actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the partic-
ular purpose intended by the buyer. Ib.
8. Under a written contract J. was to build a road for a railroad company
for $29,000, and to have possession of the road and run and use it till
he should be paid. He completed the road, but was not paid, and,
while in possession, was forcibly ejected by the company. In an
action against it for forcible entry and detainer he had judgment.
Meantime, another company purchased the road, but before that, by a
written agreement between J. and the first company, the amount due
him under the contract was fixed at $25,000. The judgment was
affirmed by this court, but before any judgment was entered on its
mandate, the second company tendered to J. the $25,000 and interest,
which he refused, and it then filed a bill in equity, for a perpetual
injunction against J. from taking possession of the road, and obtained
an order for a temporary injunction, on paying the money tendered,
into a depository of the court, to its credit, with the right to J. to
receive the money when he pleased. J. defended the suit on the
ground that the agreement as to the $25,000 was conditional and
temporary and that the condition had not been fulfilled. The court
decreed that on the plaintiff's paying into court the costs of the suit,
and $1000 for the expenses of J. in preparing to take possession of the
road, a perpetual injunction should issue. Both parties appealed.
Held, (1) The agreement as to the $25,000 was binding on J.; and its
terms could not be varied, by showing a contemporaneous verbal
understanding that the $25,000 was to be paid in cash in a limited
time; (2) The tender and the payment into court changed the con-
dition of affairs, and the right of J. to possession of the road ceased;
(3) The case was distinguishable from that of Ballance v. Forsyth, 24
How. 183; and like that of Parker v. The Judges, 12 Wheat. 561.
(4) The appeal by the plaintiff did not involve an amount sufficient to
give this court jurisdiction. Johnson v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain &c.
Railway, 602.
9. A contract of agency, which leaves the agent free to terminate his rela-
tions with the principal upon reasonable notice, must be construed to
confer the same right upon the principal, unless provisions to the con-
trary are stipulated. Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing,
10. A provision in a contract, otherwise terminable upon reasonable notice,
that a violation of the spirit of the agreement shall be a sufficient
cause for its abrogation, does not imply that it can be abrogated only
for sufficient cause. Ib.
11. The plaintiff in error by contract appointed the defendant in error
"its exclusive vendor" for its machines in a defined territory; agreed
to sell the machines to him at a large discount from its retail New
York prices; and not to "knowingly supply its goods at a discount to
go within that territory." The defendant in error accepted the appoint-
VOL. CXLI-45
ment; agreed to pay for the machines at the discount rate; not to
sell them below the said retail rate; and not to solicit orders within
the territory of other agents. Held, that the agreement constituted
him agent within the defined territory.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
LACHES ;
LOCAL LAW, 2;
PAYMENT.
1. The degree of care required of directors of corporations depends upon
the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case is to be deter-
mined in view of all the circumstances. Briggs v. Spaulding, 132.
2. Directors of a corporation are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents
whom they appoint, who become by such appointment agents of the
corporation; nor can they be held responsible for losses resulting
from the wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents,
unless the loss is a consequence of their own neglect of duty. 1b.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
LIMITED LIABILITY, 7.
NATIONAL BANK.
COURT AND JURY.
See EVIDENCE, 4;
PAYMENT, 2.
COURTS OF A STATE.
See JUDGMENT, 2.
JURISDICTION, A, 7.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
A person appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, under the provisions of the act of May 17, 1884, 23
Stat. 24, c. 53, § 3, to be the judge of the District Court of the District
of Alaska, is not a judge of a court of the United States within the
meaning of the exception in section 1768 of the Revised Statutes,
relating to the tenure of office of civil officers, and was, prior to its
repeal, subject to removal before the expiration of his term of office
by the President, in the manner and upon the conditions set forth in
that section. McAllister v. United States, 174.
CRIMINAL LAW.
See JURISDICTION, E, 1.
1. In fixing the classification of goods for the payment of duties, the name
or designation of the goods is to be understood in its known commer-
cial sense; and their denomination in the market will control their
classification without regard to their scientific designation, the mate-
rial of which they may be made, or the use to which they may be
applied. American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 468.
2. Gilling twine, when imported as gilling, for the manufacture of gill
nets, is liable only to the duty of 25 per cent under the act of March
3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488. Ib.
3. Statements made in Congress by the promoters of a customs-act are
inadmissible as bearing upon its construction; but the proceedings
therein may be referred to to inform the court of the reasons for fix-
ing upon a specific rate of duty. Ib.
4. Where a customs-act imposes a duty upon an article by a specific name,
general terms in the act, though sufficiently broad to cover it, are not
applicable to it. Ib.
5. In cases of doubt in the construction of a customs-act, the courts resolve
the doubt in favor of the importer. Ib.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 11 to 18;
PRACTICE, 3.
DISTRICT JUDGE OF ALASKA.
See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. An admitted or clearly established misapprehension of law in the mak-
ing of a contract creates a basis for the interference of a court of
equity, resting on its discretion, and to be exercised only in uuques-
tionable and flagrant cases. Griswold v. Hazard, 260.
2. Whether laches is to be imputed to a party seeking the aid of a court
of equity depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Ib.
3. In this case it is held on the evidence that the bond given by Griswold
in the ne exeat proceeding conditioned that the defendant in that pro-
ceeding should "abide and perform the orders and decrees" of the
court, was executed by him under such an apprehension of the obliga-
tions in law assumed by him in executing and delivering it, as to make
it the duty of a court of equity to reform it so as to make him liable
for the penal sum named, only in the event that the principal failed to
appear and become subject to the orders and decrees of the court; but
that, the defendant in the suit in which the ne exeat was issued having
died, and such a decree being therefore inappropriate and Griswold
being guilty of no laches, a decree should be entered perpetually en-
joining the prosecution of any action, suit or proceeding to make him
liable in any sum on or by reason of said bond.
lb.
4. D. was sued in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island by stockholders in
the Credit Mobilier for an accounting and payment of what might be
found due on the accounting, for securities and moneys coming into
his hands as president of the Credit Mobilier. The receiver of that
company in Pennsylvania released him from such liability. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island would not allow that release to be
interposed as a defence. Held, that the error, if any, in this respect
could not be corrected by bill in equity filed by a surety on a bond
given to release D. when arrested on ne exeat proceedings in that
Rhode Island suit. Ib.
5. A holder of the legal title to real estate who has no equitable interest
therein, cannot, by his act done without the knowledge or consent of
the holder of the equitable title, who is in possession of and resid-
ing on the premises, claiming title, rescind a completed settlement of
a mortgage debt on the premises so as to bind the holder of the equi-
table title, and prevent him from setting up defences which would
otherwise be open to him. McLean v. Clapp, 429.
6. A decree of foreclosure and sale, made by a Circuit Court, on a rail-
road mortgage, provided that the purchaser should pay off all claims
incurred by the receiver, and that all such claims should be barred
unless presented within six months after the confirmation of the sale.
On the sale the property was bought by the appellants. The decree
confirming the sale provided that a deed should be given, and the
purchasers should take the property, aad the deed should recite that
they took it, subject to all claims incurred by the receiver. After the
six months had expired, the appellee filed a petition to recover dam-
ages for an injury sustained by him, as a passenger on the road,
through the negligence of the employés of the receiver. The expira-
tion of the six months was set up as a bar to the claim. It did not
appear that the purchasers objected to the terms of the decree of
confirmation, or appealed to this court from that decree. Held, that
the Circuit Court had discretion to abrogate the six months' limita-
tion, and to decree that the purchasers should pay the claim, as the
receiver had been discharged. Olcott v. Headrick, 543.
7. The plaintiff in his bill set up in himself a legal title to real estate derived
from the State of Louisiana to which it had been listed as swamp or
overflowed lands; averred that the respondents claimed the same land
under certain old French grants which had been recognized by the
Land Office as valid; and prayed that he might be declared to be the
owner and put in possession of the premises, and have an accounting
for rents and profits. Held, that on these averments he had a plain,
adequate and complete remedy at law, and that the bill must be dis-
missed. Smyth v. New Orleans Canal and Banking Co., 656.
See CONTRACT, 8;
LACHES ;
RAILROAD;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. The objection that the record of proceedings in a court of record offered
in evidence should not be received in evidence, on the ground that the
transcript was incomplete, or was improperly authenticated, should be
raised in the court below; and if not raised there cannot be taken
here for the first time. Carpenter v. Strange, 87.
2. When the defence in an action for goods sold and delivered to an agent
of the defendant is a denial that any such sale was made, the burden
is on the plaintiff throughout the case to prove every essential part of
the transaction, including the authority of the alleged agent to make
the alleged purchase in the manner alleged. Schutz v. Jordan, 213.
3. The presumption that a letter properly directed and mailed reached its
destination at the proper time and was duly received by the person to
whom it was addressed is a presumption of fact, subject to control and
limitation by other facts. Ib.
4. When, in an action to recover on a contract, testimony is admitted with-
out objection, showing the alleged contract to have been made, but on
a day different from that averred in the declaration, and the court
directs a verdict for the defendant without amendment of the declara-
tion, such ruling is not erroneous by reason of the variation. Davis
v. Patrick, 479.
5. Parol testimony is admissible to show the circumstances under which a
written instrument was executed, or that it was, in fact, without con-
sideration. Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 564.
6. Circumstances attending the execution of a receipt in full of all de-
mands, may be given in evidence to show that by mistake it was
made to express more than was intended, and that the creditor had, in
fact, claims that were not included.
See CONTRACT, 6;
CUSTOMS DUTY, 3;
EXCEPTION.
See LOCAL LAW, 2.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
This case is affirmed on the facts. Evans v. State Bank, 107.
FOOD INSPECTION LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5.
|