he would have offered us. We should have faid, "We formerly made propofitions of peace to you, let us now hear the nature of yours." From this no bad confequence could have followed. All military operations are at prefent fufpended at any rate, and the preparations might have gone on with equal vigour for the next campaign. If the terms offered by Bonaparte fhould have been unreafonable, they might have been rejected with difdain. The odium of continuing the war would thus have been thrown upon Bonaparte, and every Englishman would have contributed with cheerfulnefs to carry it on. His Lordship concluded by paying a high compliment to His Majefty, whofe eminent virtues, he faid, diftinguished moderation, and fatherly care of his people, made the weakneffes and vices of the Rulers of other nations appear more glaring by contraft. He begged pardon for having fo long troubled the House; but these being his fentiments he could not vote for the addrefs; nor fhould he vote for the amendment.

The Earl of CARLISLE faid, that this was not a war to preferve a trifling colony, or to gain an extenfion of dominion; but to preserve our laws, our liberty, our religion, our property-every thing we hold dear. "We fight for fecurity, and we thould accept of no offers of peace until it is eftablished on a permanent bafis. By carrying on the war, we have obtained every object we propofed to ourselves in beginning it. We have destroyed that monfter which preyed upon the vitals of the Conftitution, and threatened its exiftence. We have checked the career of the conquefts of France, which, there was reafon to dread, would fpread mifery and defolation over every country in Europe. We have obtained fecurity, and fecurity we fhall continue to enjoy by perfevering in the conteft, and in this way alone." His Lordship was confident that to enter into a negotiation at prefent would be to ruin the country, and would therefore vote heartily for the addrefs. He thought, however, that it would have been more prudent had they only thanked His Majefty for his gracious communication, and not given any opinion upon the conduct of the Executive Government. The addrefs pledged them to continue the war till the refponfible Minifters of the Crown fhould fay that the period was come when peace would be secure. This was a fubject unfit for their difcuffion. They only knew a part of the tranfaction, and Minifters might, not improbably, have reafons unknown to them, to justify the violent answers which had been returned to the overtures of the French Government. He thought very highly of Minifters: they had by their prudence and steadinefs faved the country, which would inevitably have been ruined, had the Oppofition been allowed to

carry into execution their impolitic projects. He only wished that they would not shift the responsibility which they themselves are fo able to bear, upon others who must neceffarily be incompetent judges. He would make no specific motion upon this subject, but he could not help taking notice of it.

Lord HOLLAND faid, that the noble Secretary of State had begun his fpeech with stating, that the approbation of the conduct of Ministers, in the correfpondence under confideration, was an undeniable confequence of the former votes of the House. By this pofition he endeavoured to entrap those who had formerly supported their measures into an implicit acquiefcence in every part of their conduct. Nothing, however, could be more unfounded than this conclufion. For his own part, he had not the honour of being in the House when the first refolutions refpecting the war were adopted; but when, during the preceding part of the prefent Seffion, he had made a motion for peace, that motion was refifted on grounds totally different from those which the noble Secretary had taken up for his defence, in refusing the overture of the French Government; and every noble Lord who had spoken, whatever his fentiments were, admitted, that circumftances were materially changed. Formerly it was the conftant answer to every motion that pointed to peace, that the ambition of France was infatiable; that the refused to liften to any terms of accommodation. But after the Houfe had fo decidedly expreffed their approbation of the declaration of Minifters, after the rupture of the negotiations at Paris and Lifle; when the House had expreffed its opinion in favour of the profeffion they contained of a readiness to treat whenever the enemy discovered a fimilar difpofition, furely it was not an undeniable confequence of any former vote that their Lordships fhould now approve of the conduct of Administration, in refufing to enter upon negotiation. One great point was now ascertained by the correfpondence, which, in a most important degree, changed the relative fituation of the two powers. We could no longer fay, as formerly, that the continuance of the war was to be afcribed to the avowed animofity of the enemy. It was not that they would not make or liften to overtures; but it was even by the avowal of Minifters that we did not like to liften or make overtures that we thought it was infecure to make peace; thatis, that it was our animofity that precluded the opening of a negotiation for peace. What then are the arguments by which this step is juftified? Let us confider what are the objections now urged to any negotiation with the prefent Government of France? There was one circumftance of which he could not help taking notice, becaufe it feemed to proceed on an objection which had not been

openly acknowledged, and he hoped did not exist at all: but it was remarkable, that in the title of the correfpondence, their was a ftudied anxiety to avoid giving Bonaparte the title which belonged to him as chief Conful of the French Republic. He was ftyled General Bonaparte. This appeared to proceed from a with not to recognize him in the character which he claimed-and the French Republic is never named, but only the country of France. Certainly, however, a negotiation with a Government did not fanction that Government. It was merely a recognition of power, and nothing more. It expreffed no opinion on the means by which power was acquired, the right by which it was holden, or the manner by which it was exercised. It originated in the principle of mutual convenience. But the recency of the late Revolution in France was one of the principal objections infifted upon. On former occafions, Minifters themfelves had not confidered fuch a circumstance as affording any objection to negotiate, as of itself it could be none. When the late Conftitution of the French Republic was established, Minifters, by a meffage on the 8th of December, 1795, admitted that a crifis was approaching that might lead to the termination of the conteft. On that occafion, fix weeks had been fufficient to determine their minds. What greater objection then could apply to the prefent Government of France, that could render it improper to treat with thofe whom it has placed in authority? Was there any greater appearance of inftability in this Government, than in that which had fatisfied Minifters on fo fhort a trial? Now the inftability of the new order of things is an infuperable objection; furely after having approved of Minifters for proceeding to negotiation with a new eftablishment, it was not an undeniable confequence that they should approve the conduct of Minifters in acting in a manner diametrically oppofite to that which they fubmitted to the fanction of Parliament. Another objection was to the principle of the French Repbulic: that principle then was of two kinds, revo!utionary and ambitious; but would any man now contend that more danger was to be apprehended from the prefent Government of France than any former one? Was not the direct contrary the cafe? Had not every thing alarming; every thing of deftructive tendency and pernicious example in political principle been given up and abandoned under the present system? It was clear then, that the objection did not lie against the revolutionary principle of the new Government. Was its ambition then fo dangerous now? That the conduct of France had been deteftable on different occafions, he did not difpute; it was not his with or intention to justify its proceedings; but it was faid, the Republic had VOL. X.

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broken every treaty it had concluded. The noble Lord, on this point, perhaps, might have left more ftrength to his argument if he had omitted certain treaties in the enumeration; for inftance, it was by no means clear that the French had violated the treaty with Pruffia? This was the only cafe that was at all applicable to this country; and it was not made out that the French had been guilty of any violation of it. At any rate, however, that violation of treaty did not ferve the purpofe for which it was brought forward. It afforded no proof of infecurity from the inftability of the new Government; for moft of the treaties alluded to had been violated by the fame Government by which they were concluded; by that which had actually lafted longest in France. It was also remarkable, that the circumftance of a treaty being made by another Government had in no inftance been alledged as a juftification of its infraction. There was no proof that any one of the various Governments of France had imagined, much lefs avowed, and acted upon the principle of the treaties of one Government not being binding on that which fucceeded it. As to the ambition which characterized the prefent Government, that was a confideration that might have weight in the arrangement of terms; it was not a preliminary objection preclufive of all treaty. But what proof else could be given of an abandonment of dangerous views and exorbitant pretenfions, but a negotiation in which either ambition or moderation would be displayed? It was faid, likewise, that Bonaparte might be infincerc. Cafes might be fuppofed, in which strong grounds to fufpect the fincerity of an overture might juftify a refufal to negotiate, efpecially if negotiation might lead to danger. Nothing like this was the cafe here. There were no good reafons to imagine that the French Government was infincere. On the contrary, every day tended to demonftrate its fincerity; or, at least, if it was infincere, it had hitherto acted the part fo well, that if they were really fincere they could only have done precisely what they had done. It had done all that depended on itself to evince that difpofition. What elfe could be expected from Bonaparte? Was it reafonable to fuppofe that he should admit that the guilt of the original aggreffion lay with France? This was a point which ought not to have come into difcuffion. He was happy here to find that against the noble Secretary's prefent arguments, he could produce his own authority in an official correfpondence during a former negotiation, the noble Lord, in a note to the French Government, exprefsly ftated that there was no reafon to go into the queftion who was right or wrong, in a preceding negotiation; the object was to negotiate upon the actual circumstances of relative fituation, and upon the real grounds in difpute. It was not Talleyrand who be

gan this contest about the original aggreffion; he did not, like our Minifters, talk in a haughty tone, and throw out fevere reproach and pointed infult: Talleyrand merely ftates, that the original aggreffion was not the queftion; and it was the poffibility of arrangement that alone ought to be confidered. The noble Secretary had, indeed, began by declaring, that to thofe who difbelieved in the French being the aggreffors, he did not addrefs himself; for those he despaired of convincing; and yet he employed two-thirds of his fpeech to prove the French were the aggreffors-unfuccefsfully, he believed, as he had forefeen, to thofe who were not of that opinion before, and fuperfluoufly, he was fure, to thofe who were of that opinion. After dwelling upon the objections to peace, the noble Secretary did not fay how it was to be obtained. The note in answer to Bonaparte's communication hinted at a mode, indeed; but what was that? Suppofe that Bonaparte, defirous to obtain peace by every means, fhould fit down to confider how he could fucceed in the object of his wifhes; what does the note, then, allow him to do? He would find, indeed, that the restoration of the hereditary line of Kings is the only cafe in which a speedy peace is admitted to be poffible: his own Government must be proved by experience, and the evidence of facts, before it is admitted to negotiate. But what is this experience and evidence of facts? Formerly fix weeks were judged fufficient; now the probation required is neither ascertained by its duration, or by the mode in which it is to be conducted. In fact, therefore, the refloration of the hereditary line of Kings was the fine qua non in which immediate negotiation was admitted by Minifters. Now let us examine this condition of peace in two points of view: Was it defirable in itfelf? and did it really remove the objections urged to negotiation? Surely if the ambition of the French Republic was fo formidable, we could not forget this ground of apprehenfion, and this fource of danger, when we talked of restoring the Houfe of Bourbon. Had we forgot the recorded charges of the Parliament of this country against the ambition of the French Monarchs at various periods? Had we forgotten their almoft proverbial ambition? And was their restoration the remedy for evils arifing from fuch a fource? Every Frenchman, however, fufpected that the restoration of the antient family would be fo clogged as to render France infignificant. Frenchmen, therefore, could not be fuppofed to enter into our views in that refpect. As to that event, if it were likely to take place, he, perhaps, differed from many noble Lords. It did not feem fo defirable as fome imagined. He did not look upon it as affording the profpect either of much fecurity to this country, nor of much tranquillity and hap