasses had taken this direction; and both the success of Hayes and the defeat of Allen in 1875 had a strong influence on the party plat-preme court since 1881; John A. McMahon, demoforms of the next year, which ended the question. Since that time the regulation of the liquor traffic has become a leading question. (See PROHIBITION.) The republicans at first adopted and passed the so-called "Pond law," for the taxation of liquor selling; but this was decided unconstitutional by the state supreme court, May 30, 1882. The republicans then passed the Scott law," which was upheld by the state court in June, 1883. It forbids liquor selling or opening saloons on Sundays, and levies a tax of $200 yearly on general liquor sellers, and $100 on sellers of malt liquors, the whole tax to go into the county and municipal treasuries. — From 1860 until 1883 the republicans had a majority of the state's congressmen, except in 1875-7 and 1879-81. In the congress of 1883-5 there are thirteen democratic representatives and eight republicans; and the legislature is (1884) democratic by sixty to fifteen in the house, and twenty-two to eleven in the senate. Among the state's political leaders have been S. P. Chase, J. A. Garfield, W. H. Harrison, R. B. Hayes, John McLean, George H. Pendleton, John Sherman, E. M. Stanton, A. G. Thurman, and Benj. F. Wade (see those names), and the following: William Allen, democratic congressman 1833-5, United States senator 1837-49, and governor 1874-6; James M. Ashley, republican congressman 1859-69; John A. Bingham, republican congressman 1855–63 and 1865–73, and minister to Japan since 1873; David K. Cartter, democratic congressman 1849-53, minister to Bolivia 1861-2, and since 1863 chief justice of the District of Columbia; S. F. Cary, republican congressman 1867-9, democratic candidate for lieutenant governor in 1875, and greenback candidate for vice-president in 1876; Thomas Corwin, whig congressman 1831-40, governor 1840-42, United States senator 1845-50, secretary of the treasury under Fillmore 1850–53, republican congressman 1859-61, and minister to Mexico 1861-4; Jacob D. Cox, major general of volunteers, governor 1866-8, secretary of the interior under Grant 1869-70, and republican congressman 1877-9; Samuel S. Cox, democratic congressman 1857-65, and democratic congressman from New York 1869-85; Columbus Delano, whig congressman 1845-7, republican congressman 1865-9, and secretary of the interior 1870-75; Thomas Ewing, whig United States senator 1831-7 and 1850-51,

cratic congressman 1875-83; Return J. Meigs, democratic United States senator 1809-10, governor 1810-14, and postmaster general 1814-23 (see | ADMINISTRATIONS); Thomas Morris, state chief justice 1830-33, and democratic United States senator 1833-9; George E. Pugh, Douglas democratic United States senator 1855-61; Milton Sayler, democratic congressman 1873-83; Robert C. Schenck, whig congressman 1843-51, minister to Brazil 1851-3, major general of volunteers 1861-3, republican congressman 1863-71, and minister to Great Britain 1871-6; Wilson Shannon, democratic governor 1838-40 and 1842-4, minister to Mexico 1844-5, congressman 1853-5, and governor of Kansas 1855-6; Samuel Shellabarger, republican congressman 1861-3, 1865-9 and 1871-3; Noah H. Swayne, justice of the United States supreme court 1861-81; Edward Tiffin, first governor of the state, and United States senator 1807-9; Amos Townsend, republican congressman 1877-83; and Clement L. Vallandigham, democratic congressman 1858-63. - See authorities under ORDINANCE OF 1787 for the territorial history; 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Chase's Statutes of Ohio; Schuckers' Life of S. P. Chase; Moris' Life of Thomas Morris; Taylor's History of Ohio; Atwater's History of Ohio; Mitchener's Annals of Ohio; Way's Toledo War; Carpenter's History of Ohio; Studer's History of Columbus, O.; Reid's Ohio in the War (the election of 1863 is at 1: 153); Report of Secretary of State, 1873 (for governors); 2 Stat. at Large, 58, 173, 201 (for acts of May 7, 1800, April 30, 1802, and Feb. 19, 1803). ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

|

Aristotle,

OLIGARCHY. The rule of a few. after enumerating the governments which he calls governments in the general interest, monarchy, aristocracy and the republic, treats of governments in the interest of individuals, tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (see OCHLOCRACY), which seem to him the corruption of the first three. Hobbes," says Barthélemy St. Hilaire, “has justly remarked (Imperium, vii., 3), that 'these three second denominations are all hated and despised, but that they do not designate governments of different principles; this is precisely what Aristotle understood when he employed the word corruption.""" Oligarchy," says Aristotle, "is the political predominance of the rich, and democ

able of all." Oligarchies may maintain them-
selves by ministering to the material well-being
of the people and to their artistic wants, a capital
consideration in the time of Aristotle. (Book
vii.) But as avarice is the vice peculiar to oli-
garchies, (this is also Plato's opinion), their gov-
ernment, together with tyranny, is the least stable
of all. The rivalry of the powerful, their mis-
conduct, their acts of violence, the creation of
another oligarchy in the bosom of the first, the
ambition of some who begin to flatter the people,
the influence of mercenary troops, all these are so
many causes of ruin. Lastly, that which injures
them most is, "that they deceive the lower
classes." (Book vi., 3.) They should, above all,
refrain from taking such oaths, he says, as they
take to-day in some states: “I will always be the
enemy of the people, and I will do them all the
harm I can." (Book vii., 7.) — We have quoted
these passages from Aristotle, because they throw
light upon the social state of antiquity, and be-
cause they serve to show the difference between
ancient and modern politics. Thus, the moderns
are nearer the etymology of the word than Aris-
totle himself, when they call oligarchy the gov-
ernment of a small number, without alluding to
the wealthy, to the people, to good men, or to
virtue. In many states a minority, all powerful
through terror, constitutes an oligarchy in an
assembly democratically elected. The oligarchy
of the council of ten, at Venice, was a concentra-
tion of the aristocracy; but that of the ephors at
Sparta and that of the tribunes at Rome served as
a counterpoise to the authority of the senate. An
oligarchy may succeed abruptly to a monarchic
or popular government. Modern revolutions have
put in power, under the form of oligarchy, dicta-
tors elected by the people, or by a fraction of the
people, and governing in its name or their own,
but always opposed to aristocracies. The oli-
garchic government of the ancients was rarely
met with except in small states, in free cities, a
most favorable theatre for such a concentration of
collective power. This is also the case in modern
times, not only in what have been called "free
cities," but in other states. Oligarchy is wont to
be established in a great nation, when, on account
of an insurrection or a war, it is for the time
being reduced to the condition of the ancient
city.
JACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN.

racy, the political predominance of the poor to the exclusion of the rich." To the objection: but what if the rich be the more numerous and gov ern, or if the poor be the less numerous and govern? he replies, that the rule of the minority in democracies and that of the majority in oligar- | chies are wholly accidental, because the rich every where constitute the minority, and the poor every where the majority. The two parties," continues impartial Aristotle, "claim exclusively each for itself the right to make the law, and, indeed, this right belongs to both of them up to a certain point, but this right is not absolute in the one or the other. On the one hand, superior in a single point, in wealth, for instance, they think themselves superior in all; on the other hand, equal in one point, in liberty, for instance, they think themselves absolutely equal; the main object is forgotten on both sides. If political association was a commercial association for the purpose of gain, the share of the associated in the state would be in direct proportion to their investment, and the partisans of oligarchy would be in the right; | but the object of political association is not only the existence of the associated, but their happiness, the well-being of families and of the different classes of the people. Those who bring the most (by their talents) to the general fund of the association, have a greater share in the state than those who, equal or superior in point of liberty or birth, have, notwithstanding, less political virtue; a greater share than those who, superior in wealth, | are inferior in merit." To whom, then, should | sovereignty belong? To the multitude, to the wealthy, to the good, to a single individual of superior talents, to a tyrant? Neither to these nor to others," says Aristotle, "but to the law." And if one of the elements of the political body must be preferred, Aristotle would incline in favor of the multitude, for the reason that, if each individually errs in judgment, in the aggregate all judge well. (Book iii.) But the government which seems to him to best assure the reign of the law is the republic (Ioλıtɛia) which borrows its principles from oligarchy and democracy. If he had been asked how the alliance of these two governments, which he calls corrupt, could give birth to the best of all governments, he would doubtless have answered that they were only bad because they were exclusive, and that political wisdom should be the reconciliation of these two elements. Aristotle enumerates four kinds of oligarchy. (Book vi.) In the first, the magistracy and the legislative power are accessible to citizens paying a rather large amount of taxes. In the second, the amount of taxes is considerable, and the body of the magistrates is self-recruiting. In the third, public offices are hereditary. In the fourth, besides this hereditary OPPOSITION. The word opposition, in policharacter of public offices, the sovereignty of the tics, has two distinct meanings. Properly, it is magistrates takes the place of the reign of the the resistance which dissenting parties offer to law. The first of these oligarchies is very near the acts of the government, because their interests akin to aristocracy or democracy; the last is “a or opinions are at variance with such acts. It is dynasty or government of force, the most detest-also used to designate the parties from which this

OLMSTEAD CASE. (See PENNSYLVANIA.) OMNIBUS BILL. (See PARLIAMENTARY LAW.)

OPINION, Public. (See PUBLIC OPINION.)

resistance proceeds. These parties may vary ad | disputes. But we must contemplate these struginfinitum in point of numbers, intelligence and power; but they always constitute the opposition. An individual citizen also may resist the government, but even if he were an insurgent satrap he would be only an opponent, not the opposition. - Opposition may exist elsewhere than in the political field.. Religious opinions and even religions may engage in a struggle with each other. The dissenting parties resist and sometimes overthrow the established authority. The struggles of Christianity against Polytheism, of Protestantism against Catholicism, and of the philosophic spirit against the principle of authority, are so many examples of opposition awakened in the moral world, and which have reacted most powerfully upon politics. True, religious and philosophical oppositions differ from those purely political by the very nature of the metaphysical problems from which they spring: the destiny of man, the relations between God and the world, the government of things here below by providence. The religious struggle is carried on ardently, passionately, but with little noise; the new belief employs no arms except those of persuasion. Ideas are elaborated in the seclusion of the study, and are propagated slowly, progressively, in men's consciences. Political opposition has quite another field. It inflames the crowd in the cause of interests less sacred, doubtless, but not unimportant, and produces more immediate agitation. It is the only form for which custom has reserved the name of opposition, and the only one with which we have to do here. — The existence of a party of opposition always supposes a certain degree of liberty and of the right of investigation. A despotic government admits of no opposition, and no argument. It can only be resisted by force, and it has no alternative but to conquer or to perish, like the Roman emperors whom triumphant revolt dragged down the steps of the Aventine Hill leading to the Tiber. Where there exists an infallible authority, or what pretends to be such, opposition has no raison d'être and is not tolerated. Just as religions allow no contradiction of their dogmas, theocracies and governments by divine right, which attribute to themselves a part of their infallibility, exclude all opposition. It is therefore only in free governments, in which man's activity has free play, in which his faculties are developed without hindrance, and in which his reason has sovereign command, that opposition can find a place, not by toleration, but as a right. Opposition is born of a diversity of opinions, which can be reduced to unity by no art or science, however great the effort. It answers to the divergence of interests, the rivalry and struggles of which are at the bottom of all questions, and form the warp and woof of history. Parties are formed, struggle, and contend with one another for influence and the control of the government. Doubtless a great many petty rivalries, a great many questions of persons and egotistical ambitions, enter into their

gles from a higher plane and as a whole; great principles are engaged in them and govern them. The eternal problem of human affairs is forever reappearing in them under one of its myriad forms; in the fierce battles which he wages, it is to ideas that man devotes himself; and his honor is to die for them. Let us take as an example the glorious, little, agitated and turbulent republics of Greece. A question of principle, of sovereignty, divided them, such as: "Shall the aristocracy or the democracy rule? Sparta or Athens?" And the struggle was carried on not only in states and cities; in every city the two parties were arrayed against each other, the one in power, the other constituting the opposition. What vicissitudes in the life of these parties so changeable, so quickly organized and so quickly dissolved; one day in possession of favor and success, of popularity and of the votes of the multitude, the next forsaken, annihilated; in turn and almost without interval, conquerors and conquered!- In modern society the right of discussion, and consequently of opposition, is the very soul of representative government. This right applies not only to the making of the laws and the voting of taxes, in which the people take part through their representatives, but to all the parts of legislation, and to all public services. Opposition may even go beyond this, and attack the government and its principle. The ideal of representative, government does not allow this sort of radical opposition. It is necessary that there should be, beyond all reach of discussion, a stable, fixed point, and a principle which can not be contested. In the moral world, as in the physical, motion supposes an immovable point. The constitution, whose object is the conservation of the state as a political body, may indeed, be criticised, but it can not allow itself to be denied or its principle to be overthrown. All opposition, therefore, is outside the law from the moment that it denies the political pact and seeks not the control of the government but its destruction. Hence, even in the very countries in which political commotions are most frequent, and in which power is oftenest shaken by revolution, we see that each government tries to put its principle at least beyond the reach of the storm, and puts the constitution under the safeguard of an oath. The reason is, that, wherever the constitution is called in question, normal political life has ceased to exist, and revolution has taken its place. - England is a country which affords the world the grand spectacle of a government whose principle is accepted by all. This principle is the fixed, immovable point to which we referred above, the light-house whose foundation is beaten by the billows, but whose summit towers serenely above the storm. In such a country the opposition bears only on the direction of public affairs, on questions of influence and of persons. We need not inquire by what vicissitudes England had to pass to reach this condition of calm and of