Mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The milk wagon drivers' strike, New York, November 1, 1921. 104. Failure of voluntary arbitration: an example 1 Disputes between labor and capital may be settled in a number of ways. Very frequently, the dispute terminates in a strike or lockout, in which case the two ties attempt to settle their difficulties in the open conflict of industrial warfare. The dangers and injuries which often accompany industrial warfare have led many states to enact laws providing for a varying degree of industrial mediation, conciliation and arbitration. In practically all of the legislating states, however, arbitration is purely voluntary, and often fails because either labor or capital, or both, will not consent to arbitration. An excellent example of the failure of voluntary arbitration is the strike of the milk wagon drivers in New York in November, 1921. The following extracts concerning this strike are from the New York Times: (November 1, 1921.) Sweeping aside all efforts at Federal and municipal intervention, more than 12,000 milk wagon drivers and allied workers voted overwhelmingly at a wild and uproarious mass meeting in Madison Square Garden last night to strike. The walkout went into effect at midnight. The New York Milk Conference Board, representing the distributors, immediately answered that they accepted the challenge of the unions and would run an “open shop.” The strike order which was issued to the men includes all milk distributors of New York City, Jersey City, Hoboken, Newark, ... and as far north as the Massachusetts State line, covering a territory which has within its limits a population of more than 10,000,000 persons. I. Elkin Nathans, Secretary of the Milk Conference Board, said that the [grievances between the Board and the employees had been under consideration] by Charles Bendheim, Conciliation Commissioner of the U.S. Department of Labor, but the “union delegates wouldn't listen to him. I think [the unions] should have at least left the way open to renew the negotiations, "[said Mr. Nathans.]... (November 2, 1921.) Through the efforts of Mayor John F. Hylan, the milk distributors and representatives of the milk drivers' unions 1 From the New York Times, issues of November 1, 2, 3 and 4, 1921. Territory It is will meet in conference to-day in an effort to adjust their The mayor of New differences. York The conference between the union leaders and the distributors attempts to yesterday afternoon was called by the Mayor in a telegram in which settle the , he said: “From the point of view of the public, the situation that cause of the social nearises because of this dispute between you is intolerable. What cessity of ever the merits may be, and whichever is in the right, the contro- milk. versy should be adjusted without discomfort or inconvenience to the public and without jeopardy to the health and lives of the babies, children and invalids in the community.” (November 3, 1921.) In a letter to Dr. Royal S. Copeland, The emHealth Commissioner, the milk distributors said that they could ployers re ject the not accept arbitration, believing that the situation called for per- offer of manent settlement and must be fought out. ... arbitration, Aroused by the failure of the distributors to make a settlement and are de nounced by possible, Commissioner Copeland came out of the office in a rush. the Health “The responsibility now rests on the distributors,” he said. “They Commis sioner. want to make an open shop fight on an issue that means life and death to the inhabitants of this community.” After a conference with his committeemen, [the spokesman of The strikers favor the unions] announced: "Our committee is agreeable to recommend arbitration, at the Madison Square Garden meeting to-night that the men return to work under the old agreement while a board of arbitration takes up the question of wages." Asked what he had to say to that by Dr. Copeland, Mr. Nathans but the rep resentative demanded the union's promise in writing. The Health Commissioner of the emsaid that that could be arranged, that the unions had made a "fair ployers proposition” and a “splendid suggestion,” and called upon the two Conciliation Commissioners, Charles Bendheim and Owen Brown, who were present, and they agreed that arbitration was the best plan. Mr. Nathans said that he would suggest it to the distributors, delays ac tion on this but they did not want to "wrangle for six or eight months,” asking suggestion. that a definite period be stated for the duration of the arbitration proceedings. . . . Commissioner Copeland, warning that arguments might spoil the "pleasant afternoon," suddenly adjourned the meeting and had the unions prepare in writing their proposal to return to work. .. 6 The result, as shown by the headlines of the New York Times, November 4, 1921. (November 4, 1921.) HYLAN THREATENS TO SEIZE PLANTS BRICKS RAIN ON TRUCK S. Drivers and dealers are beaten. Policemen attacked, wagons stolen. One dying, two badly hurt. People with pails are turned back from station. Small storekeepers cowed. 40 arrests, four to jail. Courts score disregard for Public, 1 105. Legal responsibility in industrial relations 1 The neces In industrial relations, as in other phases of life, experience has sity of legal shown that the combination of great power and lack of responsibility responsibility in is likely to lead to an abuse of power. Among both employees and industrial employers organization is increasingly close and strong, and though relations. this is in many ways desirable, this development increases the necessity of protecting the community against the aggressions of either labor or capital. Authorities differ as to the desirability or even possibility of so applying ordinary corporation law as to render trade unions and employers' associations legally responsible for their acts. It is believed by some, however, that it is possible to establish legal responsibility by a special form of incorporation. In the following passage Mr. Forrest R. Black outlines a proposed law which would establish such responsibility: A proposed I. Such a law ought to recognize the peculiar nature of the trade law on this subject. union as distinct from the social club, on the one hand, and from an ordinary business corporation on the other. i From Forrest R. Black, Should Trade Unions and Employers' Associations Be Made Legally Responsible? National Industrial Conference Board, Boston, June, 1920; pp. 33–35. a II. The law should expressly recognize the "identity of interest" of recogbetween the trade union as such and its members. This would give nizing the efficiency to their contracts with employers. It should be so framed "identity of interest” that a breach of a joint contract of employment would give the union between a a right of action for the damages sustained by its members through trade union resulting loss of wages or unemployment. This would virtually in- and its members. troduce arbitration by the courts in labor disputes, by creating greater mutual confidence in the stability of each other; and thus, to a certain extent, superseding the strike, which is at present practically the only remedy against a violation of the labor contract by the employer. III. The statute should specifically recognize the distinction Combative between the combative and the charitable functions of a trade union, charitable and the funds connected with the latter should be declared immune functions of the union. from attachment in a damage suit. Protected by such a limitation, if the unions are acting in good faith, we see no reason why they should not be willing to furnish as good security as they now demand of the employer. IV. A Federal labor commission should be created to supervise A Federal labor labor organizations and employers' associations, and among other commission things, to see to it that the unions do not use the benefit function proposed. as a cloak to protect the funds to be used for combative purposes. VI. The statute must distinguish between the merchant function and the employer function of those organizations that are loosely called “employers' associations.” VII. Incorporation should be voluntary. The experience of New IncorporaZealand and Australia shows that such a system, although voluntary, tion should be volunwould soon be adopted by the great majority of trade unions and tary. employers' associations. The objections to incorporation, as such, on the part of trade unions, would be overcome by the attending privileges offered, and due to the fact that employers are even now financially responsible, employers' associations would accept it [i.e. incorporation) because of the greater leverage it would give them over organized labor, and because of the stimulus that it would give to the principle of arbitration. VIII. The foregoing system should be put into effect by national and state legislation. Lack of uniformity in state statutes would Equal treatment of trade unions and employers' associations. no doubt be a serious handicap to the success of the plan, but this is one of the defects which is inherent in our system of government. At least, the proposed plan, where adopted, would be preferable to the present system. IX. Finally trade unions must be subject to the same rules of legal ability as employers' associations, in the strict use of that term. . The public welfare demands that both trade unions and employers' associations stand upon a plane of equality before the law, — and this the state can establish. It seems that the solution lies in an extension of the Roosevelt Trust Policy of “concentration and control.” We must distinguish between good and bad unions, between good and bad employers' associations. The motive of those who urge that trade unions and employers' associations be held strictly responsible for their contracts and the acts of their agents, is not to attack the institutions themselves, - but their abuses; the purpose is not to cripple the contending factions, but to protect the great consuming public of which they are only a part. Conclusion. 106. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations 1 Backwardness of compulsory arbitration in the United States. The limitations of conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration as methods of settling industrial disputes have given rise to the demand for compulsory arbitration. Those favoring compulsory arbitration are particularly insistent that this device be applied to industrial disputes which threaten to deprive the public of such vital necessities as coal, milk, etc. Compulsory arbitration is well known in Australasia, but has not been regarded with wide favor in the United States. Nevertheless, an important step toward safeguarding the right of the public was taken when in January, 1920, the Legislature of Kansas established a Court of Industrial Relations. The chief aim of the court is not to arbitrate between labor and capital, as such, but to represent the public interest in industry. The following description of the court is from the Monthly Labor Review: The action of the Legislature of Kansas of this year [1920] in a 1 From the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review. Washington, March, 1920; pp. 214–215. |