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find occasion to dig excavations, construct reservoirs, provide fishponds, plant and cultivate fruit trees, erect and maintain useful structures, instruments, and machinery, all of which are alluring, attractive, and dangerous to children, yet it could not be claimed that he must constantly guard these things against the approach of persons coming without license or invitation, and attracted by mere curiosity or pleasure, or suffer in damages for any injury they might receive."

In Greene v. Linton (1894) 7 Misc. 272, 27 N. Y. Supp. 891, the owner of a vacant, unfenced city lot upon which children were in the habit of playing, was held not liable for the death of a six-year-old child, who, while sailing a toy boat in a cesspool on the premises, fell in and was drowned.

In Selve v. Pilosi (1916) 253 Pa. 571, 98 Atl. 723, a nonsuit was held properly granted in an action for the death of a six-year-old boy, drowned in an unguarded vault on the rear of a lot, which, in consequence of a protracted rainfall, had become filled with water, where it was not shown that there was anything on the lot to attract children, or that children were known or permitted to play there, or that the vault had been filled with water prior to the accident, or that the owner knew it had become filled with water.

In Cœur d'Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson (1914) L.R.A.1915A, 731, 131 C. C. A. 316, 215 Fed. 8 (9th C.), one having on his property, where there had formerly been a sawmill, a cistern or well which had been used for the storage of water in connection with the mill, and in which, in consequence of the obstruction of its outlet, water had backed up so as not only to fill the cistern to a depth of about 10 feet, but also to form a pool with a rim of shallow water 6 or 8 inches deep, the well at the bottom of which, by reason of the muddiness of the water and the sawdust floating in the pool, was not visible,-was held liable for the death of a seven-yearold boy, who, with other children, went on the property to play on the

sawdust pile there, as children had been in the custom of doing, and afterward waded in the pool, and then went into the water to swim, and was drowned in the deep water.

233. Portable furnace.

Burning of child attracted to, see Crane v. South Suburban Gas Co. [1916] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 33, 32 Times L. R. 74, 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. 172, 114 L. T. N. S. 71, 80 J. P. 51, 60 Sol. Jo. 222, 14 L. G. R. 382; Porter v. AnheuserBusch Brewing Asso. (1886) 24 Mo. App. 1, under heading, "Fire."

234. Post.

See also "Brick pillars."

In Keegan V. Luzerne County (1895) 8 Kulp (Pa.) 160, it was held that there was no liability for injury to an eight-year-old boy, caused by the falling of an ornamental urn on top of an iron street post, which he had climbed in order to get a better view of a parade, the court saying that the doctrine that a child of tender years cannot, under any circumstances, be treated as a wrongdoer or trespasser, so as to preclude him from asserting negligence in another which has resulted in injury for which he seeks damages, is not the law.

235. Post holes.

Caving in of, see Secard v. Rhinelander Lighting Co. (1911) 147 Wis. 614, 133 N. W. 45, under heading, "Cave-in."

Child falling into, see Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Teleph. Co. (1912) 23 N. D. 6, L.R.A.1918C, 1063, 135 N. W. 793, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 680, under heading, "Excavation."

236. Power house.

Injury to child by machinery in, see Curtis V. Tenino Stone Quarries (1905) 37 Wash. 355, 79 Pac. 955, under heading, "Cogwheels."

237. Powder. See "Blasting powder."

238. Powder magazine.

In Chambers v. Milner Coal & R. Co. (1905) 143 Ala. 255, 39 So. 170, an action for the death of a ten-yearold child who had been burned to

death by powder stored in a magazine on private property, a charge that "the defendant had the right to store this powder in the magazine and keep it there, and there was no absolute duty resting on it to keep it locked or guarded from access by children or others, unless the situation and surroundings would reasonably indicate to an ordinarily prudent person in charge of such magazine that it might be tampered with and ignited so as to cause injury to children or others. The duty of the defendant in this regard depends entirely on the surrounding circumstances which may be in evidence, and of this, the jury are the judges,"was held not to be too favorable to the defendant, where it appeared that the magazine was built of brick and stone, and was located in a woods, not in a populous community, and from 50 to 75 yards from the highway, and within 6 feet of a path seldom traveled; that the powder had been so damaged by wetting that it was nonexplosive, but merely combustible, and that the child's clothing caught fire from it because he was standing in the door.

239. Precipice.

In Mackey v. Vicksburg (1887) 64 Miss. 777, 2 So. 178, it was held to be a question for the jury whether defendant, in digging dirt from a hill and depositing it in the rear of a lot, by which a child of six was enabled and invited to escape from an inclosure thereon and go upon a precipitous and dangerous path along the hill to a point from which it fell and was hurt, had done what was reasonably calculated to entice the child, following its instincts or curiosity or love of liberty, to escape from the yard and enter upon the dangerous path. The court said: "If the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable forethought, could have anticipated the probability of the child's action, it should have guarded against the danger by removing the earth or obstructing the pathway. If it failed so to do, it failed in a duty which rested upon it, and is not relieved from responsibility

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In Lineburg v. St. Paul (1898) 71 Minn. 245, 73 N. W. 723, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 64, it was held that a city is not bound to maintain such a barrier along the edge of a precipice within the line of the street that children cannot surmount it or crawl through it, even though they may be in the habit of going over or through the fence which was there, and down the precipice to play in the sand below.

In Craig v. Beveridge [1914] 2 Scot. L. T. 435, [1915] 1 Scot. L. T. 230, the owner of premises upon which children were, to the knowledge of the owner, in the habit of playing, was held not liable for the death of a child who was killed while playing football, by falling over an unfenced drop of 5 feet 6 inches.

240. Pulleys.

See "Blocks and tackle;" "Hoisting apparatus;" "Iron wheel." Injury to child by cable running over, see "Cable."

241. Pump house.

Drowning of boy in pit in, see Shawnee v. Cheek (1913) 41 Okla. 227, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 672, 137 Pac. 724, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 290, under heading, "Buildings."

242. Pumping machinery.

In Henderson v. Continental Ref. Co. (1908) 219 Pa. 384, 123 Am. St. Rep. 668, 68 Atl. 968, the liability of the owner of a lot on which a house was located, who had placed near a path leading from the house pumping machinery which was not covered or guarded, and with which contact would be dangerous, for the death of a boy of seven, who went to the house to see a playmate who lived there, and, finding that he was not at home, went out into the lot, and, in some unexplained way, was caught in the machinery,-was held to be a question for the jury. The court said: “We do not think the facts in this case bring it within the line of the decisions in which it is held that the landowner owes no duty of protection to those who may be upon the premises.

I

Under the circumstances it can hardly be said that the child was where he had no right to be. The entire tract of land, including the two houses and the ground between them, belonged to the defendant company. As has already been noted, one of the houses was built with a side door and porch opening directly upon the vacant lot, and from the other house, a gate placed in the fence opened from that side directly into the lot. The door provided upon one side, and the gate upon the other, certainly were sufficient to indicate to tenants in the houses, to their families and guests, an implied permission, or invitation, to enter upon and cross the vacant lot. As a matter of fact, under this permission it was used for years to such an extent that a path was worn across the lot between the two houses. The lot was also permitted to be used as a playground for the children of the tenants in the houses, and by the other children. After permitting this use of the property for several years, the defendant company, according to the testimony, erected this dangerous piece of machinery right upon, or close to, the pathway between the two houses. It did not inclose or guard the machinery, nor did it shut up the door or that gate leading from the houses to the lot. It seems to have done nothing to give notice that the permissive use of its land as a passageway and playground was to be discontinued. Upon the day of the accident, plaintiff's son went to the home of the tenant living in the northern house, upon a lawful errand, to see a member of the family. On leaving, he passed through the side gate on to the lot, the existence of the gate being apparently an invitation to him to go out in that way. His attention would be naturally attracted to the curious machinery located on or near the path, and but a few feet away. A fair inference is that headlessly, or without appreciating the danger, the child ventured too near, and was injured. Under these circumstances, he cannot fairly be regarded as a mere trespasser. The lot was really

an appurtenance to the two houses, and was a part of the curtilage. It was not only so used by the occupants of the houses, and their visitors, but it was expected that it should be so used, because of the arrangements made to enter upon it from the sides of the houses. The language which counsel for defendant company cite as defining the term 'invitation' seems to fit very closely the facts of this case, so that the inference may well be drawn that the child 'entered the premises because he was led to believe that they were intended to be used by visitors, and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner or person in possession and control of the premises, but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the place was adapted and prepared or allowed to be used.'"

In Hamilton v. Hermand Oil Co. (1893) 20 Sc. Sess. Cas. 4th series, 995, 30 Scot. L. R. 854, 1 Scot. L. T. 154, the owners of a dangerous pump working near where children were entitled to play were held liable for the death of a child in consequence of their failure to fence it securely.

But in Houck v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (1906) 116 Mo. App. 559, 92 S. W. 738, it was held that the doctrine of the Turntable Cases could not be invoked in favor of a boy nine or ten years of age, whose arm was caught and broken in machinery at a railroad pumping station, where the machinery was inclosed in a building remote from any residence, was in charge of a competent engineer, and was not of a kind especially attractive to children, and the injured boy had entered the building after being told to leave the premises.

And in Pennington v. Little Pirate Oil & Gas Co. (1920) 106 Kan. 569, 189 Pac. 137, the attractive-nuisance doctrine was held not to apply in the case of injury to a boy whose father was employed to care for and operate pumping machinery inclosed in an iron house, and who, while accompanying an older brother, who went to shut off the engine, was caught in a belt, it appearing that the children

had been repeatedly warned by their parents of the danger of close approach to the plant, and told to keep away from it.

243. Push cars.

See "Hand cars and push cars."

244. Putting shot.

In Coburn v. Hardwick (1902) 1 Ont. Week. Rep. 733, one of a number of men amusing themselves on the street by throwing or "putting" an iron ball or shot weighing about 23 pounds across the road was held liable for an injury sustained by a boy of ten, who, engaged with other boys in retrieving the ball, had a finger mashed in endeavoring to stop a ball thrown by the defendant.

245. Pyramid.

Of barrels, see "Barrels."

246. Quagmire.

In Dehanitz v. St. Paul (1898) 73 Minn. 385, 76 N. W. 48, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 655, it was held that the turntable doctrine did not apply in a case in which a ten-year-old girl left the highway to go across land used by a city as a dumping ground for garbage and manure, which formed a crust over an excavation filled with water, which gave way beneath her, there being nothing alluring or enticing upon the premises. It would seem, however, that the reason why the city was not held liable is to be found in the fact, alluded to by the court, that it was performing a public corporate duty in removing garbage and manure from the business and residence parts of the city as a protection against disease.

.

The owner of an iron ore washer who has left unguarded a slush pond which has become crusted over and grown up in grass and weeds to such an extent that it is enticing to live stock, knowing that animals lawfully in the neighborhood are likely to be attracted thereto, may be liable for the death of an animal which strayed thereon, mired up, and died. Auxford Brown Ore Co. v. Hudson (1917) 16 Ala. App. 245, 77 So. 243.

247. Quarry.

Drowning in accumulation of water in, see Cochran v. Kankakee Stone & Lime Co. (1913) 179 Ill. App. 437; Stendal v. Boyd (1897) 67 Minn. 279, 69 N. W. 899, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 94, S. c. upon subsequent appeal in (1898) 73 Minn. 53, 42 L.R.A. 288, 72 Am. St. Rep. 597, 75 N. W. 735; Overholt v. Vieths (1887) 93 Mo. 422, 3 Am. St. Rep. 557, 6 S. W. 74; Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (1896) 134 Mo. 651, 33 L.R.A. 755, 56 Am. St. Rep. 543, 36 S. W. 659; Rallo v. Heman Constr. Co. (1921) 291 Mo. 221, 236 S. W. 632; Ansell v. Philadelphia (1923) 276 Pa. 370, 120 Atl. 277; Doyle v. Chattanooga (1913) 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S. W. 997, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 283, 4 N. C. C. A. 167; Holland v. Lanarkshire Middle Ward Dist. Council [1909] S. C. 1142, 46 Scot. L. R. 758, [1909] 2 Scot. L. T. 7.

Injury by blasting powder kept in quarry, see Dudley v. Hawkins (1916) Tex. Civ. App. 183 S. W. 776,

under heading, "Blasting powder." Injury to child on cars used in, see Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co. (1924) Cal. App. -, 226 Pac. 28, under heading, "Moving cars;" Morrison v. Phelps Stone Co. (1920) 203 Mo. App. 142, 219 S. W. 393, under heading, "Standing cars."

In Magner v. Frankford Baptist Church (1896) 174 Pa. 84, 34 Atl. 456, it was held that the owner of land was under no duty to protect an infant trespasser from the possible danger of falling into a quarry on adjoining property coming up to the boundary line.

248. Quicklime,

See "Lime."

249. Race.

See "Mill race."

250. Raft.

On pond, see Peters v. Bowman (1896) 115 Cal. 349, 56 Am. St. Rep. 106, 47 Pac. 113, 598, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 4; Hanna v. Iowa C. R. Co. (1906) 129 Ill. App. 134; Linnberg v. Rock Island (1907) 136 Ill. App. 495 (upon subsequent appeal in (1910) 157 III. App. 527); Richards v. Connell (1895)

45 Neb. 467, 63 N. W. 917; Omaha v. Richards (1896) 49 Neb. 244, 68 N. W. 528, affirmed on rehearing in (1897) 50 Neb. 804, 70 N. W. 363; Robbins v. Omaha (1916) 100 Neb. 439, 160 N. W. 749; Cooper v. Overton (1899) 102 Tenn. 222, 45 L.R.A. 591, 73 Am. St. Rep. 864, 52 S. W. 183; Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1916) 89 Wash. 304, L.R.A.1916D, 443, 154 Pac. 441, 12 N. C. C. A. 966, under heading, "Ponds."

251. Railing.

Injury to child by falling of shaft used as, see Warrenton v. Smith (1919) 23 Ga. App. 241, 98 S. E. 91, reversed in (1919) 149 Ga. 567, 101 S. E. 681, on ground of governmental function, under heading, "Unstable equilibrium."

On bridge permitting child to fall into attractive stream, see Comer v. Winston-Salem (1919) 178 N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619, under heading, "Bridge."

252. Railroad cars.

See "Moving cars," "Standing cars."

253. Railroad cut.

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254. Railroad depot.

A railroad depot is not a place which allures children of tender years, or holds out to them an implied invitation or special attraction to visit it; and a railroad company is therefore not under any duty of active vigilance toward a child less than three years of age, who goes upon the platform without the knowledge of the company's servants, and leans against a car, so that it is injured when the train starts. Ling v. Great Northern R. Co. (1908) 165 Fed. 813 (C. C. D. Mont.).

In Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Schwindling (1882) 101 Pa. 258, 47 Am. Rep. 706, a railroad company was held not liable for injury to a boy between five and six years of age, who, while upon a station platform for his own amusement, was struck by a bent stirrup iron on the side of a passing 36 A.L.R.-16.

freight car, and knocked under the wheels, on the ground that the company owed him no duty to protect him from an accident from such a

cause.

255. Railroad ties.

See "Ties."

256. Railroad tracks and premises.

See also "Cattle dip;" "Roundhouse;" "Third rail;" "Trestle;" "Turntable."

Accumulation of water in excavation on, see Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Beavers (1901) 113 Ga. 398, 54 L.R.A. 314, 39 S. E. 82, 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 8, under heading, "Pools."

Abutment on, as attractive nuisance, see Shaw v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (1916) Mo., 184 S. W. 1151, and Williamson v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (1905) 40 Tex. Civ. App. 18, 88 S. W. 279, under heading, "Abutments."

Fall of child from retaining wall, see Coon v. Kentucky & I. Terminal R. Co. (1913) 163 Ky. 223, L.R.A. 1915C, 160, 173 S. W. 325, under heading, "Retaining wall."

Fall of gate in stockyard, see Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Bockoven

(1894) 53 Kan. 279, 36 Pac. 342, un

der heading, “Gate.”

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Burning of child by fire on, see Smith v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1916) 177 Iowa, 243, L.R.A.1917F, 1033, 158 N. W. 546; Kalz v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. (1899) 76 Minn. 351, 79 N. W. 310; Erickson v. Great Northern R. Co. (1900) 82 Minn. 60, 51 L.R.A. 645, 83 Am. St. Rep. 810, 86 N. W. 462; Madden v. Boston & M. R. Co. (1912) 76 N. H. 379, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1058, 83 Atl. 129, under heading, "Fire."

Injury by torpedoes found on, see "Torpedoes."

Injury to child playing with hand car or push car on, see "Hand cars and push cars."

Pile of ties on, see Great Northern R. Co. v. Willard (1917) 171 C. C. A. 564, 238 Fed. 714; Tomlinson v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. (1918) 143 La. 641, 79 So. 174; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Edwards (1896) 90 Tex. 65, 32 L.R.A. 825, 36 S. W. 430; Jenkins v. Great Western R. Co. [1912] 1 K. B.

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