Opinion of the Court.

(1) Plaintiff in error relies in this connection upon the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, determining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, which provides in section 3, that "every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed." It is difficult to see what right can be claimed by the receiver under this act. The right he claims is immunity from suit without the prior leave of the court appointing him; but this is a right not given by the statute, but in obedience to a general and familiar principle of law recognized by this court in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; and Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126. The right conferred by the statute to sue without the prior leave of the court, is not given to the defendant, but to the plaintiff, and the only question which could properly arise under the act in this case is, whether the receiver so sued could be held liable for the acts of a prior receiver. The act does not deprive any one of the right to sue where such right previously existed, but gives such right in certain cases, and it was for the court to say whether the plaintiff's cause of action fell within the statute, or whether the defendant was entitled to the exemption given him by the general law. Had the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that under this act the defendant could not be sued without the prior leave of the Federal court, the plaintiff might doubtless have obtained a writ of error from this court upon the ground that he had been denied a right given him by a "statute" of the United States (Rev. Stat. § 709), but it does not follow that the other party is entitled to the same remedy. The case in this particular is analogous to that of Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, decided at the last term, in which we held that it was only the party whose right under a statute had been denied who was entitled to a writ of error to review the final judg ment of the state court.

(2) But, while we think that plaintiff in error is not entitled to immunity by virtue of the statute of 1887, we are authorized

Opinion of the Court.

any

by Revised Statutes, sec. 709, to review the final judgment or decree of a state court where "any title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party under such authority,

"etc. Now, as McNulta was exercising an authority as receiver under an order of the Federal court, and claimed immunity as such receiver from suit without the previous leave of such court, and the decision was adverse to such claim, he is entitled to a review of such ruling whether his claim be founded upon the statute or upon principles of general jurisprudence. We regard this as a legitimate deduction from the opinions of this court in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 421; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1; Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266; and Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628. The motion to dismiss must therefore be denied.

(3) But, as there was, for the reasons above stated, color for the motion to dismiss, we are at liberty to inquire whether there is any foundation for the position of the receiver in this case that he is not liable to suit without permission of the Federal court, and we are of the opinion that there is not. The act of March 3, 1887, declares that "every receiver may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which said receiver or manager was appointed." We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that it was not intended by the word "his" to limit the right to sue to cases where the cause of action arose from the conduct of the receiver himself or his agents; but that with respect to the question of liability he stands in place of the corporation. His position is somewhat analogous to that of a corporation sole, with respect to which it is held by the authorities that actions will lie by and against the actual incumbents of such corporations for causes of action accruing under their predecessors in office. Polk v. Plummer, 2 Humphreys, 500; Jansen v. Ostrander, 1 Cowen, 670. If

Syllabus.

actions were brought against the receivership generally or against the corporation by name, "in the hands of," or "in the possession of,” a receiver without stating the name of the individual, it would more accurately represent the character or status of the defendant. So long as the property of the corporation remains in the custody of the court and is administered through the agency of a receiver, such receivership is continuous and uninterrupted until the court relinquishes its hold upon the property, though its personnel may be subject to repeated changes. Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership, or the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeasances, negligences and liabilities are official and not personal, and judgments against him as receiver are payable only from the funds in his hands. As the right given by the statute to sue for the acts and transactions of the receivership is unlimited, we cannot say that it should be restricted to causes of action arising from the conduct of the receiver against whom the suit is brought, or his agents.

The defence is frivolous, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois must be

Affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE GRAY, having been absent when this case was submitted, took no part in its decision.

MAGOWAN v. NEW YORK BELTING AND PACKING COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 30. Argued October 14, 15, 1891. - Decided October 26, 1891.

Letters patent No. 86,296, granted to the New York Belting and Packing Company, as assignee of Dennis C. Gately, the inventor, January 26. 1869, for "improvements in vulcanized india-rubber packing," involved invention, and were valid.

Opinion of the Court.

The Gately packing explained in view of prior packings.

The fact considered, that that packing went at once into such an extensive public use, as almost to supersede all packings made under other methods, and that it was put upon the market at a price from 15 to 20 per cent higher than the old packings, although it cost 10 per cent less to produce it.

IN EQUITY. To restrain the infringement of letters patent, and for an account. Decree in complainant's favor, from which respondent appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. F. C. Lowthorp for appellant.

Mr. B. F. Lee for appellee. Mr. W. H. L. Lee was with

him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit in equity, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, by the New York Belting and Packing Company, a Connecticut corporation, against Allen Magowan, Spencer M. Alpaugh and Frank A. Magowan, to recover for the infringement of letters patent No. 86,296, granted January 26, 1869, to the plaintiff, as assignee of Dennis C. Gately, the inventor, for "improvements in vulcanized india-rubber packing."

The specification says:

"My invention relates to packing of the kind for which letters patent were issued to Charles McBurney on the 28th of June, 1859. This packing, which is usually employed in the stuffing-boxes of pistons, is composed of piles of cloth or canvas, cut bias, coated with rubber, and pressed together and vulcanized. When thus made, the packing is very solid, and possesses but little elastic property, so that, as it wears, there is some difficulty in maintaining a tight joint between it and the piston. To obviate this disadvantage is the object of my invention, which consists in forming the packing with a backing of pure vulcanized rubber, or rubber of sufficient elasticity for the purpose desired, which may be covered and protected by a strip of canvas or other suitable fabric.

Opinion of the Court.

"In the drawing a represents the ordinary packing-band, which is backed by the rubber strip b, the whole being vulcanized together, so as to be solidly united; and the rubber may be covered, if desired, by the canvas strip c, to protect it from injury.

"When the packing is placed in the stuffing-box and around the piston, and the follower is screwed down, so as to compress the packing, the rubber strip will also be compressed, and forced against the sides of the stuffing-box, and, as it cannot expand in the direction of the follower, it acts as a spring to hold the packing against the piston-rod, and to prevent leakage, compensating for any slight wear in the packing, and making a tight joint between the rod and the packing.

"It would be manifestly impracticable to impart this quality of elasticity to the body of the packing, or that part which is in contact with, or bears against the rod, but by backing it with an elastic cushion, which, upon being compressed between the follower and the sides of the stuffing-box, acts as above described, the packing is possessed of every qualification required for its successful use, and a tighter and better joint is made than has heretofore been practicable."