property, and the other creditors received nothing until the whole of what was due to the Crown was difcharged. He faid, he would not enumerate what His Majesty's Ministers might confider as matters of fmall confequence, fuch as the wafte of wealth, the increase of taxes and national debt, the lofs of lives, the immenfe price of all articles, and the neceffity we dad been under of having recourfe to a new mode of taxation, videlicet, Requifition upon Income, which left every man's property at the mercy of the Minifter's tribunals. But he wished the Houfe to remark, how much the danger arifing from the propofed Union with Ireland was increased by the war. It was highly probable that that measure might thwart the interests, and offend the feelings of many perfons in Ireland. If infurrrections fhould break out, war with France would neceffarily increase the danger. To enable us to carry on this war with France, we had been obliged to eftablifh a paper money-It was paper money whenever it was received, becaufe gold could not be obtained: extending this paper money to fupply the united wants of Government and commerce, there was a danger that we might violate that due proportion which ought to be obferved between the paper circulation and the precious metals. Should this happen, the whole failure of public credit would be annihilated. But what are the advantages we expect, if we fucceed in re-establishing the Monarchy of France? We are told, we fhall be relieved from the inconvenience of treating with the prefent Government: but what is that inconvenience? we doubt the fincerity of Bonaparte: the obvious anfwer to that is, it is his intereft to be fincere. But will the prefent Government of France be ftable? As long as the peace is acceptable to the French nation, peace will be permanent, whether the present Government of France remains, or is fucceeded by any other. But can we difarm? If France difarms, and her subjects apply themfelves to peaceful employments, we may difarm. But we fear French principles. Do we fear ambitious or diforganizing principles? If we fear her ambitious principles, that fentiment would have prevented us from ever making peace with the antient Government of France. If we fear diforganizing principles, let it be obferved, that the present Government of France is Anti-Jacobin; that the deftruction of the political inftitutions, which existed under the antient Government, is complete in France; and that the prefent Rulers are folicitous not to deftroy, but to preserve their political inftitutions. But they may ftill wish to deftroy the political inftitutions of other countries. France has deprived herself of the inftruments of deftruction. Can the now fay to the people, deftroy the exifting inftitutions of your country, and we will affift

you in establishing a democracy? No; the people in every country now see, that though they may fucceed in destroying the existing institutions of their country, their efforts to establish a Democracy will terminate in the establishment of an ufurping Ariftocracy. But if the antient Government of France is re-established, we might hope that Belgium might be taken out of the hands of France. Austria has already exchanged Belgium for the Venetian territories; and the fituation of Europe has been fo much changed fince the peace of Utrecht, that he feared Belgium would belong to France, whatever might be the form of Government of that country. But if it was expected that France should content herself within her antient limits, might not France with equal juftice expect that other powers fhould relinquith their acquifitions; that Ruffia, Pruffia, and Austria, should give up the poffeffion, of Poland, and Great Britain the Mysore country? But we may make peace, when the experiment had been tried. Is this the language of a Statefman? Is war fo light a matter, that it is to be continued as matter of experiment ? But it has been faid by His Majesty's Minister, that in 1787 the people wished for peace, and that they do not wish for it now. From what circumftance in 1797 did the Minifter collect that the people wished for peace? Certainly not from the votes of this Houfe; for his majorities were as ftrong at that period as they are at prefent. Will he state to us the criterion by which he discovered the sentiments of the people in 1797 ? We fhall then know by that criterion, whether the fame with for peace is not prevalent at this day. He said, no object could be obtained by the war which could benefit either the King or his People. The King and his People had been deluded into the war. He believed even the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been deluded into the war. had been deluded into the war by thofe great families who had uniformly and fyftematically avowed the defign of controuling the King and his People by confederacy and combination. The manner in which thofe great families had fettered the authority of George the Second had attracted the notice of wife and honest men. When the Earl of Bute was called to office, he had endeavoured to break this combination. He failed in the attempt. In 1792,

He

perceiving that the power which certain Peers had ufurped of nominating 150 Members of the Houfe of Commons, had been noticed in petitions to that Houfe, they had deluded the King and the People into that war, that they might have an opportunity of calumniating those who wished to deftroy their ufurped power, as men infected with French principles, and defirous of destroying the political inftitutions of this country. He thought the continuance VOL. X.

3 E

of the war unneceffarily expofed the King and his family, and the welfare of his fubjects.

Colonel J. H. ADDINGTON faid, that nothing could have furprized him more than the notice he heard given by the honourable and learned gentleman, that he intended to propofe withholding fupplies from His Majefty in the profecution of the prefent war, upon the principle on which it was to be carried on: that furprize was equalled, but not furpaffed, by the manner in which the honourable and learned gentleman had endeavoured to induce the Committee to reject the vote which was now before it, that was to fay, to refufe, in the prefent conjuncture, to grant fupplies to His Majefty to carry on this most important conteft. This fubject had been difcuffed on a former occafion; arguments had been brought forward with all the force of which they were capable, against the measure of rejecting a negotiation; but they were answered by his right honourable friend in a manner that was irresistible; and all that had been urged against the conduct of His Majesty's Ministers upon that fubject, had been anticipated by the arguments of his right honourable friend, fo that it was unneceffary to follow them in the debate to-night but there was one point, and one only, to which he should call the attention of the honourable and learned gentleman-In the laft debate upon this fubject, a friend of his, who was not now in the Houfe, ftated a very important point, and made upon it many useful obfervations-He faid, "that if we could even obtain peace immediately, it would be highly improper in this country, under its prefent circumftances, to make fuch reductions in its naval and military establishment, as had been usual at the conclufion of former wars.' That was one of the most important obfervations that were made in that debate. It involved fo much thought in a fhort fentence, and was fo forcible, that not one of the gentlemen who spoke on the other fide had attempted to answer it. Upon that point he fhould like to hear what the honourable and learned gentleman had to fay. He fhould fuppofe him to be one of His Majefty's Minifters ;-he fhould fuppofe alfo, that, as fuch Minifter, overtures were made to him, expreffive of the pacific dif pofition of the First Conful of the French Republic towards Great' Britain, and, by the bye, Bonaparte was pretty lavifh of his profeffions of fincerity to other powers, without having yet furnished one inftance of fuch fincerity:-He would fuppofe that the honourable and learned gentleman was fo determined in favour of Bonaparte, as to rely upon his mere profeffions, unaccompanied with any act to evince his fincerity, unattended with any recollection of his character, or reflection on the evidence of facts, or of doubts as to his

ability to comply with his promifes; but fuppofing all thefe difficulties to be furmounted, fuppofing the honourable and learned gentleman to be Minister of this country, and these overtures to be made to him, he would ask him, confidering him as fuch Minister, whether, if a peace were made this hour, he would take upon himfelf the tremendous refponfibility of advifing His Majefty, under the prefent circumstances of affairs, to reduce the public expenditure by any very confiderable reduction of our naval and military force? If he anfwered in the affirmative, which he did not expect, he would fay, that the man who could give that advice, under the prefent circumftances of England and of all Europe, he would take the liberty to pronounce to be no Statesman, no lover of his country, nor of the perinament intereft or tranquillity of Europe: if in the negative, why, then it followed, as of course, that the peace which could be the refult of negotiation now, would be a mere shadow as to its advantage, but as to its real evils, would be worse than the expence of continuing the war. But he would not have the honourable and learned gentleman, nor any others who agreed with him in political fentiments, understand that those who fupported the war, and who by the way would not, he was fure, be condemned by pofterity, nor did he believe they were at this hour condemned by any confiderable part of the people of England. He would not, he faid, have these gentlemen understand that those who voted for the war loved it in the abstract; they adopted it as a choice between two evils. What were the advantages of peace without fecurity -He was not afraid of war with honour, nor of peace with fecurity; but he was afraid of war wrapped up in peace-" non ego pacem, neque bellum, fed bellum pace involutum reformido." Thefe were the grounds and this was the principle on which he gave his vote to-night, and that on which he gave it on a former night, a vote the most fatisfactory to his mind that he ever gave; he reflected with pleasure upon it, in common with the glorious majority, for glorious he took leave to call that majority, in which he had had the honour of voting upon this fubject. He would fay again, that under the prefent circumftances of all the public affairs of Europe, peace would be worse in its confequences than war. The effect of even a negotiation for peace would only be a delufion of the people of this country, who were enabled, under the bleffings of Providence, to be formidable to their enemies, and to aftonish the world by their refources and exertions. Their ardour was not abated. The effect of a nego. tiation would be to dishearten and difmay our allies, and to destroy the confidence of all Europe in the common caufe. Should we by an infatuation, for such he must call it, now determine to negotiate,

by damping all the ardour of His Majefty's forces, and destroying the confidence of his allies, as well as the hopes of Europe? He hoped we fhould not. Viewing things in this light, he did really hope that the honourable and learned gentleman would feel as he did, and fee the propriety of withdrawing his oppofition to this motion; for he knew, that if it were poffible that the honourable and learned gentleman's fentiments could be adopted by the House of Commons, the people would feel it with forrow, and he would venture to say that by the pursuit of such policy as that which was recommended by the honourable and learned gentleman, this country might be undone.

ration.

Mr. B. EDWARDS began by explaining what he confidered to be the argument of the honourable and learned gentleman (Mr. Nicholls), as militating against the oppofition of Ministry to negotiate for peace rather than as oppofing the vote of fupply. And he muft fay, that upon the ground of argument advanced by the honour able gentleman who spoke laft, the war might be of an eternal duHe, for one, could not agree to give his vote for an endlefs conteft, with a view of reftoring the Bourbon family, and keeping up internal animofities between Frenchmen and Frenchmen. On one point, he muft acquit Minifters from the charge of inconfiftency; for as it was evident from their prefent conduct that they did not mean to negotiate, fo neither did he believe that they were fincere in their former propofals of negotiation. In his opinion Minifters had now an opportunity offered them of making peace, without any degradation of the national honour; they were not required to folicit peace, but rather to dictate it. All the very reasons which had been adduced against negotiating, derived from the exhausted ftate of the French finances, the capture of their colonies, &c. were in his opinion arguments for making peace. The poverty of France was the best pledge of her fincerity. Mr. Edwards then adverted to fome of the circumstances of the war; the loffes of men, and the relinquishment of St. Domingo: and in Holland a gallant army made to pass under the yoke. It was eafy for men to speak of battles who had never fought; but the events of war were uncertain, and in the hands of the Almighty. It should be remembered, that no enemy was fo dangerous and powerful as one driven to defperation. What was it that made the Buccaneers in America fo dangerous, but that, having no refpurces in themselves, they were compelled to make a prey of all within their reach. Mr. Edwards faid, he did not mean to oppofe the vote of fupply to the navy, but fimply to object to the farther profecution of the war, for which the vote was propofed.