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Among the Writers of the Articles in the Three Volumes,
are the following:
EDWARD ATKINSON, Boston, Mass.
Max. EBERHARDT, Counselor-at-Law, Chicago. BARTHELEMY SAINT-HILAIRE, Member of the In- LEON FAUCHER, Member of the Institute of stitute of France.
France. FREDERICK BASTIAT, the famous French Econ- | HENRY FAWCETT, M. P., Professor of Political omist.
Economy at the University of Cambridge; at HENRI BAUDRILLART, Member of the Institute of present, Postmaster General of Great Britain. France.
GASPAR FINALI, Ex-Minister, Italy. MAURICE BLOCK, Statistician, Political Economist John FISKE, Cambridge, Mass. and Publicist, Editor of the Dictionnaire Gén WORTHINGTON C. FORD, Brooklyn, N. Y. éral de la Politique, Paris.
L. FOUBERT, Chef de division, France. J. C. BLUNTSCHLI, one the editors of Blunt-JOSEPH GARNIER. Professor of Political Econschli & Brater's Staatswörterbuch.
omy, Member of the Institute of France. GEROLAMO BOCCARDO, Editor of the Dizionario HENRY GEORGE, Author of “Progress and Pov
Universale di Economia Politica e di Commercio, erty," New York.
D. C. GILMAN, President of Johns Hopkins UniJACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN, Paris, France.
versity, Baltimore. ALBERT S. BOLLES, Author of “ History of Amer E. L. GODKIN, Editor New York Nation. ican Finance,” Philadelphia, Pa.
G. BROWN GOODE, Smithsonian Institute, WashGASTON DE BOURGE, Advocate, Paris, France. ington, D. C. R. R. BOWKER, New York.
Louis GOTTARD, Publicist, France. T. T. BRYCE, New Haven, Conn.
GEORGE WALTON GREEN, Counselor-at-Law, New HORATIO BURCHARD, Director of the Mint, Wash York. ington, D. C.
JULES GRENIER, Publicist, France. EDWARD Cary, New York.
W. E. GRIFFIS, Author of “The Mikado's EmE. Catchy, Member of the Institute of France. pire," Schenectady, N. Y. EMILE CHEDIEU, Advocate, France.
F. P. G. Guizot, France.
utor to the Dictionnaire de l'Economie Politique. Science, Yale College, New Haven, Conn.
FAUSTIN HÉLIE, Member of the Institute of
XAVIER HEUSCHLING, Minister of the Interior, ROYER-COLLARD, Professor of the Faculté de Brussels, Belgium. Droit, Paris.
J. E. HORN, Writer on Finance, Member of the ECSTACE Conway, Counselor-at-Law, New York. Hungarian Parliament. Thos. M. COOLEY, Author of “Constitutional FRANKLIN B. Hough, Washington, D. C. Limitations,” etc., etc., Judge of the Supreme EDWARD S. ISHAM, Counselor-at-Law, Chicago,
Ill. Chas. COQUELIX, one of the Editors of the Dic E. J. JAMES, University of Pennsylvania, Philationnaire de l' Economie Politique, France.
JOHN A. JAMESON, Author of “The ConstituCOURCELLE-SENEUIL, Paris, France.
tional Convention,” Chicago, Ill. E. H. CROSBY, Counselor-at-Law, New York. PAUL JANET, Member of the Institute of France. J. C. BANCROFT DAVIS, Assistant Secretary of ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, Professor of Jurispru. State, Washington, D. C.
dence, Princeton College, N. J. DELABARRE-DUPARCQ, Director at the Military John Johnston, Banker, Milwaukee, Wis. School of St. Cyr, France.
John J. Knox, Comptroller of the Currency, CHARLES DUXoYER, France.
Washington, D. C. Jules Duval, Publicist, France.
GUSTAVE KOERNER, Ex-Governor of Illinois. Cl. DUVERNOIS, French Ex-Minister.
Chas. LAVOLLÉE, Ex-Prefect, France. DORMAN B. Eston, Chairman of the Civil Serv
Louis LECLERC, France. ice Commission, New York.
A. LEGOYT, France.
Court of Michigan.
T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE, the eminent English Polit WM. ROSCHER, Professor of Political Economy at ical Economist.
the University of Leipzig.
F. B. SANBORN, Concord, Mass.
J. B. Say, France.
L. SCHWARTZ, Germany.
JULES SIMON, Member of the French Academy. CHARLES DE MAZADE, France.
EDMUND MUNROE SMITH, Professor in Columbia J. R. M‘CULLOCH, the English Economist.
College, New York.
bats, Corresponding Member of the Institute of L. SMITH, London.
A. R. SPOFFORD, Librarian of Congress, WashM. MONJEAN, France.
ington, D. C. E. MONTEGUT, France.
SIMON STERNE, Counselor-at-Law, New York. MICHEL NICOLAS, Professor, Montauban, France. M. STOESSEL, Switzerland. S. N. D. NORTH, Utica, N. Y.
A. M. SULLIVAN, M. P., London, England. M. ORTOLAN, Lawyer, France.
HENRI THIERS, France. A. Ort, France.
John P. TOWNSEND, one of the Vice-Presidents E. PAIGNON, France.
of the Bowery Savings Bank, New York. ESQUIROU DE PARIEU, Member of the Institute A. UBICINI, Italy. of France.
FRANCIS A. WALKER, Mass. Institute of TechH. Passy, France.
nology, Boston, Mass. JULES PAUTET, French Vice-Prefect.
J. D. WEEKS, Editor of the Iron Age, Expert and M. POEZL, Professor at the University of Mu Special Agent (Tenth Census U. S.) for Wages nich.
in Manufacturing Industry, Pittsburg, Pa. FRED. POLLOCK, Cambridge University, England. DAVID A. WELLS, the eminent American EconoR. P. PORTER, Special Agent (Tenth Census mist, Norwich, Conn.
U. S.) for Statistics of Wealth, Debt, Taxation HORACE WHITE, New York. and Railroads, Washington, D. C.
FREDERICK W. WHITRIDGE, Counselor-at-Law, GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, New York.
New York. M. RABUTAUX, Publicist, France.
Talcott WILLIAMS, The Press, Philadelphia, R. W. RAYMOND, New York.
H. B. WITTON, Inspector of Canals, Hamilton,
L. WOLOWSKI, Paris, France. LEON DE Rosny, France.
Theo. S. WOOLSEY, Professor at Yale College.
POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY,
AND OF THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
ATH. Oaths have been in use in all coun. . on oath: perhaps the oath on the part of wit
nesses was generally voluntary. (Demosth., IIpòs and it is probable that there is no nation which | "Αφοβον Ψευδ, C. 16; Κατά Κόνωνος, c. 10; has any clear notion of a Supreme Being, or of and Meier and Schömann, Att. Process., p. 675.) superior beings, that does not make use of oaths - In the Roman jurisprudence an oath was on certain solemn occasions. An oath may be required in some cases from the plaintiff, or the described generally as an appeal or address to a defendant, or both. Thus the oath of calumny superior being, by which the person making it was required from the plaintiff, which was a engages to declare the truth on the occasion on solemn declaration that he did not prosecute his which he takes the oath, or by which he promises suit for any fraudulent or malicious purpose. The to do something hereafter. The person who im offense of false swearing was perjurium, perjury; poses or receives the oath, imposes or receives it but it was considered a less offense in a party to on the supposition that the person making it ap a suit when the oath was imposed by a judex than prehends some evil consequences to himself from when it was voluntary. It does not appear that the superior being, if he should violate the oath. in civil proceedings witnesses were necessarily The person taking the oath may or may not fear examined on oath; but witnesses appear to have such consequences, but the value of the oath in been examined on oath in the judicia publica, the eyes of him who receives or imposes it con- which were criminal proceedings. The title in sists in the opinion which he has of its influence the Digest, “ De Testibu8" (22, tit. 5), makes no over the person who takes it. An oath may be mention of the oath, though it speaks of punishtaken voluntarily, or it may be imposed on a per- ment being inflicted on witnesses who bore false son under certain circumstances by a political testimony. — The law in America and England, superior; or it may be the only condition on as a rule, requires evidence or testimony for judiwhich the assertion or declaration of a person cial purposes to be given on oath. A Jew, a shall be admitted as evidence of any fact. The Mohammedan and a Hindoo may be sworn as form of taking the oath has varied greatly in witnesses, but they must severally take the oath different countries. Among the Greeks a person in that form which is sanctioned by the usage of sometimes placed his hand on the altar of the their country or nation, and which they severally deity by whom he swore; but the forms of oaths consider to be binding. The offense of declaring were almost as various as the occasions. Oaths what is false when a witness is examined upon were often used in judicial proceedings among oath, constitutes perjury. - Declarations made the Greeks. The Dicastæ, who were judges and by a person under the apprehension of immediate jurymen, gave their verdict upon oath. The death are generally admitted as evidence in judiHeliastic oath is stated at length in the speech of cial proceedings, when properly verified; for it is Demosthenes against Timocrates (c. 36). It does considered that the circumstances in which the not appear that the oath was always imposed on person is placed at the time of making the declarwitnesses in judicial proceedings; and yet it ap- ation furnish as strong motives for veracity as pears that sometimes witnesses gave their evidence the obligation of an oath. Quakers also, in all 120
VOL. III. – 1
civil cases, were allowed by the statute 7 & 8 ercised over the judge by the legislator, or over Wm. III., c. 34, to give their evidence on affirm the sheriff by the judge. In the latter case the ation; and now the affirmation of Quakers and ceremony is a mere form without any useful Moravians is admissible in all judicial proceed effect whatever.” — The absurdity of this arguings, both civil and criminal. – As oaths may be ment hardly needs to be exposed. He who adeither voluntary or may be imposed by a political ministers the oath, by virtue of the power which superior, so they may be imposed either on extra. he has to administer it, and the political superior judicial or on judicial occasions. Oaths which who imposes the oath, may cither believe or not are imposed on occasion of judicial proceedings believe that the Deity will punish false swearing, are the most frequent, and the occasions are the and it is quite immaterial to the question which most important to the interests of society. The of the two opinions they entertain. That which principle on which an oath is administered on gives the oath a value in the eyes of him who ad judicial occasions is this. it is supposed that an ministers it, or of that political superior who additional security is thereby acquired for the imposes it, is the opinion of the person who takes veracity of him who takes the oath. Bentham, the oath; and if the individual who takes the in his “ Rationale of Evidence," on the contrary, oath believes that the Deity, in case it is profaned, affirms that, whether principle or experience be will inflict a punishment which otherwise he regarded, the oath will be found, in the hands of would not inflict, the object of him who enforces justice, an altogether useless instrument; in the the oath is accomplished, and an additional sanchands of injustice, a deplorably serviceable one;" tion against mendacity is secured. It matters " that it is inefficacious to all good purposes,” and not whether the Deity will punish or not, or “that it is by no means inefficacious to bad ones.” whether he who enforces the oath believes that he – The three great sanctions or securities for ve will punish or not. if he who takes the oath racity in a witness, or, to speak perhaps more cor believes that the Deity will punish false swearing, rectly, the three great sanctions against mendacity that is sufficient to show that the oath is of itself in a witness, are, the punishment legally imposed a sanction. — The fear of legal punishment is on a person who is convicted of false swearing, admitted by Bentham to be a sanction against the punishment inflicted by public opinion or the mendacity. But the legal punishment may or positive morality of society, and the fear of pun. may not overtake the offender. Legal punishishment from the Deity, in this world or the ment may follow detection, but the perjury may next, or in both. The common opinion is, that not be detected, and therefore not punished. Is all the three sanctions operate on a witness, the oath, or would a declaration without oath be, though they operate on different witnesses in “a mere form without any useful effect whatvery different degrees. A man who does not ever,” because the legal punishment may not, believe that the Deity will punish false swearing and frequently does not, overtake the offender? can only be under the influence of the first two When a Greek or a Roman swore by his gods, in sanctions; and if his character is such that it can whose existence he believed, and who, being not be made worse than it is, he may be under the mere imaginations, could not punish him for his influence of the first sanction only. Bentham perjury, was not his belief in their existence and affirms that the third sanction only appears to their power and willingness to punish perjury a exercise an influence in any case, because it acts sanction against mendacity? All antiquity at in conjunction with “the two real and efficient least thought so. There are occasions on which sanctions,” “ the political sanction and the moral oaths are treated lightly, on which he who imor popular sanction;" and that if it is stripped of poses the oath, he who takes it, and the comthose accompaniments, its impotence will appear munity who are witnesses to it, treat the violation immediately. -- Bentham's chief argument is as of it as a trivial matter. Such occasions as these follows: "that the supposition of the efficiency furnish Bentham with arguments against the of an oath is absurd in principle. It ascribes to efficacy of oaths on all occasions. Suppose we man a power over his Maker. It supposes the admit, with Bentham, as we do merely for the Almighty to stand engaged, no matter how, but sake of the argument, that “on some occasions absolutely engaged, to inflict on every individual oaths go with the English clergy for nothing;" by whom the ceremony, after having been per. and this, notwithstanding the fact, which nobody formed, has been profaned, a punishment (no can doubt, “that among the English clergy bematter what) which, but for the ceremony and lievers are more abundant than unbelievers." the profanation, he would not have inflicted. It The kind of oaths “which go for nothing” are supposes him thus prepared to inflict, at com not mentioned by Bentham, but they may be conmand, and at all times, a punishment, which, jectured. Now, if all oaths went for nothing being at all times the same, at no time bears any with the clergy, or with any other body of men, proportion to the offense.” Again: “either the the dispute would be settled. But this is not the ceremony causes punishment to be inflicted by the fact. If in any way it has become the positive Deity in cases where otherwise it would not have morality of any body of men that a certain kind been inflicted; or it does not. In the former case of oath should go for nothing, each individual of the same sort of authority is exercised by man over that body, with respect to that kind of oath, has the Deity, as that which, in English law, is ex the opinion of his body. He does not believe