THREE LETTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL

6

DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION.'

THE following Letters contain an attempt to ascertain the true principles by which the recognition, on the part of foreign Governments, of insurgent communities, is governed. It is a subject on which but little precise information will be found in the ordinary text-books.

B

I.

THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION.

THE principles involved in the question commonly termed the Recognition of the South' seem to be so imperfectly apprehended by some recent writers and speakers, and so much confusion appears to exist in the public mind respecting this interesting topic, that I venture to ask your indulgence in an attempt to elucidate the maxims of law and the practice of nations applicable to the matter.

Nothing is more common than to confound, and yet nothing is more important than to distinguish, in this discussion, that which strictly belongs to the province of law, and that which properly pertains to the domain of policy. Policy might possibly suggest that which law nevertheless disallows; and, on the other hand, law might permit what policy, notwithstanding, would dissuade. With the question of policy I do not purpose, except incidentally, to deal. I will, however, ask your leave to indicate the outlines which circumscribe the law of the case.

The general principle which underlies and forms the substratum of the whole discussion is the fundamental doctrine of the respect exacted by International Law for the independence of sovereign States. Each State is bound in its international relations to observe and respect the sovereignty, however symbolised, of every other State. Sovereignty, by the very definition of the term, implies a right to the obedience of subjects, whether the Sovereign be a despot, a monarch, or a republic. A breach of this obedience is a violation of this right. Revolution must always be a violation of Right, though it may sometimes be the consummation of Justice. But no political sect that I know of, except the Red Republicans, have ever maintained the doctrine of the primâ facie legitimacy of Rebellion, which would be nothing less than what has been called the

'Right of Insurrection.' Upon such a principle all Government is impossible, since it would be denied even the primary right of self-defence. To deal with the insurgent subjects of another State on a footing of independence, is to violate the sovereignty of the State which has hitherto exercised dominion over them. As long, then, as persons once owning the relation of subjects to a sovereign State are still capable of being regarded in any sense as such subjects, to deal with them upon an independent footing is a hostile act towards that Sovereign which, according to the principles of International Law, may be justly resented. On the other hand, if persons who once owned the relation of subjects have been able, either by force of arms or otherwise, to divest themselves, in a final and permanent manner, of the status of subjects, then diplomatic transactions with such persons afford no justifiable ground of offence to their former Sovereign, nor can they be regarded as a breach of neutrality or friendship.

As generally happens with all questions of law, the principle itself is sufficiently clear, but the difficulty lies in its application. When does a subject cease to be a subject? is a question of mixed law and fact which is not very easy of solution. The answer is to be looked for rather in the recent and approved practice of nations than in any definitions of text books. The old theory of de jure and indelible sovereignty which led Louis XIV. and the non-jurors to persist in asserting the sovereignty of the Pretender, is now universally abandoned. The sufficiency of a de facto independence is admitted by common consent. But still remains the difficult question, What constitutes de facto independence?

In 1849, the people of Hungary proclaimed their independence, and for some time asserted it with considerable success by force of arms. Indeed, so enfeebled at that time were the military resources of the Austrian Government, that for a certain period her authority in the Hungarian provinces was wholly set aside, and it was only by the assistance of a foreign power that she was enabled to reinstate her dominion. In this state of things the American President despatched a special envoy to Kossuth, with instructions* not only to enquire into

* Vide Note at the end of this Letter.

the status of the Revolutionary Government, but with full powers at his discretion to recognise and to treat with it. Yet by the general opinion of Europe this transaction was severely reprobated; and the American executive, though they blustered a good deal more suo, did not ultimately pretend to justify or insist on this course. It was properly considered, that, though the Revolutionary Government was temporarily in complete possession of the territory to which they laid claim, a greater lapse of time was necessary in order to give prescription to the tenure. It was thought that their success, though remarkable, might not be permanent; and the proceeding of the American Government was pronounced not justifiable, and proved in fact at once offensive and nugatory.

The modern precedents which have been alleged by those who recommend the immediate recognition of the Southern Confederacy, display, in a conspicuous manner, the confusion of the public mind on the question at issue. I observe that a Member of Parliament, in a recent speech, relies upon the instances of Belgium and Greece as conclusively settling the head of legality; yet, in truth, Belgium and Greece have nothing whatever to do with the matter in hand. If the hon. gentleman had been recommending a collective European intervention to settle with a strong hand the disputes between the American belligerents, Belgium and Greece might have served as apposite illustrations. But to cite the action of the European powers in the affairs of Belgium in 1830 as a case of recognition, betrays a total ignorance of facts, and an entire confusion of principles. Conference of London did not, nor did it profess to, recognise the independence of Belgium; its avowed object was to create the independence of Belgium. Anyone who will be at the trouble to examine the history of that transaction, will see that Belgium did not pretend, nor did anyone assert on its behalf, that it had achieved a de facto independence. On the contrary, it is perfectly notorious that after the battle of Louvain, the Dutch army, but for the armed interference of France, would have reoccupied Brussels. The powers of Europe, which in 1815 had assigned Belgium to the Crown of Holland, thought themselves entitled in 1830, in the same European interest, to recast their own plan. The case of Belgium was, therefore,

The