Argument of counsel. less belt was the well known equivalent for the plungerconveyor long prior to Cochrane's patent. A patent can only be invalidated on account of another patent or printed publication when the subject matter was patented or so described prior to the invention or discovery thereof by the American patentee. Rev. Stats., Sec. 4920; Bartholomew v. Sawyer, 1 Fish. 516; Judson v. Cope, 1 Fish. 615; Howe v. Morton, 1 Fish. 586; White v. Allen, 2 Fish. 440. The law defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia gives to that court jurisdiction of suits upon patents as defined in the recited sections of the Revised Statutes; section 4921 confers upon all courts having jurisdiction of patent suits general equity power; and upon the statute it cannot be contended that the court below had not full power to entertain a determined suit. It should be noted that the section of the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia places suits in equity and at law upon an equal footing. The language of the act is "solely in equity as at law," thus removing from the system of patent legislation the ancient preference of our jurisprudence for common law proceedings. Messrs. A. L. Merriman and H. C. Cady, for appellees: If the appellants have anything of real value it is in Cochrane's process. Upon this process patent they evidently depended and failed in the contest below. But little effort was made touching the remaining issues and reissues, which, by way of distinction, may be classified as the mechanical patents. Now, however, these mechanical patents are to brought up as a forlorn hope upon the theory that the parts used by these respondents, and shown in the Welch patent are the equivalents of those shown by Cochrane and set up in plaintiff's bill. But the radical distinction between the old mode and Argument of counsel. new process, and the results before stated, show that the mechanical devices used are not equivalents. They are different in form; they are different in their results. They relate to a different machine, acting differently and producing, one "fine flour" as it was called that is to say, flour mainly from the head of the bolt, composed largely of the starchy part of the berry-the other, flour from the middlings entire, and treated in a separate machine. The court below dismissed the bill upon the ground that the complainants had not presented such a case upon the pleadings and proofs gave the Court of Equity jurisdiction. It is well established in equity jurisprudence that a Court of Equity has jurisdiction only when there is no adequate remedy at law, and this principle has been succinctly declared by Congress, which thus defines its jurisdiction: "Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case when a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." Rev. Stats., sec. 723. Before a patentee can have an injunction he must show an exclusive enjoyment long enough to justify the presumption of a right or an incontrovertible right. Hilliard on Inj. 401. The simple charge of infringement gives the Court of Equity no jurisdiction. Sec. 449, Rev. Stats., provides a remedy for infringements of patents by action on the case, with power in the court to assess damages in cases of the actual damage as a penalty. The only statutory power given to Courts of Equity is to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of equity. If objections be made that the question of jurisdiction should have been specifically raised in the pleadings, we reply that aside from the fact that the answer makes a reservation of all cause of demurrer, and also that the court below considered this question in connection with the facts proven, the question of jurisdiction, and apparent upon the face of the bill, may be introduced judicially by the court at any stage of the proceedings. Opinion of the court. Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Maine, 531; Heriot v. Davis, 2 Wood. & Minot, 230; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge Co., 1 Wood. & Minot, 406; Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 149. The Court of Equity is of limited jurisdiction, and it has now no original jurisdiction conferred upon it in actions for infringement of patents, for which actions the statute has expressly provided a remedy at law. The court below sitting as a jury having found the facts in favor of the defendants as well as the law, such findings will not be reviewed by this court. Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court : This is a suit in equity, instituted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for injunction and relief against an alleged infringement of various patents belonging to the complainants. The bill was dismissed and the complainants have appealed. The patents sued on are six in number, originally five, granted to the appellant Cochrane on the 13th of January, 1863, and numbered respectively 37,317, 37,318, 37,319, 37,320, and 37,321. They all related to an improved method of bolting flour, the first being for the general process; and the others for improvements in the different parts of machinery rendered necessary in carrying on the process. Three of the original patents, Nos. 37,317, 37,318 and 37,321, were surrendered and reissues taken in 1874, which reissues were numbered 5,841, 6,029, and 6,030, the first being for the process, and the other two for portions of the machinery. Reissues 6,029, being in place of the original patent numbered 37,321, was also subsequently surrendered, and two new reissued patents substituted therefor, numbered 6,594 and 6,595. The case has been mainly argued on the question of infringment, the defendants using a bolting apparatus con. structed according to letters patent issued to Edward P. Welch in April, 1873, for improvements upon machines pat 94 U. S. 781-782. Opinion of the court. ented to Jesse B. Wheeler and Ransom S. Reynolds, which, as well as the process employed, they contend, are radically different from the apparatus and process of Cochrane. A preliminary question is raised, with regard to the jurisdiction of the court below to hear the case on a bill in equity, before a determination of the rights of the parties in an action at law. The powers of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in patent cases are the same as those of the Circuit Courts of the United States. See Revised Statutes, relating to the District of Columbia, secs. 760, 764. The Circuit Courts were first invested with equity jurisdiction in patent cases by the Act of Feb. 15, 1819 (a), which declared that these courts should have "Original cognizance, as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings, inventions and discoveries; and upon any bill in equity, filed by any party aggrieved in any such cases, should have authority to grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of equity," etc. This law was substantially re-enacted in the 17th section of the Patent Law of July 4, 1836 (b), and the 55th section of that of July 8, 1870 (c), special powers to assess damages in equity cases being also conferred by the latter Act. Before the Act of 1819 was passed, the Circuit Courts had cognizance of actions at law brought to recover damages for the infringement of patents, but not of the suits in equity in relation thereto, unless the parties happened to be citizens of different States. Phil. Pat. 379; Livingston v. Van Ingen, 1 Paine, 54; Sullivan v. Redfield, 1 Paine, 447. Under that Act and the subsequent Acts in which it became incorporated, bills in equity for injunction, discovery and (a) Otto inserts "3 Stat. at L., 481." 94 U. S. 782. Opinion of the court. account have constantly been sustained, frequently without any previous action at law. As said by Mr. Justice Grier, in a case decided at the Circuit: "It is true that, in England, the chancellor will generally not grant a final and perpetual injunction in patent cases, when the answer denies the validity of the patent, without sending the parties to law to have that question decided. But even there the rule is not universal; it is a practice founded more on convenience than necessity. It always rests on the sound discretion of the court. A trial at law is ordered by a chancellor to inform his conscience, not because either party may demand it as a right, or that a court of equity is incompetent to judge of questions of fact or of legal titles. In the United States, the practice is by no means so general as in England.” Goodyear v. Day, 2 Wall., Jr., 296. Subsequently in the case of Sickles v. Gloucester Co., 3 Wall., Jr., 196, the same judge said: "The courts of the United States have their jurisdiction over controversies of this nature by statute, and do not exercise it merely as ancillary to a court of law." And after quoting the statute, he proceeds: "Having such original cognizance * * *the courts of the United States do not, in all cases, require a verdict at law on the title, before granting a final injunction, or concede a right to every party to have every issue as to originality or infringement tried by jury." The position of Mr. Justice Grier is undoubtedly true, that whether a case shall be first tried at law is a matter of discretion, and not of jurisdiction; and in this matter the courts of the United States, sitting as courts of equity in patent cases, are much less disposed than the English courts are to send parties to a jury before assuming to decide upon the merits. But the counsel for the defendants suggest that the revised statutes have not preserved in entirety the previous enactments on this subject, but have omitted the vesting of original cognizance in the Circuit Courts sitting as 94 U. S. 783. |